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Dating Violence Policy: Making the Grade
RICHARD HOEFER
BEVERLY BLACK

University of Texas at Arlington
School of Social Work
MASHOOQ SALEHIN

Radford University
Social Work
Dating violence rates affect an unacceptably high percentage of
youth. This paper tests a model to understand the considerable
variationin state dating violence policy comprehensiveness. Independent variables in the model are state political culture, partisan
control of political institutions, prevalence of dating violence, and
median household income. Bivariate results show partial support
for preliminary hypotheses. Regression analysis indicates that
strength of DemocraticParty control of governmental institutions
is the only variablein the model that achievedstatisticalsignificance.
Implicationsand recommendationsfor future researchare provided.
Key words: dating violence, social policy, political culture, political party influence in policy-making
Dating violence among adolescents is a serious public
health concern that occurs across all social, economic, cultural,
and ethnic groups (Silverman, Raj, Mucci, & Hathaway, 2001).
Some studies suggest that up to 40 percent of high school students have had experiences with dating violence (Hickman,
Jaycox, & Aronoff, 2004). The Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance
(YRBS) survey reported that, in the United States, about 10
percent of high school students experience physical abuse
such as being slapped, hit, or physically hurt on purpose by
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, December 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 4
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their boyfriend or girlfriend (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention [CDC], 2008). Dating violence affects teens' physical and psychological development and well-being (Callahan,
Tolman, & Saunders, 2003), and threatens the stability of communities (Desjarlais, Eisenberg, Good, & Kleinman, 1995;
Fischbach & Herbert, 1997; Krug, Dahlberg, Mercy, Zwi, &
Lozano, 2002). Strong correlations exist between youth being
victimized by physical dating violence and higher levels of
depression, and poorer educational outcomes (Banyard &
Cross, 2008; Filson, Ulloa, Runfola, & Hokoda, 2010); such
youth are also more likely to engage in risky behaviors, including episodic heavy drinking, sexual intercourse, attempted
suicide, pregnancy, smoking and physical fighting, than nonvictimized youth (CDC, 2006).
Studies on teen dating violence often concentrate on the
impact of victimization, help-seeking, risk and protective
factors, and the evaluation of prevention efforts or interventions. Few studies (Campbell, 2005; Largio, 2007) have focused
on policy issues related to dating violence, and we know little
about what influences the content of dating violence policies.
Examination of the factors associated with more comprehensive dating violence policies across the United States may help
us better understand how to promote policies to address the
alarming rates of adolescent dating violence. In this study, we
examine the influence of a number of variables on the comprehensiveness of states' dating violence policies.
All fifty states in the USA have some form of domestic violence civil protection order legislation. Legal policies to address
adolescent dating violence are often embedded in those domestic violence policies (Sousa, 1999). Dating violence policies
vary dramatically from state to state (Break the Cycle, 2010).
States developing adolescent dating violence policies face
significant challenges. The definition of dating violence is challenging in itself. There are few definitions of what constitutes
a dating relationship. For example, adolescent dating relationships are often brief, so youth differ in their conceptions
of dating. Teens also use different words for dating relationships, and the words describing dating partners change frequently and vary in different parts of the country (Pittman,
Wolfe, & Wekerle, 2000). Definitions of violence are difficult to
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capture. Adolescents may form different opinions and judgments about violent incidents based on the context of the situation. Culture also plays a vital role in adolescents' perceptions
of what constitutes violent incidents (Lee, Takaku, Ottati, &
Yan, 2004). Another challenge to developing dating violence
policies is the use of specific language and terms (i.e., dating
violence) so teens understand that these policies exist to help
them (Largio, 2007).
None of the foregoing research addresses the determinants
of dating violence policy, specifically, or of intimate partner
violence policy more generally. Given these differences in policies between states and the lack of prior research to explore
the topic, it is natural to wonder what relates to the variation
between states on this policy issue. In this study, we examine
the comprehensiveness of each state's dating violence policies,
and relate the policies to the prevalence of dating violence and
other policy-relevant variables.
Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework examines factors internal to the
particular state, a common strategy for comparative state policy
research (Matisoff, 2008; Wiener & Koontz, 2010). According
to Weiner and Koontz (2010), the internal determinants approach studies characteristics of states that occur within those
states' borders. Typical factors include problem severity, social
and cultural history, economic conditions, and political party
strength. While these variables have been tested in many different policy arenas, only a few are used in any one study. As
there appears to be no extant research on the determinants of
dating violence prevention policy particularly, we look at four
variables that are internal to the state in this research: political
culture, partisan control of government institutions, problem
prevalence, and state socio-economic level.
Political Culture
A state's political culture refers to its inhabitants' orientations toward key objects of the political system and toward
the individual's role in that political system (Almond & Verba,
1965; Silver & Dowley, 2000). Political culture consists of political views, characteristics, and the core values which are shared
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by individuals within a society, and it influences the social and
legal policies of a society (Fisher & Pratt, 2006; Mead, 2004;
Shock, 2008).
Elazar's (1972) theory describes three subcultures relating to the purpose and role of government in the United
States: moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic. The core
value of moralistic political culture is the concept of "commonwealth," which is that citizens have an obligation to
participate in government. It stresses the commitment to communal power and believes in government intervention into
any activities considered antithetical to the public interest
(Elazar, 1972). States with a predominantly moralistic political
culture are likely to have a higher level of political liberalism,
with less political corruption and more progressive political
attitudes (Elazar, 1972).
The individualistic political culture is characterized
by private entrepreneurship and conservative values.
Individualistic political culture considers politics as a specialized activity for professionals, with the expectation of limited
participation by the general public (Elazar, 1972). States with
individualistic political culture tend to embrace limited government intervention into private activities.
Traditionalistic culture upholds the paternalistic and elitist
values that encourage a hierarchical society. It accepts government's positive role for the community and welfare of its
citizens. However, the traditionalistic political culture emphasizes securing and maintaining the existing social order, which
includes male dominance in the family and workplace (Elazar,
1972). Participation of citizens in politics is expected to remain
within society's elites.
State political culture has been found to be a significant determinant of policies relating to the death penalty (Fisher &
Pratt, 2006), the stringency of voter identification laws (Hale &
McNeal, 2010), educational policy (Louis, Thomas, Gordon, &
Febey, 2008), the implementation of the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families program (Mead, 2004), and the agendasetting impact of newspaper coverage (Tan & Weaver, 2009).
Partisancontrol of governmental institutions.The term "governmental institutions" in this study refers to the political
governing bodies in the states, i.e., the legislative assemblies
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and the governorships. Partisan control of these governmental institutions shapes the policies that emerge from the give
and take of lawmaking. The Republican and the Democratic
Parties are associated with conservative and liberal values, respectively. In recent decades, the Democratic Party has been
linked with liberalism and progressiveness and the willingness to use government policy to decrease the severity of
social problems (such as dating violence) (Fowler, 2004). On
the other hand, the Republican Party has been more connected
with laissez-faire policies, fiscal conservatism, and the promotion of personal responsibility (Fowler, 2004). Thus, we believe
that political party of legislators and governors will influence
the enactment of dating violence policies.
Dating Violence Prevalenceand Economic Resources
We believe that the level of dating violence in a state
impacts the likelihood that there will be action taken regarding
the problem. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) show how publicity regarding a problem increases the chances of legislation in
many different policy areas. While it may take only a single
horrific example to push an idea into law, it is also possible
that a continuing series of years of problems lead government
officials to act (Kingdon, 2002). We thus believe that legislation is more likely in states where the problem is greater. States
with a higher level of economic resources in terms of average
income per household are believed to be more likely to invest
in legislative action to solve social problems (Brunner, Ross &
Washington, 2011).
The following hypotheses were tested: (1) Political culture
of the states will be associated with the comprehensiveness of
the states' dating violence policy, such that moralistic political
culture will have the highest grade, followed by individualistic
and then the traditionalistic cultures; (2) Greater Democratic
Party control of the governmental institutions in a state (governorship, Senate, and, state House of Representatives) will be
positively associated with the comprehensiveness of the states'
dating violence policy; (3) The greater the prevalence of dating
violence at the time of enactment, the greater the level of comprehensiveness of dating violence policy will be; and (4) The
higher the state's median household income, the more comprehensive the policy will be.
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Methods
All of the states of the USA were considered for inclusion.
While the District of Columbia is treated as a state in some com-

parative state policy research, it was excluded in this project as
it does not have the political culture variable. Nebraska was
also eliminated as it has a nonpartisan, unicameral state legislature (Council of State Governments, 2010). Montana and
Alaska were omitted due to having a non-partisan state legis-

lature during the time studied.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in our study is the grades of dating
violence policies given to all states by the nationally regarded
advocacy group 'Break the Cycle' (2010). The grades published

in 2010 are based on the comprehensiveness of dating violence
laws in effect in December, 2009. We briefly describe how this
group developed a grade for each state. A higher grade is
related to greater ease in obtaining a civil domestic violence
protection order for a teen, and a broader range of grounds for
granting such protective orders (Break the Cycle, 2010).
The level of difficulty in accessing civil protection orders
(CPO) for teens was based on 10 indicators related to the rec-

ommended policy criteria advocated by the experts on dating
violence at Break the Cycle (Break the Cycle, 2010). The experts
in dating violence scored and weighted the following indicators: (1) minors can be granted CPOs; (2) dating relationships
recognized for CPO acquisition; (3) minors can file for CPO
on own behalf (10%); (4) parental notification requirement; (5)
same sex couples quality for CPOs; (6) CPO granted against a
minor respondent; (7) other options available if minor cannot
file for CPO; (8) qualifying definitions of abuse for filing CPO;

(9) minor's request for CPO heard in courts familiar with domestic violence; and (10) modifiability of the CPO (Break the
Cycle, 2010). According to Break the Cycle (2010),
States that met the criterion received ten points for
the indicator and those with the most adverse policy
received zero points. Intermediate policies were
assigned point values between 0 and 10. States earning
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at least eight points received an A, states earning at
least 7 points received a B, those earning at least 6
points received a C, and those earning at least 5 points
received a D. However, states that did not permit
minors to obtain a CPO or permit dating relationships
to qualify for a CPO received automatic failing grades.
(p. 5)
Break the Cycle (2010) rated dating violence policy comprehensiveness for all 50 states. Grades of the states' policies
were originally coded with a letter grade, A (most comprehensive) to F (most limited). We coded the policy grade in similar
fashion, and treat it as a continuous variable with five values:
A = 5, B = 4, C = 3, D= 2, and F = 1.
Independent Variables
The independent variables in this study are: (1) political
culture, (2) partisan control of governmental institutions, (3)
dating violence prevalence; and (4) median household income
of the state. This section describes each variable.
Political culture. Based on the Elazar's (1972) theory of
states' political culture, we used Johnston's (1983) classification scheme to classify all 50 states into three broad groups. All
states were coded according to their dominant political culture.
We have operationalized political culture as a categorical variable where 1 represents the traditionalistic political culture, 2
represents the individualistic political culture and 3 represents
the moralistic political culture.
Partisancontrol ofgovernmental institutions.We originally developed three variables to represent the state's level of partisan
control of the governmental institutions: party majority in the
state Senate, party majority in the House of Representatives,
and party affiliation of the governor at the time of enactment
of the most recent dating violence policy. We then created a
composite variable to use in our hypothesis testing. We assigned the value of 1 if the chamber's majority or governor's
affiliation was Republican and 2 if it was Democratic for each
of the three institutions. We summed these three scores so that
the final variable ranged from 3 (total Republican control of
the governmental institutions) to 6 (total Democratic control
of the governmental institutions in that state). In the two cases
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where there was a bipartisan coalition in the legislatives or
non-partisan governor, the case was dropped, as the objective
of this study is to understand the impact of partisan control of
governmental bodies on dating violence policy.
Dating violence. Data on dating violence prevalence were
collected from the Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance (YRBS),
conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC, 2006, 2008). YRBS is a voluntary school-based biennial
survey that uses a nationally representative sample of students
attending ninth to twelfth grades in public and private schools
in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (CDC, 2006).
Dating violence prevalence rate is the percentage of high school
students (9th - 12th grade) who experienced dating violence
(being hit, slapped, injured, or physically hurt on purpose by
their boyfriend or girlfriend) during the 12 months preceding the survey (CDC, 2008). In our analyses, we use information collected in 2007 (CDC, 2008), because it is the year most
closely preceding the year the dating violence policies were assessed for comprehensiveness, and because the data published
in 2008 are the most comprehensive of the data series, with
information from the most states.
Median state income. Information relating to state median
household income in 2009 was collected from the United States
Census Bureau (2011).
Analyses
Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the overall situation of dating violence policy grades, political culture, partisan
control, dating violence prevalence, and state median income.
Bivariate analyses, ANOVA and t-tests were used to examine
the relationships between the independent and dependent
variables. The number of cases in our study is 47, although the
number of states for which we have a measure of dating violence prevalence is just 34, thus decreasing the number of cases
in the regression analysis testing the policy model. Because of
the limited number of states, which increases the likelihood
of committing a Type II error, we used an alpha level of .10 to
determine statistical significance.
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Results

DescriptiveAnalysis
Dating violence policies. Dating violence policies are, in
general, not very comprehensive. In 2010, six (13%) of the
states had an "A" grade policy and 14 (30%) states had policies
with a grade of "B." The grade of "C" was awarded to 13 states
(28%), while four (9%) earned a "D," and 10 states (21%) had

a grade of "F."
Politicalculture. Almost half of the states (n = 23; 49%) have
moralistic
culture, 34% (n = 16) have a traditionalistic culture
a
and 17% (n = 8) have an individualistic culture.
Partisancontrol of governmental institutions. In 2009, states
leaned slightly towards the Democratic Party. Nine states
(19%) had single-party control by Republicans and 13 states
(28%) had two out of three institutions in the Republican camp.
Eleven states (23%) had mostly Democratic control of institutions and 14 (30%) were controlled by Democrats exclusively.
Prevalence. The dating violence prevalence rate for the year
2007 (CDC, 2008) was used in this study because it was the
most recent year prior to the assessment of the laws in all of the
states. It thus represents the data that legislators and governors were most likely to turn to in considering whether dating
violence was a problem for their states or not. Nationally, in
2007, more than one in ten high school students reported experiencing physical dating violence (M = 11.5%, SD = 2.42).
Median household income (2009). The median household
income ranged from a low of $52,034 in New Mexico to a high
of $94,441 in New Jersey. The average median income was
$69,454 (SD = $11,024).

BivariateHypothesis Tests
We earlier presented four bivariate hypotheses. This section
examines the results of testing these hypotheses.
H r We hypothesized that states with a moralistic political
culture will receive the highest policy grade, followed by the
individualistic culture and then the traditionalistic culture. The
results lend support to the hypothesis, but are not statistically
significant [F (2, 44) = .687, p = .508]. Moralistic states have
the highest mean policy grade (M=3.26, SD = 1.32), followed
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by individualistic states (M=3.00, SD=1.07) and traditionalistic
states (M=2.75, SD=1.48).
H 2. We predicted that Democratic political party control of
the governmental institutions of the state (Governorship, State
Senate, and, State House of Representatives) will be positively
associated with a higher policy grade (showing greater policy
comprehensiveness) for the state. The composite variable of
partisan control creates an overall picture of unified versus
divided government. Using the variable relating to overall
partisan control, the correlation of policy grade (greater levels
of comprehensiveness) and partisan control (more Democratic
control) shows a positive correlation of .465 (p = .001), showing
a strong linkage between these two variables.
H 3. In our third hypothesis, we predicted a positive correlation between the prevalence of dating violence (2007) and the
grade of the dating violence policy of the state (2010). States
with a grade of A (n = 4) had an average prevalence of 10.00
percent. States with a B grade (n = 11) had a prevalence of 11.25
and those with a grade of C (n = 11) had a slightly higher victimization rate of 11.83. Policy at the D level (n = 2) was associated with a prevalence rate of only 8.75 percent, far below that
of even the A states. States with a grade of F (n = 7) did have
the highest prevalence rate, at 13.00 percent. These results,
however, do not reach the level of statistical significance [F (4,
30) = 1.982, p = .1231.
H 4. We hypothesized that the higher the state's median
household income, the higher the policy grade would be.
States with a grade of F have a median household income of
$64,565, those with a D have a median household income of
$69,740, and those with a grade of C have a median household
income of $71,095. States with a grade of B, however, only have
a median household income of $69,245, or a bit less than those
at the D grade level. States with an A grade have the highest
median household income, $74,340. Despite showing a trend
as we hypothesized, these results are not statistically significant IF (4, 42) = .849, p = .502].
In sum, we have one hypothesis (political control) that is
supported using bivariate significance tests. We have two hypotheses (political culture and median state income) that are
trending in the expected direction, but do not reach statistical
significance. Our final hypothesis (prevalence of the problem)
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has results in the opposite direction of what we hypothesized,
though these results are not statistically significant.
Model Testing
The bivariate analysis conducted so far indicates some,
though limited, support for several of our hypotheses. Overall,
results of the regression analysis to test our full model indicate results similar to the bivariate analyses. Only one of
the variables impacts the dependent variable significantly:
partisan control of the institutions of government by Democrats,
(0 = .566, t(34) = 3.916, p < 0.000), as shown in Table 1. All other
variables are below the threshold for statistical significance.
The model had an adjusted r-square of .331 [F (4, 30) = 5.201,
p = .003)].

Table 1: Regression Analysis Results
Standardized
regression
coefficient

Independent variable

(13)
Political culture

.655

.517

Partisan control of the institutions of
government by Democrats
Percentage of high school students who
experienced dating violence (2007)

.566

.000

-.236

.120

.074

.667

2009 State median income
Discussion

The purpose of this paper is to understand better the forces
that shape the comprehensiveness of dating violence policy at
the state level. We created a literature-based model to explain
the grade of state dating violence policy. When tested, the
results of the study found only partial support for the model.
We found that Democratic partisan control of governmental
institutions is a statistically significant predictor of higher
policy grades. We also found that political culture followed
the pattern we hypothesized (moralistic culture led to the most
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comprehensive policies, traditional culture was associated
with the most limited policies, and individualistic culture was
correlated at an intermediate level), but not to a statistically
significant level. We determined that states with higher levels
of median income tend to have higher policy grades (again,
however, this is not a statistically significant relationship).
One test had results that ran counter to our expectations.
While we believed that a higher prevalence of dating violence
would lead to higher policy grades, we found an opposite
pattern to be the case (though it is not a statistically significant).
When testing the overall model, results show that the
model is useful in predicting the dependent variable, though
only one independent variable (Democratic partisan control
of governmental institutions) is statistically significant. The
strength of this one variable is impressive and underscores the
importance of political party affiliation in predicting policy
choices.
Limitations of the Study
There are several limitations to this study. First, the small
size of the potential sample of states reduces the ability of statistical analyses to arrive at statistically significant results. This
limitation was addressed by using a broader definition of significance, .10 rather than the typical .05 level. Yet, with missing
data on some variables, particularly the prevalence rates of
dating violence at the state level, the final n for the regression
analysis is only 34 cases, much lower than we would like. This
loss, one-fourth of the initial sample of 47, makes it difficult
to discover any but very strong effects. The small number of
cases compared to the number of variables may be the cause of
low levels of significance rather than fatal flaws in the model.
Measurement concerns exist as well. The YRBS data, used
to determine dating violence prevalence, were collected only
from youth in school. The CDC (2008) reports that in 2005, at
least 3% of youth in the 16-17 year age group were not enrolled in a high school, thus these data do not represent all
persons of the age group under this study. Additionally, the
YRBS relies on self-reports. The extent of youth under-reporting or over-reporting of their dating violent behaviors was not
assessed in measuring prevalence. There was some variation

Dating Violence Policy

in data collection across states and some states did not report
data on all variables. Despite its limitations, the YRBS is the
most comprehensive measure we have of physical dating violence prevalence across states and so was used in this research.
Implications and Conclusion
Despite these limitations, several results bear notice and
the topic needs to be explored further. Perhaps the most
eye-opening result is the generally low level of comprehensiveness of dating violence policy states have on the books.
Out of 49 states, only a few had policies strong enough to earn
an "A" grade in 2010 (Break the Cycle decided not to create
grades in 2011, so, while laws may have changed since then,
we do not have a comparable measurement of them). This fact
indicates the severe limitations of most policies in protecting
teenage victims, according to the criteria of Break the Cycle.
The most important policy-related implication emerges
from the finding that the party in control of state governmental bodies strongly influences dating violence policies.
This result supports previous studies' findings on the influence of political party on social, legal, and environmental
policies (Gershtenson, Mangun, & Smith, 2004; Young, Farrell,
Henderson, & Taxman, 2009). States with Democratic majorities in the legislature are shown to have more comprehensive
dating violence policies, a fact that should be important in mobilizing advocates on the topic to participate actively in electoral campaigns at the state level.
Researchers interested in teen dating violence, gender
and women's studies, and social policy can use this study as
a springboard to conduct further research to: (1) collect and
obtain more data on dating violence to know the actual prevalence rates, along with other related demographical and socioeconomical indices; (2) identify other socioeconomic and political factors that influence such policies; (3) measure the impact
of policies on prevalence of dating violence (and other forms
of violence); and (4) explore other legal procedures or options
that can be used to protect the victims of violence. Additional
research is needed. Longitudinal research is needed to better
understand the effect of these factors on the development and
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prevalence of risky behaviors. A longitudinal study is needed
to identify the direction of associations between dating violence and strength of the policy. Research is also needed to
understand how dating violence policies differentially impact
male and female adolescents, since we know that the dynamics
and consequences of dating violence vary by gender (Banister
& Schreiber, 2001; Silverman, Raj, & Clements, 2004).
While this study is merely an initial step to understanding
the correlates of dating violence policy, the results indicate it is
possible to better comprehend the relationship between dating
violence policies and variables that influence the polices. Very
few studies have addressed the role that policy variables,
such as partisan control of governmental institutions, might
have in impacting policy concerning dating violence among
adolescents. Variables that are important in understanding the
formation of other types of policies seem to be less important
in shaping dating violence policy. Future research efforts are
needed to provide greater understanding of how policy in this
arena is formed and the impact of more comprehensive policies on the prevalence of dating violence in a state.
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Explicating the Social Mechanisms Linking
Alcohol Use Behaviors and Ecology
to Child Maltreatment
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This paper begins to describe and explicate the specific mechanisms
by which alcohol use and the alcohol use environment contribute
to specific types of child maltreatment. These mechanisms relating alcohol outlet densities to child maltreatment described here
include effects on social disorganization,parent's drinking behaviors, and parental supervision. By investigatingpotential mechanisms, new information could be obtained on the importance and
role of alcohol and its availability in the etiology of child maltreatment. This knowledge can be used to further tailor interventionsto
those conditions most likely to prevent and reduce maltreatment.
Key words: child maltreatment, alcohol outlet density, venue
utilization, alcohol use, supervisory neglect, physical abuse

In 2009, approximately 763,000 children were found to be
victims of child maltreatment by Child Protective Services
(about 10.1 per 1,000 children, U.S. DHHS, 2010), and over
400,000 children resided in foster care (U.S. DHHS, 2011).
General population estimates of physical abuse and neglect
suggest that the actual rates of child maltreatment are likely to
be much higher (Sedlak et al., 2010; Straus, Hamby, Finkelhor,
Moore, & Runyan, 1998). The vast majority of research on
child physical abuse and neglect has traditionally focused
on the psycho-social characteristics of parents and caretakers
that lead to child maltreatment. However, a growing number
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, December 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 4
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of studies suggest that characteristics of the environment in
which these families live may also affect parenting behaviors.
Yet, with a few notable exceptions (see Coulton, Korbin, & Su,
1999; Molnar, Buka, Brennan, Holton, & Earls, 2003), these
studies of individual or environmental characteristics occur in
isolation of each other. For this paper, child maltreatment will
be used interchangeably with 'child abuse and neglect' and
refers to physical abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect as defined
by the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
(Public Law, 93-247).
Currently, broad theories exist that seek to understand why
individuals maltreat their children (e.g., stress and coping)
while others seek to understand how the larger environment
affects rates of maltreatment (e.g., social capital). An overarching framework that can encompass these and other theories is
the ecological framework by Bronfenbrenner (1979) that posits
multi-levels of relationships and environments influence behavior. Lacking in most of these theoretical frameworks are explicit statements or understandings of the social mechanisms
at play. Here social mechanisms are defined as "frequently and
easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under
generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences" (Elster, 1998, p. 45). While large-scale theories are
general enough to include explanations for all types of behaviors, social mechanisms seek to identify under what conditions
certain behaviors are more or less likely to result in abusive or
neglectful parent practices.
This paper provides a framework for beginning to explicate the specific mechanisms by which the ecology of where
children and families interact with family and parental characteristics result in child maltreatment. Specifically, mechanisms
of the alcohol environment will be explored in order to develop
a greater understanding of what supports or hinders maltreating behaviors by parents. Findings from studies investigating
these mechanisms can be used to develop primary prevention
activities aimed at populations of families living in neighborhoods with characteristics deemed high risk for potential maltreatment or secondary prevention efforts targeted at places
where the individuals most at-risk for committing abuse and
neglect spend time.
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Social Mechanisms
As researchers, we often are able to identify relationships
between variable "x" and variable "y." For example, parents
who abuse alcohol are more likely to physically abuse their
children (Ammerman, Kolko, Kirisci, Blackson, & Dawes,
1999; Chaffin, Kelleher, & Hollenberg, 1996), greater densities of alcohol outlets are related to higher rates of child maltreatment in neighborhood areas (Freisthler, 2004; Freisthler,
Midanik, & Gruenewald, 2004), and those in poverty are more
likely to be involved with the child welfare system (JonsonReid, Drake, & Kohl, 2009; Pelton, 1981). These correlational
relationships, once identified, provide almost no information
on why these relationships exist. Certainly, explanations for
and theories about why these relationships occur are provided, but the exact mechanism that links one variable to another
is generally unknown. In fact, without identifying the mechanisms that generate the relationships, we might unintentionally be giving too much weight to some factors and not enough
to others (Hedstrom & Swedberg, 1998). Incorporating the appropriate variables from various hypotheses relating sets of
factors to maltreatment would allow us to get at the real source
of what is causing maltreatment. As social welfare practice
continues to move toward providing evidence-based services
in the field and as funders increasingly require the use of these
practices, developing interventions based on a more complete
understanding of these mechanisms becomes more important.
The Moving to Opportunities (MTO) program, designed
and implemented by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), is one example of a good intervention
idea that may have taken an approach that did not fully address
the mechanisms at play. MTO was a program designed to assist
lower income individuals move from highly disadvantaged
areas full of social problems (e.g., crime) to areas with fewer
social problems. The goal was to determine how neighborhood
of residence was related to a variety of problems, including
crime, education, employment, and various health outcomes.
This was based on a simple premise that where a person lived
affected behavior, and having access to more resources in areas
with less social problems would mitigate bad outcomes for individuals who had previously lived in worse neighborhood
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areas. The findings from studies of MTO were mixed: better
short-term outcomes for adult physical and mental health
(e.g., Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2001; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn,
2003) but similar or worse outcomes for employment or earnings for household heads (e.g., Katz, Kling, & Liebman, 2001)
and long-term academic achievement for youth (e.g., Kling &
Liebman, 2004; Leventhal, Fauth, & Brooks-Gunn, 2005; Orr
et al., 2003). The fact that not all outcome measures improved
suggests that several underlying mechanisms are at work.
Individuals moving out of familiar neighborhoods may have
been leaving behind trusted and important forms of social
support (Orr et al., 2003). Despite moving to areas viewed as
having more resources, without these supports in place, families may have not taken advantage of new opportunities available to them. Thus, had attention been paid to both moving
individuals and providing structure to develop new support
networks, outcomes may have improved and been sustained
in even more areas. The underlying mechanisms, then, suggest
that both location (i.e., neighborhood) and social relationships
may interact to produce better outcomes for families.
Focusing on the mechanisms underlying these relationships requires us to think systematically about why and how
these relationships occur and to collect data in such a way that
allows us to explicitly test sets of mechanisms. Instead of just
measuring poverty, one might also need to include a measure
of contact with mandated reporters or conduct a general population study that allows for comparisons of parenting behaviors across income groups. These relationships may be more
likely to occur only under specific conditions (e.g., extreme
stress) or with specific populations (e.g., young parents). Once
these conditions are specified, it moves development of policy
and practice interventions from a "one size fits all" approach
to one that requires specific information on the clients or communities with whom we work. This nuanced understanding
of mechanisms may result in more interventions effective at
reducing or preventing maltreatment.
To assist with the study of mechanisms, Hedstr6m and
Swedberg (1998) identify a typology that describes the interaction between the larger environment and individual behaviors
through three types of mechanisms: situational, action-oriented, and transformational. A situational mechanism (macro to
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micro) occurs when an individual encounters a situation that
affects his or her behavior in a particular way (e.g., increased
densities of alcohol outlets increase frequency of drinking).
Action-oriented mechanisms (micro to micro) transpire when
the characteristics of an individual (e.g., beliefs, desires) result
in a specific action (e.g, using drinking to self-medicate during
stressful situations). Finally, transformational mechanisms
(micro to macro) arise when the behavior of individuals as
they interact with each other results in a collective action at the
macro level (e.g., increased network size in areas where more
opportunities for social interactions exist, such as in neighborhoods with more bars, clubs, or restaurants). All of these examples could increase different types of maltreatment and would
suggest different types of interventions to reduce or prevent
maltreatment. This typology frames many of the mechanisms
described within this paper and allows us to better understand
the ways in which social mechanisms can be used to develop
interventions to reduce social problems.
Background of Child Maltreatment
Scope of Child Maltreatment
Child maltreatment, particularly child neglect, within the
general population is widespread (Sedlak et al., 2010; Straus et
al., 1998); however, official reports tend to underestimate the
scope of the problem (U.S. DHHS, 2009). Prevalence estimates
for the general population suggest that about 60% of parents
used corporal punishment (i.e., spanking on the bottom with
a bare hand) while 5% of parents have engaged in physically abusive behaviors (i.e., hitting with a fist, or kicking hard,
Straus et al., 1998). Supervision problems (i.e., supervisory
neglect) account for 30% of all cases seen in the child welfare
system (Coohey, 2003). This is higher than both physical abuse
(10.8%) and sexual abuse (7.6%) (U.S. DHHS, 2009).
Individual Characteristicsand Child Maltreatment
A variety of parental and child characteristics are related
to child maltreatment. Research on child maltreatment has
consistently found that it is disproportionately reported among
poor families (Gelles, 1997; Jonson-Reid et al., 2009; Pelton,
1981), those with lower levels of education (Gelles, 1997), and
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among domestic violence households (Jouriles, McDonald,
Slep, Heyman, & Garrido, 2008). Parents are more likely to
maltreat their children if they were abused and neglected
as children (Berger, 2005; Black, Heyman, & Slep, 2001), are
younger (Straus et al., 1998), report higher levels of depression
(Black et al., 2001), experience higher levels of stress and reactivity (e.g., impulsivity, Berger, 2005), and have more children
at home (Berger, 2005; Gelles, 1997).
Neighborhood Environment and Child Maltreatment
Consistently, areas with high poverty rates, housing stress
(e.g., residential instability), and drug and alcohol availability have higher rates of maltreatment (Freisthler, Merritt, &
LaScala, 2006). High percentage of unemployment and high
levels of child care burden (e.g., higher ratios of men compared
to women) also tend to have high rates of child maltreatment
but this relationship is not as stable (Freisthler et al., 2006).
These relationships are often interpreted within the framework of social disorganization described below.
Child maltreatment and social disorganization. Populationlevel studies of child maltreatment have found a positive relationship between social disorganization and child maltreatment (Coulton, Korbin, Su, & Chow, 1995; Freisthler, 2004;
Freisthler et al., 2006). A socially disorganized neighborhood
is one that lacks a structure to help maintain social controls
that allow communities to realize commonly held values.
Neighborhoods are commonly measured by constructs related
to concentrated disadvantage, child care burden, and residential instability (Coulton et al., 1995; Sampson & Groves, 1989;
Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). Perceived neighborhood processes such as low collective efficacy (i.e., the willingness of neighborhood residents to intervene for the common
good) and social disorder have been found to be associated
with psychological and physical abuse (Guterman, Lee, Taylor,
& Rathouz, 2009), crime (Sampson et al., 1997), and intimate
partner violence (Browning, 2002). Neighborhood areas
with high levels of social disorganization may impede the
development of collective efficacy and other socially supportive relationships with neighbors that may prevent or reduce
maltreatment (Sampson et al., 1997; Sampson, Morenoff, &
Earls, 1999).

Social Mechanisms of Child Maltreatment

31

Social support and social networks in neighborhoods. Having
more individuals to provide support with parenting tasks
lessens some of the burdens related to child care and can
provide parents with assistance during times of extreme stress.
Social support can come in a variety of forms: (1) emotional
support-talking through problems and asking for advice;
(2) instrumental (or tangible) support-material aid such as
money or babysitting; and (3) social companionship-spending time with friends and families in recreational activities
(DePanfilis, 1996).
When controlling for neighborhood socio-economic status,
high risk neighborhoods had fewer neighborhood resources
and support than the low risk neighborhoods (Garbarino &
Kostelny, 1992; Garbarino & Sherman, 1980; Vinson, Baldry, &
Hargreaves, 1996); individuals in these areas also had smaller
social networks (Coulton et al., 1999; Molnar et al., 2003;
Vinson et al., 1996). Parents who neglect their children generally have fewer network members, less frequent contact with
members in their supportive networks, and tend to live further
away from those network members (Coohey, 1996, 2007;
Thompson, 1985). Thus, disorganized neighborhoods, or those
characterized by high residential turnover and disadvantage,
may prevent social networks from forming or decrease the
shared connections between residents who may prevent child
maltreatment.
Although social support resources have been linked to lower
levels of maltreatment, it would be inappropriate to assume
that more contact with one's social network is always advantageous. In a review of social capital literature, Portes (1998)
discusses how the same mechanisms that result in positive
aspects of social support also result in negative consequences,
such as conformity to group norms and downward leveling of
social norms. These negative consequences can be found when
social support is embedded in social structures that produce
less desirable outcomes (i.e. gangs). For example, parents who
reported having a larger number of friends who drank alcohol
and who perceived greater availability of social companionship (e.g., friends willing to go to parties) are at greater risk of
physically abusing their child (Holmes, in review). If a parent
is spending time with social support members who are also
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heavy drinkers, the parent may engage in such behavior more
frequently, thus putting the child at greater risk of being physically abused.
Alcohol Use and Child Maltreatment
Rates of child maltreatment, particularly physical abuse, are
higher among individuals reporting heavy drinking (Berger,
2005; Famularo, Stone, Barnum, & Wharton, 1986; Kelleher,
Chaffin, Holleberg, & Fischer, 1994; Murphy et al., 1991; Sun,
Shillington, Hohman, & Jones, 2001). Children are at 2 times
the risk for being physically abused and 3 times the risk for
being physically neglected if one parent abuses alcohol when
compared to children who had no parents abusing alcohol
(Dube et al., 2001). That risk increased to over 3 times for
physical abuse and 6 times for physical neglect if both parents
abuse alcohol (Dube et al., 2001). Sedlak and colleagues (2010)
found that 10% of all cases of child maltreatment in the general
population have alcohol use as a factor in the abuse or neglect
incident.
Social Mechanisms: Alcohol Environment and Child Maltreatment
Figure 1 shows a conceptual model of the social mechanisms that may represent the relationship between alcohol
and child maltreatment at both individual and neighborhood
level. An underlying assumption of this model is that there are
certain conditions under which alcohol use and the density of
alcohol outlets may be more or less likely to result in abusive
or neglectful parenting practices. That is, not all parents have
to abuse alcohol for alcohol to play a role in parenting practices
that are physically abusive or neglectful.
The role of the alcohol environment. Density of alcohol
outlets appears to be positively related to rates of child maltreatment when using several geographic units of analysis
(Freisthler, 2004; Freisthler et al., 2004; Freisthler, Needell, &
Gruenewald, 2005; Markowitz & Grossman, 1998). At the state
level, Markowitz and Grossman (1998) studied the relationship between state excise taxes on beer, alcohol outlet density,
and child maltreatment. They found that fewer outlets per
1,000 people were significantly related to a decrease in the
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model of Social Mechanisms Relating Alcohol
Outlet Density and Alcohol Use Behaviors to Child Maltreatment
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probability (4%) of severe child maltreatment. Alcohol outlet
densities may contribute to child maltreatment in smaller
geographic areas as well. Recent cross-sectional studies have
found that higher densities of bars are related to higher substantiated reports of child maltreatment at the Census tract
and block group levels (Freisthler, 2004; Freisthler et al., 2005).
This relationship remained after controlling for measures of
social disorganization at the neighborhood level, including
concentrated disadvantage, residential instability, immigrant
concentration, and child care burden. Alcohol outlets are not
just a marker for socially disorganized neighborhoods but contribute independently to problems in these areas.
Alcohol outlet density is not the only feature of the alcohol
environment that affects maltreatment. Higher taxes on beer,
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liquor, and wine are related to lower levels of child maltreatment (Markowitz & Grossman, 1998) and fatalities to children
under 10 years of age (Sen, 2006). Further, a retrospective
study that examined reduction in blood alcohol content (BAC)
laws to .08 found a reduction in child homicide deaths (Sen,
2006). Increases in taxes on alcohol are related to shorter time
for children in foster care, particularly for those who primary
reason for removal was parental alcohol abuse (Markowitz,
Cuellar, Conrad, & Grossman, 2011). Thus, geographic availability of alcohol (as measured by outlet densities) and economic availability of alcohol (as measured by taxes) show that
policies enacted at the state or national level may affect rates
of maltreatment.
Alcohol Outlet Densities and "Frail" Neighborhoods
Neighborhood areas with high levels of social disorganization already have a number of conditions (e.g., low collective efficacy) that make them vulnerable to a variety of
social problems, including crime and child maltreatment
(Coulton et al., 1995, Freisthler, 2004; Sampson, Morenoff, &
Earls, 1999). With an already weakened (or "frail") neighborhood structure, these neighborhoods may lack the appropriate social capital to absorb the negative effects related to high
densities of alcohol outlets in their community (Gruenewald,
Freisthler, Remer, LaScala, & Treno, 2006). Greater densities
of alcohol outlets in areas with high social disorganization
act in a manner that increases the likelihood residents will
retreat from neighborhood interactions, depriving themselves
of those contacts with neighbors that might develop into socially supportive relationships (Bennett, Diiulio, & Walters,
1996). On the other hand, with this transformational mechanism, neighborhoods that have higher densities of alcohol
outlets but lower levels of social disorganization may be able
to absorb the effects of outlets without risking further harm to
children due to the increased levels of social capital available
to those neighborhood residents.
Social Mechanisms: Alcohol Outlets, Alcohol Use, and
Child Maltreatment
Greater alcohol outlet densities may lead to more frequent and higher quantity of alcohol use by parents, placing
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children at greater risk for being abused or neglected. A major
mechanism by which the physical availability of alcohol affects
child maltreatment may be through parental drinking. Parents
who frequently drink heavy amounts may regularly place
their children at increased risk for abuse and neglect, making
it more likely that they will come to the attention of Child
Protective Services. Yet despite the wide-spread correlational
assessment of alcohol use and child maltreatment, no causal
studies exist showing that increased alcohol use causes child
maltreatment. An important next step is to identify how drinking at different levels may exhibit a dose-response relationship
with child maltreatment. In other words, does each additional
drink increase the likelihood that parents will use physically
abusive parenting practices? Does more drinking increase frequency of using more severe types of physical abuse as disinhibition increases? Or, is there a point at which parents become
incapacitated from drinking that makes it less likely they will
physically abuse their children, but more likely that they will
be unable to supervise them adequately?
Risk for abuse or neglect for children of parents who are
moderate or infrequent drinkers is likely to still exist. These
children may still be at riskk, but that risk may be more infrequent and less likely to be detected. Additionally, an infrequent drinker (e.g., less than once a month) who drinks only at
special occasions (e.g., weddings) but consumes large quantities to the point of intoxication, may drive home with his or
her children in the car, a form of supervisory neglect (Coohey,
2003; Sedlak & Broadhurst, 1996). These children may be at
high risk for abuse or neglect, but only on an occasional basis
throughout the course of the year. These situational types of
child maltreatment are certainly much more difficult to detect
but can have fatal consequences for children. Thus, while
much of the focus on the relationship between child maltreatment and alcohol use focuses on those caregivers who are
dependent on alcohol, the environment in which alcohol use
occurs can also provide important information on maltreating
behaviors. Understanding the spectrum of harm for physical
abuse or neglect across all drinking levels is an important contribution of this theoretical framework, as moderate and light
drinkers may be more likely to be affected by certain types of
prevention efforts.
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Social Mechanisms: Routine DrinkingActivities and Venue Use
Where a parent chooses to drink may also affect the likelihood that he or she will maltreat his or her children. Venue
use (e.g., bars, restaurants) for drinking activities varies by
both sociodemographic characteristics and drinking behaviors. Compared to single people, married people tend to use
bars less often (Gruenewald, Treno, Nephew, & Ponicki, 1995)
and drink in their own homes more often (Treno, Alaniz, &
Gruenewald, 2000). On the other hand, heavier drinking
married people use bars more often than single people or
married couples without children (Treno et al., 2000). Similarly,
as an action-oriented mechanism, a parent's utilization of bars
as a recreational activity may decrease parental supervision
and monitoring, thereby increasing a child's risk of being neglected (Coohey, 2008), particularly since these activities take
a parent away from home. Use of bars can also represent an
economic strain on families, as alcohol at this venue is more
expensive than purchases made through off-premise alcohol
outlets (Gruenewald, Johnson, Millar, & Mitchell, 2000). Thus,
parents who spend significant amounts of time at bars drinking may also be spending valuable resources that may lead to
physical neglect of their child(ren)'s needs. In a preliminary
study on the relationship between venue utilization and child
physical abuse, Freisthler (2011) found that parents who frequently went to and/or drank at bars and parties at friends'
and in their own homes were more likely to use physically
abusive parenting practices. These results suggest that where
a person drinks, independently of how much they drink, may
negatively interact with parenting abilities.
Outlet density and venue utilization. As shown in Figure 1,
drinking behaviors and drinking venue utilization are expected to be directly related to maltreatment. Additionally, venue
utilization may moderate the relationship between drinking
behaviors and child maltreatment. These mechanisms rely on
the tenets of routine activities theory, which states that harm
occurs when there is a suitable target (the child), a motivated
offender (parent or other adult), and the absence of effective
guardians (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Under most conditions,
parents will not participate in abusive or neglectful behaviors, but that may change in certain locations and/or under
certain circumstances. Alcohol outlets (e.g., liquor stores) that
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allow ready access for consumption in the home (where fewer
guardians capable of stopping the violence are present) may
indirectly influence child maltreatment rates, particularly with
respect to physical abuse (Freisthler et al., 2004). However, for
this to occur, alcohol must be available in the home for consumption. Purchase of alcohol for use at home generally occurs
at off-premise establishments, such as liquor, grocery, or convenience stores. Thus, the primary mechanism affecting child
maltreatment may be through greater densities of off-premise
alcohol outlets. This greater density may decrease the costs associated with obtaining alcohol (e.g., reduced travel costs) and
increase the frequency of alcohol use, thereby increasing the
risk of child physical abuse. The effects of off-premise density
and alcohol use on perpetration of physical abuse may be
higher in homes of single parents as fewer guardians are available to prevent the physical abuse from occurring (Freisthler
et al., 2004).
Similarly a parent who drinks a couple glasses of wine at
dinner in a restaurant may find himself or herself over the legal
limit. After dinner, the parent may have to drive home, with
his or her children in the car-a form of supervisory neglect
(Coohey, 2003). Parents living in areas with higher densities
of restaurants that serve alcohol have more opportunities to
drink and drive when eating out. In fact, individuals living in
areas with higher densities of restaurants drink more frequently and drive after drinking more often (Gruenewald, Treno, &
Johnson, 2002). Thus, where parents drink may affect the type
of maltreatment their children experience. Location of drinking venues and their use by parents may also point to secondary prevention efforts that target parents at locations where
they drink.
Venue utilization and support. Generally, tangible social
support that provides additional resources for child supervision acts to reduce rates of neglect. However, support in the
form of social companionship may lead to greater or lesser
rates of child neglect, since it may be conditional upon the
social activities reinforced. Some parents may experience substantial social support for participating in activities outside the
home, live in areas with high densities of bars, and enjoy drinking in the company of friends to the neglect of their children.
In 19% of supervisory neglect cases in New York State, parents
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were found to be participating in illegal or irresponsible activities, including drinking. In an additional 12% of cases, parents
were otherwise "out" for other entertainment purposes when
the supervisory neglect incident occurred (Jones, 1987).
Recent research by Coohey (2007) suggests that parents
who leave children home alone (vs. with inadequate supervision) may do so because individuals in their social networks
are not adequate caregivers. For example, parents who spend
increased amounts of time at bars may develop support networks of individuals who are also bar-goers and likely drinkers. Although these individuals provide social companionship
support, having social network members who drink increases
the risk of physical abuse (Holmes, in review) and they are
likely to not be available at night for babysitting when the
parent is spending time at bars. In this case, preferred drinking venue may interact with type of social support from social
networks such that parents spending large amounts of time
in bars are receiving social companionship, but not tangible
support (i.e., babysitting), leaving children vulnerable to supervisory neglect. Not only might bar density increase the
number of locations parents can go without children, it may
also change the types of support networks these parents have,
placing children at higher risk for being left home alone or
without adequate supervision.
The type of support received may only be one mechanism
through which venue utilization and social support interact to
increase maltreatment. Highly social parents who have a lot
of members in their social networks may also be vulnerable to
committing maltreatment through supervisory neglect, especially in areas where there are a lot of activities directed towards
adults. A high density of restaurants that serve alcohol can
point to an active night life in a city or neighborhood area that
caters to adult interests. Having many individuals with whom
a parent wants to socialize may mean those living in areas with
increased opportunities for socialization in these adult venues
may be more likely to do so. On a practical level this increases
the need for adequate babysitting and, failing that, increases
the opportunities for supervisory neglect to occur (Freisthler
& Williams, in review).
Where the social networks are formed might also speak
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to how venues are used and the risks associated with them.
Parents whose children participate in sports might become
friendly and celebrate their children's sporting achievements
at parties or gatherings that involve alcohol use. Both authors
have observed instances of parents drinking alcohol as part of
their children's sporting celebrations or events. In one case, a
youth (8 - 10 years) baseball team held their end of the season
party at a bar where parents were observed to be drinking
shots. In another, parents celebrated the first win of the lacrosse season by drinking wine at the park while the children
were practicing. Although isolated observations, these incidents may point to a culture of how social networks developed
through children's activities may support drinking that may
lead to maltreatment. These special events might occur irregularly but the act of drinking and subsequently driving after
drinking may place these children at risk for harm.
Challenges to Studying Social Mechanisms
In order to study the exact mechanisms by which the environment or individual behaviors are related to child maltreatment, one must be able to specify what those mechanisms are.
This requires detailing the mechanisms a priori. As stated by
Stinchcombe (1968), most scientists can easily provide two or
three explanations for their findings in correlation studies after
the fact. The real difficulty is in providing a strong theoretical
justification for studying specific mechanisms and being able
to test them with the data at hand. The mechanisms described
here are complicated, as they are trying to realistically depict
the complexities of human behavior and our interactions with
our social and physical environment.
Further, without investigating these relationships over
time or some aspect of the patterning of the events, the studies
remain correlational with little to no information on the
causality of the mechanisms. Studying these relationships
cross-sectionally will provide a basic understanding of
whether or not there is any evidence to support the theoretical
justification for specific mechanisms. However, to truly explicate the relationships, surveys must ask questions about when,
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for example, alcohol use occurs in relationship to maltreating
behaviors. Another approach would be to study these mechanisms in longitudinal studies where the beginning of alcohol
use behaviors and influence of neighborhood environment can
be studied over time. These studies also require large sample
sizes in order to have enough statistical power to identify significant relationships when they exist. All of these result in
higher monetary costs and larger amounts of time and effort
need to complete such studies. These costs may be prohibitive,
thus limiting one's ability to design and complete this type of
research.
The reality is that no matter what mechanisms you specify,
by virtue of choosing to measure some constructs, some behaviors, and not others, it influences what you do or do not find.
This is one of the greatest challenges faced in understanding
and studying the effect of mechanisms on behavior. At some
point the focus must be on determining what mechanisms are
most likely to result in child maltreatment so practitioners can
develop prevention efforts that will be most effective at reducing maltreatment.
The challenges associated with studying and understanding the influence of social mechanisms are not inconsequential.
It requires a level of theoretical development and justification
that goes past describing and explaining simple correlational
findings. Despite these complexities, this approach also has
the ability to significantly advance how we think about and
develop interventions to address social problems, including
child maltreatment.
Promise in Understanding Social Mechanisms
The potential for developing multiple avenues of prevention and intervention programs based on a better understanding of the nuances of the social mechanisms is great. Here,
we theorize that the alcohol use environment does not only
affect maltreating behaviors through alcohol use itself. Social
network characteristics, social support, and neighborhood
cohesion may all create environments that either condone or
sanction abusive and neglectful parenting practices. And, in
the case of social support, it can do both, depending on the
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type of support received. This challenges professionals designing prevention programs and working with parents at-risk for
abuse or neglect to devise assessment tools and intervention
strategies that assess the positive and negative qualities of individuals, their social systems, and their environments to determine how such factors are being used by a given parent.
Clinicians may want to be even more specific and ask questions about where the individuals in a client's support network
live. Based on this framework, having a vast social network
may not be helpful if none of the social network members live
close enough to babysit in a pinch, or if the members of the
client's social network who do live close are not the ones who
provide tangible support. This distinction between knowing
if a client has a lot of social support versus knowing where
that support lives and the specific types of support he or she
receives holds implications for helping the clients develop effective parenting and coping strategies.
The direct effects of the alcohol environment on child physical abuse and duration of foster care suggests opportunities
for primary prevention efforts that are likely to reduce abusive
and neglectful parenting practices. These include raising taxes
on alcohol purchases (Markowitz & Grossman, 1998) or lowering the legal blood alcohol content (BAC) for drivers carrying children (Quinlan, Brewer, Sleet, & Dellinger, 2000). These
global-level policies may be effective at reducing maltreatment
rates, as suggested by previous work (Sen, 2006).
At the community level, understanding social mechanisms
requires social service agencies to focus on the larger environment from where their clients come. Enhancing livability in
those areas may decrease child maltreatment. This could occur
by developing a sound neighborhood economic structure and
institutional supports, possibly through local planning and
development regulations that decrease the number of permits
available for alcohol outlets. This could also be completed by
increasing the roles of place managers in these neighborhoods.
Place managers are influential people in neighborhoods who
act like "eyes on the street" to prevent and deter crime (Eck,
1995; Mazerolle, Kadleck, & Roehl, 1998). This might also
require neighborhood areas to find creative and innovative
ways to tap into natural helping networks to formalize these
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relationships in at-risk areas or among at-risk populations to
create stronger neighborhood foundations.
More important than identifying global prevention efforts
that may succeed in reducing maltreatment are the nuanced
secondary prevention efforts that may arise from a more thorough understanding of the mechanisms relating alcohol use,
social support, and venue utilization to child abuse and neglect.
With regards to social support, the development of neighborhood babysitting co-operatives could increase informal sources
of support for families with young children and be utilized
even during evening hours when parents may utilize drinking
venues or attend parties where drinking is likely to occur. This
sort of child care option is available at many workout facilities
and could be an extension of "Mom's Day Out" but focus upon
nighttime activities of parents and include opportunities for
overnight stays or "slumber parties" for children so parents
have several hours in the morning to deal with the aftereffects
of drinking to intoxication the night before.
Another strategy for increasing informal support might
through
the development and use of "welcome wagons"
be
in high-risk neighborhoods, as characterized by high rates of
poverty, disadvantage and maltreatment. These committees
could consist of both residents of these neighborhood areas
who are welcoming new families to the area and service providers who may provide incentives to use services that most
families in these areas may utilize (e.g., WIC or TANF). This
approach would also allow service providers to quickly identify newcomers to neighborhood areas and begin to develop
relationships that may facilitate greater use of these services.
These events may also be used to form informal networks of
parent support groups that are used to exchange parenting
strategies and information on local resources related to families (Cushman, 1998).
Social mechanisms identifying differential use of alcohol
venues by parents may also suggest targeted secondary prevention efforts. For example, if parents who use restaurants
more often are prone to drinking and driving with their children in the car, warnings about the hazards of drinking and
driving on vulnerable passengers could be listed on alcohol
menus. Responsible beverage service practices that reduce the
amount a person drinks (e.g., Saltz, 1987; Saltz & Stanghetta,
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1997) could be expanded to include specific strategies for monitoring customers with children at the table.
Similarly, if the study of specific social mechanisms finds
that drinking at special occasions (e.g., weddings) leads to increased risk of maltreatment for children, specific strategies
could be recommended that reduce these problems. Brides
and grooms might hire a babysitter that would watch children
overnight if the reception is expected to go late into the night.
They could also hire shuttles that transport guests from the
reception venue to home or a hotel to decrease drinking and
driving with children in the car. Sports leagues for children
could provide financial support or venue use for end of the
season parties that do not include alcohol.
As we continue to learn more about how and when the
specific mechanisms result in abusive and neglectful parenting
practices, this knowledge can be used to further tailor interventions that are designed to prevent and reduce child maltreatment. Thus the real promise in identifying and systematically
studying mechanisms will be the ability to develop and refine
interventions designed to reach at-risk populations in those locations where they spend time, allowing us to better determine
what works for whom and under what conditions. Multiple
layers and levels of interventions may help ensure that fewer
families fall through the proverbial cracks and reduce harm
directed towards children.
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Designed to provide security and equity to defined benefit (DB)
pension plans, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) became law in 1974. Since that time, the economy has
shifted to a more globalized, non-unionized, service-based environment, where defined contribution (DC) plans replaced
DB plans as the dominant type of private pension plan. Today
workers and retirees bear the burden of managing their pension
plans and the associated risks. To protect Americans against
the financial risks they face in retirement and ensure greater
economic security in old age, targeted financial education, research, and fundamental pension policy reform are required.
Key words: pensions, ERISA, retirement income, individual responsibility,financial education

Primary government programs, namely Social Security
and Medicare, face significant shortfalls. Social Security, for
example, faces a long-term financial imbalance (Munnell, 2011).
Fewer workers will finance the retirement of the growing baby
boom generation, yielding a system of benefits and current tax
rates that are not sustainable in the future. Medicare, too, is at
risk of not sustaining the current level of health insurance it
provides adults. Between 1996 and 2005 out-of-pocket medical
expenses increased by 39.4 percent (Paez, Zhao, & Hwang,
2009), a trend that is likely to continue. As a result, the role of
private pensions is heightened, requiring private pensions to
contribute larger amounts to retirement income. Nevertheless,
the private pension landscape has shifted in ways that may
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, December 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 4
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result in lower private pension wealth for retirees (Kapinos,
2009).
Private pensions have experienced profound change over
the past forty years. Firms have shifted from the provision of
defined benefit (DB) plans, where the employer bore the economic and demographic risk (Scahill, 1999), to defined contribution (DC) plans. Although the American welfare state is premised on a mix of private, tax-subsidized benefits, that pattern
is being undermined as firms shift to providing 401(k) plans
and reduce the benefits they provide employees (Peters, 2005).
The transition from DB to DC plans has placed a premium on
participants' decision-making competencies (Clark & Strauss,
2008). Today individuals must take more fiscal responsibility
for their pension plans and retirement income, yet many are
not equipped with the knowledge to manage this responsibility. This lack of knowledge can have a profound effect on retirement income and public and private policies, as they relate
to administering private pension income to America's older
adults. The erosion of employee pension benefits will have farreaching effects, potentially decreasing retirement income and
increasing poverty levels in old age.
Historical Development of Private Pensions
The Social Security Act and its Amendments were precursors to the large-scale development of private pension plans
and prompted the growth of private pensions in the United
States. Between 1940 and 1945 the number of pension plans
grew dramatically. In 1940, 1,530 private pensions existed; this
grew to a total of 6,700 in 1945, covering 6.5 million employees
(Ippolito, 1997). This positive growth was due to changes in
tax policy, the stabilization of wages during World War II and
the Korean War, and actions of the War Labor Board (WLB)
(Ippolito, 1997).
To finance World War II, Congress increased the top corporate and individual tax rates; six percent of the nation paid tax
in 1939, which increased to nearly seventy-five percent by 1945
(Sass, 1997). As a result, tax sheltering became an important
concern to the more highly compensated employees (Koff &
Park, 1999). Additionally, the Revenue Act of 1942 regulated
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tax incentives by tightening requirements for the qualification
of pension plans and improving the tax advantage for qualified plans, which included no capitations on pensions paid by
tax-exempt trusts, no vesting requirements, and the regulation
of pension costing and funding (Sass, 1997).
The war experience demonstrated the usefulness of the
pension as a compensatory instrument (Sass, 1997), where the
deferred nature of the compensation would enhance employee
loyalty to the company. As tax rates decreased and wage flexibility returned after 1945, the private pension emerged in the
post-war era as a widely recognized management tool (Sass,
1997).
Labor, too, played a significant role in the development of
pensions. Although organized labor's main interest in private
pensions did not begin until after World War II, two main
forces were instrumental in its development (Hacker, 2002).
Unions, namely The United Auto Workers (UAW), put private
pensions and welfare benefits at the center of their bargaining drives. These organizations embraced fringe benefits, specifically private pensions, in their negotiations with employers because they saw them as effective tools in their battle
for benefits (Hacker, 2002). Second, the Federal government
pushed pensions onto the bargaining table as a means to resist
demands to increase public social insurance (Ippolito, 1997). In
support of labor's efforts, in 1949 the Supreme Court approved
a National Labor Relations Board ruling that pensions were a
legitimate issue to use in collective bargaining (Hudson, 2005).
From 1950 to 1960 the largest employers, namely manufacturers, dominated the pension plan expansion. Over this same
period the number of plans increased dramatically, as did the
proportion of workers covered, which grew from 12 percent to
33 percent between 1940 and 1960 (Sass, 1997). Yet, during the
1950s, complaints surfaced about losses of employee pension
benefits. For those who retired early, the requirements of age
and service were barriers to their receipt of pension benefits
(Hudson, 2005).
Growing evidence of fraud, embezzlement, and the mismanagement of investment pension funds exacerbated these
problems, and Congress responded by enacting the Federal
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 (PL 85-836),
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which was significantly amended in 1962 (McGill, Brown,
Haley, Schieber, & Warshawsky, 2010). A weak component of
the legislation was that plan participants had prime responsibility for monitoring pension plan activity. The individual
plan participants were expected to spot fraud and criminal
activity and the legislation provided them with a way to seek
relief from the wrongdoing (McGill et al., 2010). This was a risk
for participants because few were knowledgeable of pension
plan activity and, for the most part, they had neither the time
nor interest in this responsibility. Additionally, there were a
number of gaps in corporate pension plans, such as the ability
of a corporation to default on its obligations (Sass, 1997). These
gaps alerted policymakers to the need for a new approach to
retirement security. Although there were several attempts to
regulate and oversee aspects of the private pension system
prior to 1974, none were as comprehensive as ERISA.
ERISA
While the number of workers covered by private pensions
increased through the 1960s and the burden of detecting fraud
and criminal activity shifted from the plan participant to the
Departments of Labor and Justice, individual participants had
inadequate protections (Hacker, 2002). The most prominent
issues that fostered the design of ERISA were defaults, namely
that of the Studebaker Company, and abuses that became
public as a result of the Studebaker collapse (Wooten, 2001,
2004).
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation (Studebaker) collapse, a prime focusing event (Wooten, 2001), created the
impetus for moving private pension legislation forward. At
the time, Studebaker was a large automotive manufacturing
company in Indiana. Known as a model welfare capitalist firm,
it had a negotiated contract signed by the UAW Union (Klein,
2003). Although the UAW union was a champion of conservative funding and investing, the Studebaker pension plan did
not have the assets required to redeem all the benefits that
were promised (Sass, 1997). The pension plan was millions
of dollars short and 7,000 workers received little or nothing
from the company (Klein, 2003). Moreover, there was rigorous
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competition from Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler
Corporation, the Big Three automakers, at the time. As a result,
Studebaker closed its South Bend, Indiana plant on November
1, 1964 and terminated its labor contract one month later (Sass,
1997).
Based on the fall of Studebaker in 1964, a number of abuses
in pension plan structure became public and prompted future
legislation. Unreasonably high vesting thresholds prevented
long-time workers from qualifying for benefits (Wooten, 2004).
Also, pension rules defined "unbroken" service in narrow terms.
For example, if a worker was re-assigned to a job with a different classification, this was considered a break in service and
adversely affected the worker's pension benefit. Additionally,
courts upheld practices of employers by reserving their rights
to modify, decrease, or deny benefits or eliminate pensions
at will (Sass, 1997). Employers avoided a number of liabilities by asserting in plan documents that workers were claiming benefits against the plan, and not against the assets of the
corporation (Klein, 2003). Due to these abuses, the Studebaker
shutdown became a catalyst for reform and prompted future
legislation (Wooten, 2001).
Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) to eliminate abuses through greater federal regulation and guarantees (Klein, 2003). Additionally, the UAW
pension specialists devised a remedy that became a precursor to Title IV of ERISA, the termination insurance program
(Wooten, 2001). The remedy moved default risk (risk that a
pension plan will terminate without enough funds to meet its
obligations) (Wooten, 2001) and termination insurance onto
the legislative agenda and stimulated the enactment of private
pension legislation, ERISA. This effort took ten years to come
to fruition.
The ERISA legislation originated as a Presidential initiative
under Kennedy in 1963. Although Johnson pursued the drafting of the ERISA legislation, the labor movement and leading
business groups were hostile to it, so the process came to an
abrupt halt (Hacker, 2002). Nixon's administration countered
the reform agenda, but with his resignation legislators were
eager to prove to the American people that the political process
was not broken. As a result, ERISA legislation was processed
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expeditiously. It passed in the House on August 20, 1974, in
the Senate on August 22, 1974 and was signed by the newly
installed president, Gerald R. Ford, on Labor Day, September
2, 1974 (Sass, 1997).
Although its creation was a lengthy process, ERISA was
designed to redress regulatory shortcomings that deprived
employees of old-age retirement income security (Ledolter &
Power, 1984). Among its many provisions and amendments,
ERISA's over-riding purpose remains the provision of security and equity to the retirement income of private-sector employees (Altman & Marmor, 1988). As the first comprehensive
legislation regulating many aspects of private pensions and
savings plans, ERISA was the product of four congressional
committees: the House Ways and Means Committee, the House
Labor Committee, the Senate Labor Committee, and the Senate
Finance Committee, which are members of the Departments
of Labor and the Treasury (Scahill, 1999). ERISA's objectives
were:
e to ensure that workers and beneficiaries receive
adequate information about their employee benefit
plans;
* to set standards of conduct for those managing
employee benefit plans and plan funds;
9 to determine that adequate funds are set aside to pay
promised pension benefits;
e to ensure that workers receive pension benefits after
they have satisfied certain minimum requirements; and
* to safeguard pension benefits for workers whose
pension plans are terminated. (Coleman, 1989, p. 3)
The successes of ERISA are noteworthy; benefit security
and fiduciary responsibility have improved, as has funding
for poorly managed funds (Scahill, 1999). As a result, between
1975 and 2005 there was a significant increase in total number
of pension plans, number of participants, as well as in the financial assets of private pension funds. More retirees and employees are participating in pension plans than ever before.
Through the ERISA legislation, employers are required to
adhere to guidelines that did not exist prior to 1974.
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Pension Eligibility, Participation,
and the Termination of Plans
For pension plans to operate fairly and effectively, ERISA
requires certain criteria to be met. For example, to participate
in a private pension plan, an employee must be eligible. The
term 'eligibility' refers to the conditions an employee must
meet before being covered by a pension plan; these conditions
generally involve attaining a minimum age and completing a
minimum period of service with an employer (Coleman, 1989).
ERISA does not set these minimums; it only requires that these
criteria are set in advance, are clearly communicated to participants, and are not arbitrarily changed by the employer (Sass,
1997).
Pension contributions begin to accrue as soon as an employee satisfies eligibility requirements and becomes a participant in a pension plan. Yet, no legal right to receive any
benefits from those contributions exists until an employee
becomes vested (Coleman, 1989). Vesting periods are waiting
periods before rights to benefits can be exercised (Crystal &
Shea, 2003). These periods are established by employers and
can range from five to fifteen years. Once vested, an employee "owns" the right to receive a retirement benefit from that
plan when retired; in most cases, this right is maintained even
if they leave that employer (Coleman, 1989). If an employee
leaves a company before vesting, they forfeit any right to a
benefit upon retirement.
Benefits accrue differently in defined benefit (DB) and
defined contribution (DC) plans. In DB plans, once an employee is a participant, the employee begins to accrue a specific amount of money each year toward a monthly retirement
benefit (Coleman, 1989), which is invested by the employer.
The amount accrued each year is based on a formula applied
to salary and years of service. The employee gains a legal right
to the accruals, when vested, but does not actually receive the
benefit until the agreed-upon retirement period time is reached.
In a DC plan, the participant's accrued benefit is the balance in
an individual's account and is invested and managed by the
participant.
In 1974, at the time of the implementation of ERISA,
three Federal agencies were made responsible for its

56

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

administration: the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), the Department of the Treasury, including the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Department of Labor's
Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA). While the
latter two are responsible for DB and DC benefit plans, including 401(k) plans, the PBGC guarantees benefits of DB plans
only. The PBGC was designed to reduce the risk of pension
forfeiture by mandating that all firms participate in a common
insurance pool (Hacker, 2002). This governmental underwriting of private pension risk marked a novel departure for the
federal government in the pension field (Hacker, 2002).
The PBGC is a tax-exempt, self-financed, independent
corporation, whose income comes from premiums paid by
private pension plans that are subject to termination insurance
(Coleman, 1989). It provides plan termination insurance ensuring employees are paid at least part of their benefits upon termination of a plan. Additionally, it is liable for the payment of
all guaranteed or insured benefits in single-employer benefit
plans. The PBGC also provides loans to financially troubled
multi-employer pension plans (Coleman, 1989). The PBGC receives no funds from general tax revenue, and its obligations
are not backed by the credit of the U.S. government (Sass, 1997).
Its operations are funded by the insurance premiums, assets
from pension plans trusteed to PBGC, investment income,
and recoveries from companies responsible for trusteed plans
(Sass, 1997).
Today the PBGC insures the pensions of 44 million workers
in more than 27,000 private sector DB pension plans (U. S.
Government Accountability Office, 2011a). Yet, during the past
decade, the PBGC has come under pressure. There has been
an unprecedented number of pension plan terminations with
substantial levels of underfunding. A number of insolvent pensions, predominantly in the airline industry, were turned over
to the PBGC in the early 2000s, which assumed the pensions'
liabilities. In 2004 the PBGC posted its largest shortfall in the
agency's 30-year history. Losses from completed and probable
pension plan terminations totaled $14.7 billion for the year (U.
S. Government Accountability Office, 2011a). At the end of
fiscal year 2010, the PBGC's net accumulated financial deficit
was $23 billion (U. S. Government Accountability Office,
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2011a). As a result, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) placed the PBGC's single-employer program on its list
of 'high risk' government programs in need of immediate attention in July, 2003 and added the multiemployer program
to the list in January, 2009 (U. S. Government Accountability
Office, 2011a). Today each program faces increased risk due to
the steep downturn in the financial markets (U. S. Government
Accountability Office, 2011a).
Operation of Private Pension Plans
In 2004, 51 percent of all workers in the United States
between the ages of 21 and 64 participated in an employersponsored private pension plan (Munnell & Perun, 2006). In
addition to an employee's level of income, participation in employer-sponsored plans depends on the size of the employer,
employment status (e.g., full-time or part-time), age, union
status, tenure, and industry. Until recently, employers offered
retirement benefits because of Federal income tax advantages,
the anticipated reduction in employee turnover, and as a retirement incentive for older employees (Ippolito, 1997), creating powerful financial incentives that influence individual
work and retirement decisions of employees and employers.
As a form of deferred income, private pensions are administered as DB and DC plans. The employer, who makes pre-tax
contributions into a pension fund for all participants, funds
the DB plan. Participants typically do not make contributions.
Plan contributions are held in a trust on behalf of all participants, where contributions are subject to federal funding rules
and regulations. In this type of pension plan, the employer
owns the assets in the fund, directs the investments, and bears
the risk (Gale, Papke, & VanDerhei, 2005). A DB plan provides
income that commences after an employee retires; this is considered a guaranteed annuity.
As long as the employer's financial health is strong, the fulfillment of retirement income is probable through a DB plan.
However, when businesses encounter financial difficulty, the
promise is at-risk. Since this risk jeopardizes retiree's incomes,
employers are required to pre-fund DB pension plans. Through
the ERISA legislation, the PBGC guarantees the benefits within
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limits and charges insurance premiums to the plans, which
are intended to cover the agency's expected costs (Gale et al.,
2005).
In contrast to a DB plan, a DC plan provides an employee
with an individual account in which the benefit provided consists of contributions made by the employee and the employer,
and includes any investment earnings gained. The employer's
contributions are based on a pre-determined formula; most
often the employee and the employer contributions are placed
in an individual account on behalf of the participant. It is then
the responsibility of the participant to manage the investment,
and as a result, the employee bears the risk of the fluctuating
asset values (Gale et al., 2005). A DC plan is not subject to the
termination insurance program (PBGC), hence the individual
bears the risk of the plan.
Figure 1. Number of Private Pension Plans by Type (1975-2005)
[E

08 Plans

U

DC Plans

1

Source: U.S.Department of Labor (2011) (Table El)

A hybrid of a DB and DC plan also exists and is known as a
cash balance plan. Cash balance plans, introduced by Bank of
America in the early 1980s, are DB plans that look and feel like
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DC plans, where the basic benefit is provided as a lump-sum,
and not as an annuity (McGill et al., 2010). An annual allocation is provided to the participant's account as a percentage
of pay; these accounts grow through a rate established by a
predetermined formula (McGill et al, 2010). Schieber (2005) reported that hybrid plans are preferable for younger and more
mobile workers.
Figure 2. Number of Private Pension Plan Participants by Type, in
thousands (1975-2005)
E-

DB Plans
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Source: U.S.Department of Labor (2011) (Table ES)

As Figures 1 and 2 indicate, since the enactment of ERISA in
1974, the number of pension plans and participants in pension
plans grew dramatically. The total number of DB and DC plans
grew from 311,100 in 1975 to 680,000 in 2005, where DC plans
accounted for the majority of the growth. In 1975, 66.8 percent
of all plans were DC plans, whereas in 2005, 93 percent of all
plans were DC plans. New plan formations in recent years
have been small, with the total of single-employer private
plans increasing by about 1 percent, where new plan creations
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were offset by terminations and mergers (U. S. Government
Accountability Office, 2011b). These trends are noteworthy
because of their implications for workers and retirees.
In addition, there has been a significant increase in the
total number of plan participants. In 1975, approximately 44.5
million individuals participated in a private pension plan; this
increased to 117 million in 2005 (U. S. Department of Labor,
2011), a 163 percent increase in the number of participants.
Similar to the growth in the number of DC plans, the number
of DC plan participants also grew more than DB plan participants. In 1975, 26 percent of the total participants were in DC
plans; whereas in 2005, 64 percent were in DC plans (U. S.
Department of Labor, 2011).
Corporations that replaced DB plans with DC plans predominantly responded to a dynamic economic and political
environment. DB plans initially evolved with the growth of the
manufacturing sector in the United States. Essentially, large
firms and unionized work forces bargained for these plans. But
as the economy shifted to a more non-unionized, service-based
environment, DC plans proliferated. Moreover, government
regulation is known to be more onerous on DB plans than on
DC plans. The PBGC requires firms offering DB plans to pay
premiums to maintain insurance; the regulations for DB plans
impose a complicated set of funding rules, limitations, and
regulations pertaining to pension investment (Clark, Craig, &
Wilson, 2003). As a result, shifts in union status, firm size, and
regulations explain much of the trend toward DC plans.
Employees gained control of their retirement benefits
through the proliferation of DC plans. They then had the ability
to manage their individual retirement accounts, contribute to
them, and take the accounts with them when they left their
employers. With the advent of 401(K) plans, the predominant
type of DC plan, workers gained the ability to direct their own
investments. Employees were offered the ability to make taxdeductible employee contributions, making this investment
vehicle quite attractive (Brown, 2008).
Yet, the pension landscape was not secure for retirees
during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s. Funding rules were weak
and premiums for plans covered by the PBGC were not adequate. Additionally, some employers began manipulating DB
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pension plan benefits to serve corporate profitability and did
not adequately provide the retirement security that workers
expected. This trend is documented by Schultz (2011), who
claimed that in the 1990s corporations used a variety of accounting techniques, tax incentives, and other forms of manipulation to syphon money from pension plans and serve
corporate purposes. She provides an example called the "accounting effect," where a company could reduce benefits by
hundreds of millions of dollars and record the change as a
profit. This practice benefited corporate executives, who were
compensated by reaching certain profit targets, and shareholders, but in many cases workers and retirees, subjected to this
deception and fraud, were cheated out of retirement income.
Many workers did not realize they were victimized until the
DB plans went into default and were turned over to the PBGC.
The Pension Protection Act of 2006
The underfunding of pension plans continued to threaten firms' abilities to pay retirees their pensions (Campbell,
Dhaliwal, & Schwartz, 2010). Pension defaults threatened the
fiscal viability of the PBGC. In 2005, when United Airlines
became the largest pension default in U.S. history, pension
legislation regained its prominence in Congress. In response
to the pension crisis, Congress adopted the Pension Protection
Act of 2006 (PPA), which is a comprehensive piece of legislation. Initiated as PL 109-280, the PPA passed the House by a
vote of 279-131 on July 28, 2006. The Senate voted 93 to 5 to
approve the bill on August 3 and the legislation was signed
into law on August, 17, 2006 by President George W. Bush.
The PPA provided major revisions to the DB pension
system, DC qualified plans, individual retirement accounts,
and annuities (Landsberg, 2008). Silver-Malyska and Jenkins
(2006) claimed that the focus of the law was to increase funding
for DB plans through stricter fund requirements and limits on
benefit increases and lump-sum distributions. The PPA made
significant changes to the rules governing DC plans as well,
specifically provisions that encourage automatic enrollment.
The GAO (US Government Accountability Office, 2011b)
reported:
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In order to encourage greater participation by
employees with access to an employer-sponsored
pension plan, provisions of the Pension Protection Act
of 2006 facilitated the adoption of automatic enrollment
policies in DC plans by providing incentives for
doing so and by protecting plans from fiduciary and
legal liability if certain conditions are met. With such
policies, new hires and existing employees who are not
contributing to their 401(k) plan would be automatically
enrolled and contributing unless they affirmatively
take action to stop those contributions. (p. 9)

Data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) show that
in 2008 about 53 percent of private-sector wage and salary
workers, aged 25 - 64, worked for employers that sponsored a
retirement plan, and about 44 percent participated in a plan (US
Government Accountability Office, 2011b). Because the CPS
does not ask respondents about the type of pension plan, the
data reflect both DC and DB plans. Yet, in DB plans, coverage
and participation are synonymous, whereas in DC plans participation is voluntary, resulting in varying rates of coverage
and participation (Purcell, 2004). The automatic 401(k), which
harnesses the power of inertia by setting the default option at
each phase of the 401(k) saving cycle, is designed to improve
retirement security for millions of workers without requiring
them to become financial experts (Gale, lwry, & Walters, 2009).
In sum, although the PPA made progress in improving the
PBGC program and in providing automatic enrollment to employees, it did not fully correct the firms' failures to fund their
pension obligations adequately. Since the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (2011a) designated single-employer and
multiemployer DB pension plans as high-risk in 2003 and 2009,
respectively, the financial position of the PBGC remains poor.
Additionally, today half of the workforce lacks access to any
employer plan, requiring these individuals to rely on savings
and Social Security in retirement. These issues remain a challenge. Between worries about insolvency of Social Security, the
substantial underfunding of public, state, and local pension
plans, high profile losses in 401(k) plans at firms like Enron, the
impact of the recent economic recession, and the fact that the
PBGC had an accumulated deficit of $23 million in September,
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2010, more than double the deficit of two years earlier (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2011a), public confidence
in the nation's retirement system is low (Brown, 2008).
Expanded Role of the Individual
The GAO reported that over the last three decades, DC
plans have replaced DB plans as the dominant type of privatesector employer pension plan and, by almost any measure,
have taken on a primary role in how workers save for retirement (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011b). By 2007
(the most recent year with available data), DC plans comprised
93.1% of all plans and active DC participants in the private
sector outnumbered those in DB plans 66.9 million to 19.4
million (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011b).
Table 1: Life Expectancy at Birth, 1970 - 2007, and Projected Life
Expectancy, 2010 - 2020
Total
Male
Female
Year
74.7
70.8
67.1
1970
77.4
70.0
73.7
1980
75.4
71.8
78.8
1990
76.8
74.1
79.3
2000
75.4
80.4
77.9
2007
75.7
80.8
78.3
2010 (Projected)
81.4
78.9
76.4
2015 (Projected)
81.9
79.5
77.1
2020 (Projected)
Source: Xu, Kochanek, Murphy, & Tejada-Vera, 2010

By participating in a DC plan, individuals enjoy the benefits and flexibility of saving for retirement. DC plans provide
lump-sum payments; they offer workers more liquidity before
and during retirement, and they are portable, which means
that workers can take their individual funds with them when
they leave their company (Hacker, 2002). This type of disbursement is appealing to many employees and employers,
but may present a challenge to an employee or retiree who is
unfamiliar with the concepts of amortization and life expectancy, and lacks knowledge about investment options and the
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associated tax implications. Ideally, it is in the best interest of the
employee and retiree to invest this lump-sum so it will last
through the retirement years. If an individual does not have
this knowledge or foresight, the DC participant essentially
faces the risk of outliving his or her pension income. In light
of existing and projected increasing life expectancies (Table
1), outliving one's income is possible for many older men and
women. In addition to the benefits accrued by participating in
a DC plan, there are risks.
The recent economic recession created significant financial
losses for many Americans. Not only did the decline in equity
values decrease 401(k) accounts by 30%, many Americans lost
their jobs, corporations suspended their 401(k) matches, and
hardship withdrawals from 401(k) accounts ticked upward
(Munnell, Kopcke, Golub-Sass, & Muldoon, 2009). Based on
these recent developments, income from a DC pension plan is
likely to be less than anticipated. In addition, there has been an
overall decline in plan coverage and participation between 2000
and 2008 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2011b). And
among those who participate in a plan, mistakes are made in
the management of their accounts (Munnell & Sunden, 2004).
Over half fail to diversify their investments, many over-invest
in company stock, and almost none re-balance their portfolios in response to their age or market returns (Munnell, 2006).
Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and Yamaguchi (2006) found that
most workers with DC plans are inattentive portfolio managers and are characterized by inertia. The declining prevalence
of DB pensions that provided a guaranteed lifelong income
have put much of the responsibility for preparing for retirement directly on workers (Purcell, 2009), yet there is little evidence that supports the notion that workers are equipped to
handle this responsibility.
In order to make informed financial decisions about
issues such as financial entitlements, pension plans, insurance
matters, investment strategies, budgeting, and health care
(Mackell, 2008; Skinner, 2007), Americans must be financially
educated and learn to view themselves as individually responsible for their financial well-being. Those who lack financial
literacy are less likely to plan for retirement, are more likely to
be poor in retirement, are less likely to invest in stocks, and are
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more likely to accumulate expensive debt (Lusardi & Mitchell,
2008). Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a, 2007b) also found that
financial literacy is not widespread among older Americans.
Only half of the respondents aged 50 and over could correctly answer questions about compound interest and inflation.
Additionally, women displayed much lower levels of financial
literacy, raising concerns about the ability of older women to
make sound saving and investment decisions related to their
retirement (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2008).
Discussion
As the first wave of baby boomers turns 65 years of age
in 2011, governmental agencies, researchers and policy makers
are at a pivotal crossroad. ERISA and the PPA promised greater
economic security to employees and private pension retirees.
Although these promises may have been met early in the ERISA
and PPA life-cycles, pension policy of the past decades has
reduced the retirement security of the baby boom generation
and is not capable of delivering the necessary pension protections of today's economic environment. Economic uncertainty,
increased globalization, an increased non-unionized workforce, and longer life expectancies for men and women necessitate further change in the pension system. Baby boomers will
be the first generation to have spent their whole careers under
the regulated retirement system that exists today (Schieber,
2005), where there has been a transfer of fiscal responsibility
from employers to pension plan participants. As a result, we
must work to minimize financial risks older Americans will
face in retirement. Following are a few practice, policy, and research considerations.
Because financial literacy is associated with retirement
planning and planning has a positive relationship with retirement savings (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007b), offering targeted
financial education programs is critical, specifically among minorities and women, who face the greatest economic risk in
retirement. It is unlikely that men and women will spend the
time and money needed to develop the financial knowledge
necessary to make informed investment decisions (Schulz,
Rosenman, & Rix, 1999). Hence, workers should be trained
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and educated about financial issues while in the workplace
(Kim, 2008). In a study of benefit administrators at 212 corporations, Volpe, Chen, and Liu (2006) recommended that future
educational programs focus on retirement planning and the
basics of personal finance because employees have inadequate
knowledge in these two areas. The positive impact of financial knowledge extends beyond retirement planning (Hira &
Loibl, 2005), and is known to benefit the employer and employee through increased levels of productivity and decreased
absenteeism (Kim & Garman, 2003). In addition to offering targeted financial education programs, comprehensive research
that evaluates existing programs is needed, focusing on the
long-term effects of participants' financial well-being among
the diverse array of workforce populations (Kim, 2008).
Moreover, we face a major challenge understanding the relationship between behaviors and economic decision-making.
The field of behavioral economics, combining research from
psychology and economics, offers a unique area of developing knowledge that can help us better understand the motives,
acts, thoughts, and feelings behind the behaviors related to
participating in pension plans. Developing a common language and framework to promote interdisciplinary research
and an exchange of knowledge (Heckman, 2011) in these two
fields is recommended.
Additionally, there are a number of areas where pension
policy reform is required. One area pertains to the retirement
savings behaviors of individuals. For example, automatic enrollment plans and lifecycle balancing plans (Mitchell et al.,
2006) anticipated increased levels of retirement savings, but
they have not realized their intended impact. Tergesen (2011)
reported that the total amount put into 401(k) plans increased
by 13 percent since 2006, but the average savings rate has fallen
in recent years. Additionally, some employers have not yet
offered their employees the auto-enrollment feature because of
the cost of the employer match to the organization. Life-cycle
balancing plans, which balance risk and return for investors
using a pre-determined time horizon, have not yet produced
their intended results either. Many investors do not participate
in these types of plans. Consequently, revised pension policy
correcting these unintended consequences is needed.
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Because the increased administration cost associated with
government regulations exceeded the tax advantage of pension
saving for workers at lower pay levels in small employers,
many small employers terminated their DB plans over the
past two decades (McGill et al., 2010). This has resulted in low
participation rates for low-income workers. Congress should
consider the implications of their past pension policies and
promote pension policies with lower administration costs so
smaller employers can offer attractive pension plans to all employees, specifically, low-income workers. Moreover, tighter
federal regulations are needed to control the retirement system
that has been abused by corporations, who siphoned money
from pension plans to serve corporate purposes. These executives managed the system for their own benefit at the expense
of the retirement security of employees and retirees.
An additional policy recommendation pertains to
strengthening the PBGC. Similar to legislation introduced by
Senator Kohl (D-WI) in 2009, entitled The PBGC Governance
Improvement Act of 2009 (S. 1544), future legislation is required
to strengthen the limitations of the PBGC, specifically its structure and practices. The proposed legislation of 2009 amended
ERISA by revising the composition and duties of the Board of
Directors of the PBGC and requested that the Board form audit
and investment committees to improve their effectiveness and
establish a risk management position. If this type of legislation is enhanced, re-introduced, and ultimately becomes law,
the improved functioning of the PBGC would be one positive
step toward providing better protection to millions of workers
participating in DB plans.
Policy initiatives that respond to the current economic
environment, which is similar to the economic period when
DB plans were first introduced, will be beneficial also. Federal
policy that promotes the growth of pension plans with DB
characteristics, including DB-DC hybrids, the DB(k) plan, and
traditional multiemployer portable DB plans that are common
among mobile workforces (Ghilarducci, 2006) may offer viable
alternatives to employees and employers. For example, in
DB-DC plans, employees and employers contribute to the plan,
but the employee does not have the responsibility for managing it (Munnell & Quinby, 2009). In fact, in the Netherlands,
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where collective risk-sharing is preferred to individual investor autonomy, hybrid pension plans (also known as "averagewage" schemes) have evolved, which effectively balance risk
among employers, employees, and retirees and help maintain
social solidarity among its citizens (Ponds & van Riel, 2007).
The economic environment has changed drastically over
the past 40 years. The role of private pension plans is heightened because of the financial shortfalls facing Social Security
and Medicare. Public policy has had a huge impact on pensions
in the past and could provide greater security in the future.
Legislation that protects the financial interests of workers and
programs that increase financial knowledge among workers
and retirees will provide a critical path toward ensuring financial well-being in late life. Additionally, pension policy
should guard against financial risks and promote participation
so workers of all income levels have an incentive to participate in a private pension plan. Pension reforms that improve
retirement security are needed. By fixing the private pension
system, confidence in the nation's retirement system will be
restored.
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Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are among the
primary means for promoting reconciliation in communities recovering from violent conflict. However, there is a lack of consensus about what reconciliation means or how it is best achieved.
In a qualitative study of the first TRC in the U.S., this research
interviewed victims of racial violence who participated in the
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission (GTRC),
a community-based restorative justice intervention. Findings
reveal that participantsconceptualized reconciliationas a multileveled process, that different concepts of reconciliation influenced assessments of the success and limitations of the GTRC,
and indicate how community-based restorative interventions
can be improved to contribute to reconciliation in a local setting.
Key words: reconciliation, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, restorative justice, victims, violence, post-conflict reconstruction, peace building

Advocates of peace and nonviolence have long sought to
find solutions to the problems of war, violent conflict and oppression (Adams, 1991), from Jane Addams' peace activism
during WWI (Addams, 1922) to Gandhi's nonviolent revolution in India (Hiranandani, 2008). After the Nuremberg trials
following WWII, war crimes trials and tribunals became the
preferred means of addressing violence in the post-conflict
setting (Stover & Weinstein, 2004). However, the limitations
to implementing such trials include settings with an underdeveloped rule of law, jurisdictional restrictions, and political
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, December 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 4
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compromises necessary to establish peace. Furthermore, trials
are not victim-centered and do not promote the reconciliation
of conflicting groups.
Addressing these shortcomings, restorative justice has
emerged as a field of theory and practice that seeks to repair
the social fabric that is damaged through violence (Braithwaite,
2002). Restorative justice has been applied to child welfare
(Adams & Chandler, 2004) criminal justice (Umbreit & Armour,
2011), and international conflict resolution and peace-making (Beck, Kropf, & Leonard, 2011; Moore, 2004). Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are restorative justicebased interventions that promote the social recovery from violence through reconciliation (Androff, 2010b). Originating in
Africa and Latin America, TRCs have been applied globally,
most famously in South Africa in the peaceful transition from
Apartheid to democracy (Hayner, 2001). The international
community, state actors and community activists have implemented TRCs and other reconciliation interventions at international, national and local levels, despite a lack of consensus on
reconciliation's meaning or how to best achieve it.
This study examines the first TRC to be applied in the U.S.,
a community-based restorative justice intervention that sought
to promote reconciliation in Greensboro, North Carolina after
decades of division and animosity following a 1979 incident
of racial violence. Through the perspectives of victims of the
violence that participated in the TRC, this research seeks to understand reconciliation in a local, community-based context.
This study investigates: how victims' expectations, perceptions, and experiences with reconciliation reflect differing conceptual understandings of reconciliation; how the Greensboro
TRC (GTRC) attempted to accomplish reconciliation; and the
limits of reconciliation in local settings. A better understanding of what reconciliation means in a local U.S. context and the
successes and limitations of the TRC in achieving reconciliation will lead to improved interventions for promoting peace
and rebuilding communities recovering from violence.
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The Greensboro Truth & Reconciliation Commission
The Greensboro Massacre was an episode of racial violence that occurred on November 3, 1979 in Greensboro, North
Carolina (GTRC, 2006; Magarrell & Wesley, 2008). A racially
mixed group of labor and social justice activists with ties to
the Communist Worker's Party had been organizing for labor
rights in North Carolina. Members had gained union leadership positions inside textile mills, and began to protest an increase of Ku Klux Klan (KKK) activity in the state. Earlier in
1979, the KKK screened their recruitment film, Birth of a Nation,
in a community theatre and the activists protested outside
and burnt a confederate flag. Vowing revenge, the KKK and
members of the American Nazi Party made plans to attend a
future demonstration; provocative and violent rhetoric escalated between the groups. The Greensboro Police Department
and the FBI had an informant in the KKK and knowledge that
the groups were arming themselves in preparation for the
demonstration, yet there was no law enforcement presence
on the day of the rally. On November 3, 1979, the demonstrators held a social justice rally and community teach-in a lowincome, African American neighborhood in Greensboro that
was to culminate in a march. KKK and American Nazi Party
members arrived at the demonstration in a caravan, and a fight
broke out. The KKK and Nazis fired into the crowd, killing five
demonstrators and injuring ten more.
Afterwards, police arrested some victims and surveilled
others (Bermanzohn, 2003; GTRC, 2006; Waller, 2002). City
authorities prevented further protests, harassed the survivors, and pressured the local media to portray the violence
as an equal shootout between two radical fringe groups, even
though only one side suffered casualties. The victims were
portrayed in the media as outside agitators without community ties. Despite video footage of the shooting, the perpetrators
were acquitted in two criminal trials by all-white juries. The
District Attorney responsible for prosecuting the shooters was
hostile to the victims, and denied publically any difference
between killing communists in Vietnam and killing them in
the U.S. Distrust of the city government grew among the lowincome and African American residents, as many suspected
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that law enforcement agencies were complicit in the violence.
The fallout increased racial tensions and a climate of animosity that negatively affected life in Greensboro (Wheaton, 1987).
The survivors dedicated themselves to pursuing justice
for the dead and the truth about the violence (Bermanzohn,
2003; Waller, 2002). In 1985 they won a federal civil suit against
the Greensboro Police Department and the perpetrators. The
settlement launched the Greensboro Justice Fund, a civil rights
organization promoting democracy and racial tolerance in the
U.S. South. One survivor founded the Beloved Community
Center, which advocates for criminal justice and education
reform, campaigns for the homeless, and has organized K-Mart
workers.
The idea of reinvestigating the Greensboro Massacre was
discussed at the 2 0 th anniversary of the violence by survivors
and community leaders impressed by the success of the South
African TRC. With philanthropic funding and NGO consultants, they decided to apply a similar model to Greensboro.
In 2004 the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(GTRC) was created with a mandate to examine the causes
and consequences of November, 3, 1979 and to promote dialogue and reconciliation. In an effort to ensure that the process
would be objective in its investigation and independent from
the victims, the organizers conducted an inclusive selection
process to choose the seven Commissioners that would lead
the GTRC.
While many of the participants in the GTRC were victims
and concerned community members, Greensboro police personnel, lawyers from the criminal trials, and a few of the perpetrators came forward to participate (GTRC, 2006; Williams,
2009). The Mayor and the City Council of Greensboro declined to participate and actually opposed the process, even
though all the African American City Council members voted
in favor of supporting the GTRC. Those who were opposed
to the GTRC, including the city administration, claimed that
Greensboro's racial problems were in the past and irrelevant
to contemporary life, and that focusing on old issues would
harm Greensboro's image. Further, the reaction of the wider
community was mixed; there was a lot of support in the form
of donations and volunteers, but many in Greensboro were
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confused by, ignorant or critical of the GTRC for being overly
focused upon the victims.
Without any governmental support, the grassroots GTRC
did not enjoy subpoena powers to compel the disclosure of
records or the testimony of individuals. The GTRC took voluntary statements from approximately 200 people, including
victims, perpetrators, and community members, and held three
public hearings on the events leading up to the violence, the
events of November 3, 1979, and the consequences of the violence. They consulted the records they could obtain, however,
many documents released under the Freedom of Information
Act were significantly redacted. The GTRC concluded in 2006
with the release of the Final Report, a comprehensive account
of their findings and recommendations for the community.
As an intervention, the GTRC faced significant constraints
of funding, time, and authority that limited the scope of its
work. Functioning as a grassroots community-based initiative without governmental support, the GTRC operated on a
shoestring budget and with a small staff supported primarily
by volunteers. By design, the GTRC was a time-limited intervention; the Commissioners were empanelled in 2004 and the
Final Report was released in 2006. While it accomplished a lot
in its two years, its work was also constrained by these time
limits. The third limit on the GTRC's functioning was the lack
of sanction and support from the City of Greensboro. In addition to the technical limitations of not having subpoena power
to compel participation and obtain records, this may have
harmed the appearance of the GTRC's legitimacy for some in
the Greensboro community and contributed to the relatively
low turnout of perpetrators that participated in the GTRC.
That the GTRC was organized and completed its work in the
face of these constraints is remarkable.
Reconciliation
Definitions of Reconciliation
Reconciliation is as popular a concept as it is unclear.
Connotations of social harmony have led to unrealistic expectations of friendly relationships between warring parties
(Kumar, 1999; Stover & Weinstein, 2004) and the goal of reconciliation has been dismissed as an ephemeral and spiritual
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but impractical goal (Boraine, 2004; Tutu, 1999). Despite this
conceptual confusion, the term abounds in social science and
post-conflict projects around the world.
Reconciliation's etymology from Latin means 'coming together,' and its main usage has been theological (Boraine, 2004;
Kumar, 1999; Minow, 1998; Tutu, 1999). Most definitions of
reconciliation in post-conflict settings involve communication
and mutual tolerance between opposing groups (Minow, 1998).
Reconciliation has been defined as the "mutually conciliatory
accommodation between antagonistic or formerly antagonistic persons or groups" (Kriesberg, 2007, p. 2), where each side
accepts the other's "right to co-exist" (Kumar, 1999, p. 1). The
peaceful co-existence of both victims and perpetrators of violence is the goal of reconciliation, achieved through normalized relations (Rosenberg, 1994) that involve both "restoring
dignity to victims" and "dealing respectfully with those who
assisted or were complicit with the violence" (Minow, 1998, p.
23). Stover and Weinstein (2004) prefer social reconstruction or
reclamation to describe restoring safety, rejecting wrongdoing,
and rebuilding communities after violence.
The willingness to 'put up with' people or groups that one
previously was openly hostile towards is an essential ingredient of reconciliation (Cox & Pawar, 2006; Gibson, 2004; Stover
& Weinstein, 2004). Increased cooperation and mutual tolerance through intergroup engagement and dialogue is based
upon the social contact hypothesis of intergroup relations,
which holds that the more people interact, the more likely they
are to tolerate and accept each other. Applying this concept to
post-Apartheid South Africa, Gibson (2004) found that "interracial reconciliation is heavily dependent upon interracial contacts" (p. 20).
Reconciliation does not necessarily entail forgiveness,
which is often criticized as an unrealistic goal following violence (Kumar, 1999; Minow, 1998; Tutu, 1999). Reconciliation
interventions and TRCs sometimes lead to forgiveness, such
as when a former Apartheid death squad commander was
forgiven by the widows of his victims after he participated in
the South African TRC and apologized (Gobodo-Madikizela,
2003). Despite a significant social psychology literature on
interpersonal conflict and forgiveness (Enright, 2001), little
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attention has been paid to the meaning and process of reconciliation among victims of violence (Androff, 2010a).
Approaches to Reconciliation
Varying approaches differ on how to best achieve reconciliation, ranging from retributive justice, restorative justice,
political, and social justice perspectives. Retributive justice
advocates maintain that reconciliation is a by-product of the
rule of law, and view criminal prosecutions as the best route to
achieving reconciliation (Stover & Weinstein, 2004). Restorative
justice emphasizes repairing the social fabric through mediation and dialogue between victims and offenders (Braithwaite,
2002; Umbreit & Armour, 2011), and views reconciliation as a
process of re-humanization necessary to reverse the negative
stereotypes and dehumanization that accompanies violent
conflict (Androff, 2012b; Ajdukovic & Corkalo, 2004; Halpern
& Weinstein, 2004). The political approach defines reconciliation as an exercise in state-building and democratization
(Gibson, 2004). Restoring democratic discourse, supporting
pluralism and diversity, adopting peaceful dispute resolution
and joint participation in communal life are linked to strengthening civil society, open elections, and reforming institutions.
Those who argue for compensatory or distributive justice hold
that reconciliation would be best achieved through reparations
and structural changes to the economic system (Minow, 1998).
This perspective recognizes the role of inequality and structural violence in perpetuating physical violence.
Combining these perspectives and drawing from
Bronfenbrenner and community psychology, Stover and
Weinstein (2004) have proposed an ecological model of social
reconstruction and reconciliation. This systems approach
echoes social work's paradigm of the person-in-environment
perspective (Payne, 2005). Stover and Weinstein (2004) define
their ecological model as "a process that reaffirms and develops a society and its institutions based on shared values and
human rights" and includes legal, education, economic and intergroup engagement interventions to address the factors that
led to the conflict at the levels of individuals, communities and
the state (p. 5).
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Reconciliationas a Multi-leveled Process
Research by Stover and Weinstein (2004) reveals that social
reconstruction and reconciliation is a slow process, occurs on
multiple levels (individual, community, and state) and is affected by social identity, collective memory, and intergroup
interaction. Daly and Sarkin (2007) also contend that reconciliation occurs on multiple levels ranging from individual
to the international. Androff (2010a) developed a typology of
interpersonal reconciliation that includes cognitive-affective
reconciliation (changes within individuals), behavioral reconciliation (a gesture made by one person towards another),
and social reconciliation (acknowledgment of another's behavioral reconciliation resulting in transformed relationships).
Reconciliation also can occur within communities, as former
perpetrators and victims learn to coexist, and within nations,
when people are reconciled with the state following repression
and persecution. International reconciliation refers to peaceful
relations between nations following conflict.
In addition to occurring on multiple levels, reconciliation
is also thought to be a process that unfolds in stages (Maynard,
1999; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). Most stage models of reconciliation and social recovery from violence include the steps of
establishing safety, establishing culturally appropriate modes
of bereavement, restoring trust and morality, and facilitating
dialogue and education. Establishing safety is paramount; reconciliation initiatives often fail if the violent conflict is ongoing
(Hayner, 2001). Bereavement entails cultural mourning practices of ceremony, art, dance, music, and drama that contribute to healing (Minow, 1998). Rebuilding trust and morality
includes re-humanizing victims and perpetrators, promoting
empathy, and creating a historical record of the injustices
(Androff, 2012b). Dialogue and education foster critical reflection on the causes and consequences of the conflict, and work
to cultivate respect and prevent future violence (Freedman et
al., 2004).
TRCs' Contribution to Reconciliation
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs) are restorative justice interventions that investigate human rights
abuses, political repression and violent conflict, and are one of
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the most popular post-conflict interventions for repairing the
social fabric (Androff, 2010b). The truth-seeking function of
TRCs is a narrative process that aims to add victims' stories to
the historical record (Androff, 2012a). The reconciliation function of TRCs seeks to repair the relationships between victims,
perpetrators and the community. TRCs promote reconciliation by bringing together perpetrators, victims, and community members who may have been witnesses or supporters
of various sides; all are given the opportunity to share their
experiences and engage in dialogue. TRCs also contribute to
reconciliation through public hearings, community mediation
ceremonies, reparations and restitution. These strategies often
incorporate traditional or indigenous models of community
reconciliation and restoration by combining local culture, religion, and conflict resolution techniques into TRCs. The South
African TRC emphasized an African concept of collectivity,
unbuntu (Hayner, 2001), the Timor-Leste TRC incorporated
animist shamans into local reconciliation ceremonies (Androff,
2008), and the Greensboro TRC worked with Christian churches, labor and civil rights leaders (Magarrell & Wesley, 2008).
TRCs must operate in the wider context of social reconstruction; the social recovery from violence, injustice, and repression is a large context for post-conflict interventions. TRCs
do not constitute a comprehensive intervention for achieving
reconciliation, and should be one tool among many. The GTRC
did not result in total reconciliation in Greensboro, yet was
able to contribute to reconciliation in important ways. TRCs
are best understood as limited mechanisms that can contribute to a range of broader reconstruction efforts and can accomplish certain goals under certain conditions. If these are
clarified, TRCs can be successful interventions in an ecological
framework of post-conflict reconstruction. TRCs play a significant role with other social reconstruction efforts, including
legal trials, economic development, education reform, as well
as cultural practices that promote community bereavement,
the re-humanization of social groups, trust building between
groups, and peaceful conflict resolution.
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Methods
This study employed a qualitative design to explore the
perspectives of victims of violence who participated in the
GTRC (n = 17). This is the first study of this population and
their experiences of reconciliation, therefore, an exploratory,
qualitative design is appropriate. In-depth, open-ended interviews allowed for a detailed investigation of victims' perspectives on reconciliation. An interview guide was developed
for this research to examine the theme of reconciliation that
elicited background information, such as respondents' demographics and socio-economic status. Respondents were asked
what reconciliation means to them, if and how they felt the
GTRC addressed reconciliation, how successful the GTRC was
at bringing about reconciliation, and what the limits of reconciliation were in this context. Respondents were encouraged to
express anything they felt was relevant as well as both positive
and negative experiences with the GTRC. Contact information
for victims who participated in the GTRC was obtained from
the GTRC Research Director.
Each participant was first contacted with a letter describing the research project, and then contacted a week later by
phone for follow up. After securing informed consent, participants were offered a small amount of compensation for
their time, $20. Purposive sampling identified seventeen
victims of the 1979 violence who participated in the GTRC.
Interviewing other victims of the violence who choose not to
participate in the intervention was beyond the scope of this
study. Perpetrators and community members were not included in this sample, in order to isolate victim's experiences with
reconciliation as a result of their participation in the GTRC.
The absence of perpetrators' perspectives is a limitation of
this research and to understanding the GTRC's contribution
to reconciliation, however, understanding victims' experiences of reconciliation is central to the functioning of TRCs.
For the purpose of this research, the category 'victim' refers
to the survivors of the Greensboro Massacre, including those
shot and stabbed, widows and children of those killed, and
others present who witnessed the violence and could have
been injured. 'Participation in the GTRC' refers to victims who
gave a personal statement in a private interview to a GTRC
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staffer, delivered testimony before a public hearing, and attended GTRC events such as planning meetings, the seating
ceremony of the Commissioners, and the Final Report release
ceremony.
The sample was primarily comprised of the fourteen activists at the 1979 demonstration as well as three of their children.
In 1979 the demonstrators were in their 20s and 30s, and their
children were either very young or born afterwards; the oldest
of this group was 9. The children, who refer to themselves
as the Second Generation, were included because they met
the sample inclusion criteria as victims and participants; the
oldest was present at the demonstration and the others grew
up deeply affected by the violence as their parents struggled
through the aftermath and each gave a statement to the GTRC
or testified before a public hearing. At the time of the interviews, the survivors were in their 50s and 60s, and their children in their 20s and 30s. Participants are randomly labeled A-Q
to protect confidentiality. The sample was nearly even between
genders; nine were female and eight male. Respondents selfidentified their ethnicity; seven described themselves as White
and non-Jewish, four described themselves as White and
Jewish, and four identified as African American. Twelve of the
respondents held graduate degrees, two bachelor's degrees,
and three had completed high school but had not attended
college. Interviews averaged two hours, and were recorded,
transcribed, and analyzed in ATLAS.ti qualitative data analysis software. A hermeneutical approach and thematic coding
were used to analyze data to uncover the meaning of reconciliation to victims. Triangulation was employed to verify findings by checking with GTRC staff, accessing the GTRC archive
of statements from the public hearings, and by accessing local
media, such as newspapers and blogs.
Victims' Perspectives on Reconciliation
Respondents' descriptions of their perceptions and experiences with reconciliation reveal insights about what reconciliation means in a local community context. These findings
include respondents' conceptions of reconciliation as a multileveled process, their views of the GTRC's efforts to address
reconciliation, and reservations about its limits. The GTRC
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was a complex intervention, and respondents had positive and
negative assessments of its outcomes. Despite frustration with
its limitations, respondents noted its value, "[the GTRC] is part
of a flawed, but important, process ... people just have to recognize it for what it is" (B).
Defining Reconciliation
When asked about their conceptions of reconciliation, respondents echoed the lack of consensus in the literature on a
specific definition. Respondent H summed up the problem:
"It's hard to know [what reconciliation is] because we have so
little of it." However, respondents identified two key features
of reconciliation: that it is multi-leveled and is a long term
process.
The multiple levels of reconciliation.Respondents universally
stated that reconciliation occurs on different levels. There can
be many acts of reconciliation. "It's not a wholesale, single
thing" (C). One respondent explained, "I think genuine reconciliation has taken place on a couple levels" (G). The levels
along which reconciliation occurs were identified as micro
and macro reconciliation. Micro-level reconciliation refers to
changes in and between individuals. Macro-level reconciliation refers to changes between groups of people (perpetrators
and victims, GTRC supporters and critics, African American
and White communities, other minority-majority groups, and
different age and class groups). It is unclear if macro-level reconciliation is the result of many cases of individual reconciliations, or if is more than the accretion of reconciliation on the
micro level. Macro-level reconciliation, played out on a larger
scale than micro-level reconciliation, relates to ongoing efforts
in the community to further the GTRC's work. Macro reconciliation involves "engagement" or getting diverse segments of
the community to come together and participate in the GTRC.
One example of macro reconciliation in the GTRC was that
participants were made up of diverse age groups, specifically
many young people (mainly college students) and older adults
(mainly members of church congregations).
The long term process of reconciliation. In addition to the
multi-level concept, most respondents described reconciliation
as something that happens over a long period of time. In the
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literature, reconciliation is most often conceived of as a process
over time in multiple stages. Respondents indicated that the
GTRC was a "really powerful first step" and "a good first step"
(I) toward reconciliation, though there is still a long way to go.
"I think steps towards [reconciliation] were achieved. I think
it's an ongoing process but I think [the GTRC] is definitely a
good first couple steps towards it" (G). Thus respondents were
positive but cautious, often referring to the GTRC's contribution to reconciliation as the first stage of a longer process
which required more work, "fundamentally I think this is like
the first tiny step in a bigger process," and "I think it was just
more or less a beginning of acknowledging some injustice"
(H). Respondents indicated that the GTRC began the process
of reconciliation by acknowledging diverse perspectives and
important issues, and by promoting dialogue between these
groups.
Respondents were cautious in assessing the GTRC's contribution to reconciliation in Greensboro, which revealed different perspectives on reconciliation. "I think that they helped
it move along. It wasn't like a magic thing, like one day [there
is the GTRC] and the next day [there is reconciliation]" (E).
Respondents also had varying ideas of what the GTRC could
achieve. "I don't think all of the social healing could come
about through the truth and reconciliation process, but I think
that's an important part of it. I'm glad it's happened" (H). As
such, most respondents talked about wanting to see continued work towards reconciliation. "I hope the process will be
ongoing because that will be [the GTRC's] true legacy-if it
can be promoted and built upon. Otherwise [reconciliation
will be] very limited" (H). This respondent saw the GTRC's
contribution to reconciliation as part of a broader struggle for
social justice.
I view this from the perspective of the struggle
overall-it's not a conclusive phase of the struggle, but
an example of what can be done to move the struggle
forward on the road towards making those changes
that we want to see. (H)
Another respondent voiced that the full meaning of the
GTRC will be revealed in the future, and determined by
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activism. "I think it goes on. If there's going to be any meaning
for Greensboro, it's got to come out in community organization and struggle" (M). Ongoing efforts at social change that
stem from a TRC reflect a vision of reconciliation that includes
social justice. This view necessitates that the full measure of
community reconciliation may not be revealed until long after
the completion of the GTRC.
Addressing Reconciliation
Nine respondents felt that the GTRC successfully addressed reconciliation, and achieved more reconciliation than
they had expected was possible."There's been genuine reconciliation that has gone on, that would not have gone on" (G).
Some were surprised at what the GTRC was able to do, "it was,
in many ways, more than what I expected" (B) and "my expectations were exceeded" (I). Another respondent said, "I'm
delighted with how it came out. I think [the GTRC] really did
just such a good job" (I). Eight respondents had a more mixed
perspective on what the GTRC accomplished. "The Truth and
Reconciliation process exceeded my expectations and in some
ways, I felt let down, so it was both. It was both more and
less than I had hoped" (B). The primary factors that respondents identified as facilitating the GTRC's success in addressing reconciliation were the structure of the intervention and
the stance of neutrality and independence of the communitybased organization.
Respondent C believed that the structure of the GTRC promoted reconciliation. "There was an atmosphere conducive to
people hearing one another's truth, maybe hearing it for the
first time" and stated that "many acts of reconciliation happened in the course of the Commission's work" (C). She added
that the GTRC "invited reconciliation," that the process had
"reconciliation built into it." Hearing people's stories, especially listening to the perpetrators, promoted reconciliation.
As C noted, "If you're going to sit and talk, not be shooting
at one another, furthermore, you're going to listen; you're
going to listen respectfully. People are going to have their say,"
which would "promote reconciliation." Another commented
that "I never thought black people and Klan members could
[both participate], but it's being done. It's honest, truthful and
healing ... it's a good process" (D).
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Others emphasized how the neutrality of the GTRC
contributed to its success at reconciliation. The GTRC was
organized so that the victims would not be in control of the
process; this distance earned the GTRC objectivity. People described the GTRC as "an open process," and as being "transparent" and thus credible, because "it does draw on so many
different people" (B, I). This independence for the victims was
sometimes "frustrating" when some respondents felt that "[the
victims] weren't having as loud a voice as we wanted" or that
the Commissioners and other participants "were saying things
that I disagreed with," yet many agreed that this was "really
a mark of its value," and "that's part of why it's so good,
because they are so independent and can say things that we
wouldn't agree with." Respondent I added that this ensured
that the GTRC wasn't "just the mouthpiece for Greensboro
Justice Fund or former members of Communist Workers
Party or the Second Generation [of survivors]." Despite the
frustrations, many felt that the GTRC "really was beyond us
and I think that that's part of what made its success." Another
person indicated that the GTRC's objectivity was ensured by
refraining from attacking city agencies. "I think they sought
reconciliation honestly, sincerely. They didn't go around trying
to bash the police" (H).
Limits of Reconciliation
Respondents indicated that the GTRC's constraints and
the overall lack of participation by perpetrators limited the
GTRC's ability to achieve reconciliation. Respondent F felt that
reconciliation was a great idea. "I really love the idea that you
can make [reconciliation] happen, have some healing and get
to a better understanding of what went on," but was poorly executed. "I've not been overly impressed with how this [turned
out]."
Disappointment with the GTRC reflected the conception of
reconciliation as a long-term process. Eight respondents were
disappointed at the reconciliation achieved by the GTRC. "I expected more," one stated. Another noted, "there is still a long
ways to go" (A, G). Many respondents were skeptical of the
GTRC's contribution to overall reconciliation in Greensboro,
"I had low expectations from the start. I wanted it to work, I
thought it was a great idea, and I was glad someone else was
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trying, but I wasn't going to put any of my time into it" (F). "I
think it is a deafening silence there [on how the Commission
addressed reconciliation]," leading to a negative assessment,
"[It think the impact of the GTRC upon the community has
been minimal" (F).
Some respondents felt the absence of participation by some
perpetrators hampered reconciliation from the outset. "I think
the Commission was limited because the lack of involvement
from the other side," and "the lack of participation by the perpetrators makes it difficult for it to be a complete reconciliation" (A). Respondent J added, "I would have liked to have
heard more from the people who didn't like us ... it would
have been nice to have more Klans and Nazis there just to
hear what they had to say." This was disappointing to some
respondents, due to the efforts of the GTRC to reach out to "the
Klansmen, the Nazis, the police department, the public officials
in Greensboro," which "offered them the opportunity to come
forward and tell their story" (H). This was a common complaint raised in terms of achieving a wider reconciliation. "For
the most part they didn't accept that opportunity, the fact that
they didn't accept it probably hurt reconciliation more than
helped it" (H).
Respondents were mixed in their views of the perpetrators that did participate; their differences were a result of their
conceptions of reconciliation. Since most of the perpetrators
didn't participate at all, and the few that did only did so in a
very circumscribed manner, the majority of respondents were
disappointed with this aspect of the GTRC. Several reasons
were cited for this; chief among them was a lack of good-faith
participation of the KKK and Nazi perpetrators, who did
participate in the GTRC but stopped short of acknowledging
their own failures and apologizing. Respondent B described
prerequisites for reconciliation, "there has to be an acknowledgement of wrong-doing and sincere intent to be or do differently." They were not satisfied here. "I didn't hear a lot
of that. Most of the people who came forward weren't being
candid, weren't being forthright and didn't honestly want to
acknowledge their wrong-doing." They shared their perception of what the perpetrators said. "We heard folks who said,
'I wish I hadn't come that day because what happened was I
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ended up in jail for a day."' Others said, "'I didn't know there
was going to be violence."' These statements were made "by
people who brought the guns or organized the guns and knew
there was going to be violence." These respondents' evaluation
of the situation was that "saying, 'I didn't think that there was
going to be violence,' doesn't lay a basis for the word reconciliation," and this prevented "conditions for what I would see
as real reconciliation which would have to come from some
folks who had done some real soul searching." Victims also
described what they would have liked to hear from the perpetrators instead: "'I did plan violence. I did come because I was
planning to kill people and these are the people who I talked
to and I really, really wish I hadn't brought that gun and killed
those people."' If they had heard statements to that effect,
more of the victims would have been open to reconciliation,
"then you can talk to me about reconciliation. In the absence of
that it's hard to imagine what that would really look like, for
me" (M).
This failure to fully participate and engage in the GTRC
frustrated many and constituted a significant obstacle to reconciliation that they were not able to overcome. "They've been
able to obscure the situation for decades, for a generation and
a half. So, on the subject of forgiveness, forget it. On the subject
of reconciliation, forget it" (0). B felt that this prevented the
GTRC from working as it was intended, because "the process
itself didn't lend itself to [reconciliation]."
Some respondents gave specific reasons why they thought
the GTRC's efforts at reconciliation were limited, including
media relations, outreach efforts, and insufficient neutrality.
Respondent F was impressed by the only perpetrator who
apologized to two of the victims, and raised the question of
"why wasn't [the apology] a marquee story for our side? Not
just for our side, but for the whole TRC process?" This failure to
publicize even modest successes was seen as a limiting factor
to drawing attention to the reconciliation efforts and a wider
community impact "that was pretty powerful, but I never
heard anybody make anything of it. I never heard anybody
on our side say, 'list that as a good thing. "' This kind of good
press, this respondent felt, could have provided justification
for the process. "You can say that's worth it right there, just to
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have even one guy who was so involved and a shooter [make
an apology]."
Respondent J felt that reconciliation would have been
better served through greater outreach to "more people who
were not so happy with us" and if the GTRC had "some kind
of follow up with ... people that don't like us." Others feared
the victim-centered approach of the GTRC prevented perpetrators from being fully engaged in the process. Respondent F
criticized the attitude of the GTRC as "'Oh, sure, we're going
to apologize for what it's clear we did wrong, but basically, we
were the good guys and they were the bad guys."' This was
seen as another obstacle to reconciliation, especially discouraging more perpetrator participation. "I never quite understood
how that proposition was going to be inviting to anyone else,
or how it was going to deal with people in the middle-it's a
question for how TRC's can ever work."
Other respondents described victims that chose not to participate in the GTRC and who criticized the process. "There's
been criticism ... that this is no place for a TRC." This person
"hated the idea," of a TRC, "thought it was horrible," and felt
that "to even say it in the same breath as South Africa was
an abomination." Respondent J explained this person's perspective by saying, "[one of the demonstrators] is very angry
about the history and doesn't [think the conflict was legitimate
enough to warrant] a TRC."
Respondents cited confusion over the meaning of reconciliation, its nebulous nature and idealistic intentions, as preventing the GTRC from having more of an impact. Respondent
F complained, "I haven't seen an explicit discussion about how
you define it, or the process exactly for getting there? It seemed
a little vague." This seemed especially true as people struggled
to understand how reconciliation works. "From what I've seen,
the plan is: if everybody tells their story, they'll feel better and
they won't be so divided or angry, and there'll be some sort of
implied reconciliation" (F). Four people questioned reconciliation as a realistic goal in a community characterized by power
inequalities, emphasizing the economic disparities between
the two sides. "It's not a question of two [equal] sides in conflict, [but] one side's got power and the other is side trying to
defend itself" (K).
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Discussion and Implications
The GTRC is an example of the popularity and proliferation of reconciliation initiatives, however it is distinct from previous TRCs as a grassroots-organized and
community-based intervention ata locallevelin a relativelysmall
community context. The victims' lived experiences of recovering from violence and grappling with a community reconciliation intervention contribute to the clarification of the
concept and especially its limitations. However, this research
is limited by several methodological factors. The respondents
were only interviewed after their participation in the GTRC.
In the future, baseline data collected prior to the intervention
should be used to assess participants' expectations of reconciliation interventions and combined with follow up studies.
Also, this study only interviewed the victims that participated
in the intervention; this was a self-selected population. Data
from the victims that elected to not participate could shed light
on further limitations of the GTRC and how it was perceived
in the wider community. Most significantly, research with the
perpetrators that did and did not participate is necessary to
enlarge the picture of the GTRC; future research should attend
to all affected populations in order to assess reconciliation
interventions.
Respondents confirmed the two basic elements of reconciliation found in the literature-that reconciliation is both a
multi-leveled and a long term process. Respondents distinguished reconciliation between individuals from reconciliation between groups, within community, and with the local
city government. They stressed that reconciliation would be
a long term process in Greensboro, and any contribution that
the GTRC may have made is only the first step which needs
to be consolidated and extended. Beyond these core elements,
respondents expressed differences in their conceptualizations
and thus experiences of reconciliation. For respondents who
were generally satisfied with the GTRC, the process contributed to reconciliation and they accepted that reconciliation
was a practical goal in this setting. They felt that reconciliation could be accomplished through dialogue; the process of
getting people to talk and respectfully listening to the other
side was seen as instrumental to establishing a measure of
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reconciliation.
However, as noted in the literature, vague definitions
and unrealistic expectations of reconciliation can confound
the implementation of reconciliation projects. Some respondents had difficulty with the concept and were troubled with
the ill-defined nature of reconciliation; others questioned its
appropriateness as a goal. These respondents' understanding
of reconciliation is linked to the goal of social justice and the
transformation of society. It is likely that these expectations
were too high and exceeded the GTRC's capacity to address
and remedy the structural inequalities and injustices of social
life in the U.S. South. Future TRCs may improve the intervention by better defining reconciliation. Clarifying participants'
expectations of reconciliation may lead to more realistic views
of the outcomes. If the process is defined more narrowly, people
and communities may get more out of it. Greater specificity
about the anticipated goals will lend itself to increased publicity and outreach campaigns, and may make reconciliation
efforts more inviting to perpetrators. TRCs are limited interventions that can overpromise their potential; the very name
of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission may contribute to
unrealistic expectations by proposing that 'truth' exists and
'reconciliation' is achievable. When linked to social justice, the
ideal of reconciliation is better thought of as a valuable process
than an attainable destination. The concrete work of increasing
mutual tolerance by facilitating dialogue and respectful listening between antagonistic groups is achievable and is a contribution of the GTRC. The willingness to coexist with others in a
diverse society is a building block of peace and social stability;
in this way, TRCs and reconciliation interventions can further
the goal of peace and nonviolent social movements.
The City of Greensboro's opposition to the GTRC was
another obstacle to reconciliation in the community. Some respondents felt that reconciliation was unrealistic in the absence
of those in positions of power in the city. This relates to the
view held by some respondents of the role of social change as
an element of reconciliation. For these respondents, dialogue
that does not lead to social change does not constitute steps
toward reconciliation. Most TRCs have been borne of political
transitions; there was no such transfer of power or change in
the city administration in Greensboro. This hinders the GTRC's
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ability to contribute to social change and limits it impact to the
grassroots level. However, some respondents also felt that the
GTRC had a low community impact, and that further publicity
and outreach efforts would have enhanced its reception by the
general population of Greensboro. Additional resources could
have amplified the GTRC's publicity and outreach efforts.
More attention to framing reconciliation initiatives to maximize community response and participation could improve
future interventions. The GTRC's lack of official state sanction
is unique among TRCs, however, there were benefits associated with this independence from government. State implemented reconciliation efforts have been criticized as instruments of political expediency. Some respondents found that
the lack of City support increased the moral authority of the
GTRC. It was a grassroots community sanctioned project-an
exercise in direct democracy and an example of what citizens
can accomplish despite resistance from the government. That
even a few perpetrators participated is testament to the power
of moral suasion of community-based projects.
The GTRC's success at meeting or exceeding some of the
respondents' expectations of reconciliation and engaging some
former perpetrators and victims must be weighed against the
lack of participation by the city and majority of perpetrators.
Their absence was the largest obstacle to reconciliation identified by respondents. In addition, the contribution of the few
perpetrators who did participate was deemed insufficient by
some respondents, but not all. They viewed the failure of the
perpetrators to take responsibility for their harmful actions as a
major impediment to reconciliation. Reflecting on the failure to
engage the majority of perpetrators, one respondent raised the
question of how the GTRC could have attracted more participation from perpetrators. A few previous TRCs were endowed
with legal authority to grant perpetrators the participation incentive of amnesty or to compel participation; as a grassroots
organization, these measures were beyond the scope of the
GTRC. Further, compelling testimony may lead to dishonest
or self-serving narratives, which may hinder reconciliation in
a different manner. Although the GTRC did implement an inclusive process that invited the participation of all community
stakeholders, the goal of full community engagement was not
fulfilled. This indicates that reconciliation will be incomplete
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when all sides do not participate in such interventions.
As an approach to reconciliation, the GTRC was squarely
in the restorative justice perspective. In Greensboro, the retributive justice approach of prosecutions had failed. The political approach was absent from the GTRC without the involvement of the city authorities. The social justice approach of
attending to structural inequality and reparations was beyond
the scope of the GTRC. The need for reparations was perhaps
lessened due to the 1985 civil suit settlement received by the
victims. However, respondents did report that the GTRC was
connected to ongoing efforts to bring about social change in
Greensboro. With its restorative justice approach, the GTRC
facilitated the social contact and engagement of perpetrators
and victims through dialogue and listening to each other's
perspectives. This process restored dignity to the victims and
promoted mutual tolerance and peaceful coexistence. As the
respondents remarked, the feat of having the Klan and demonstrators in the same room without violence was significant.
Despite their differences, both sides were willing to 'put up'
with each other.
A nuanced appreciation for the GTRC's contributions to
reconciliation makes apparent the need to supplement reconciliation efforts with other community interventions working
for social justice. Recalling the ecological model of social recovery from violence, a multiplicity of interventions is necessary to rebuild communities. The GTRC has begun the work of
reconciliation in Greensboro, but the project of social transformation cannot end there.
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Immigration policy has shifted its focus from family reunification
to strict enforcement of "illegal" immigration. It has become much
more difficultfor U.S. citizens to adjust their non-citizen spouses'
legal status, especially spouses who are undocumented. This paper
examines the vulnerabilities of female U.S. citizens married or
partnered with undocumented Mexican men. Findings challenge
the simplistic notion that marriagewith a U.S. citizen creates automatic legalizationfor undocumented individuals and highlights
the creation of a second class citizenry for native-born partners.
This study argues that punitive immigration law and policies
have profound negative implicationsfor the lives of U.S. citizens.
Key words: mixed-status families, immigration policy, undocumented immigrants, citizenship
Most people in the United States assume incorrectly that
marriage between a non-citizen and a U.S. citizen creates a
seamless pathway to legalization for the immigrant partner
with few consequences for the citizen spouse. However, the
complex lives of U.S. citizens married to undocumented immigrants (i.e., mixed-status couples) rarely enter the public's
consciousness. What little we do know about mixed-status
couples is often mischaracterized by the media. Films such as
The Proposal,a box office smash in the summer of 2009 reduce
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the public's understanding of marriage between citizens and
those without legal status to an easy and crass tactic to gain
citizenship (Mandeville Films, 2009). By and large, the general
public is unaware and misinformed of how the emergence of
exclusionary immigration policies, with a focus on cracking
down on "illegal" immigration, also marginalizes U.S. citizen
spouses.
Similarly, the experiences of mixed-status couples have
also been omitted from scholarly research. Although academics have examined intermarriage between U.S. citizens and
"legal" immigrants (Jasso, Massey, Rosenzweig, & Smith,
2000), no work provides first-hand, qualitative accounts of
adult citizens impacted by their partners' undocumented legal
status. Fix and Zimmerman (2001) describe demographic profiles of mixed-status families but mainly focus on immigrant
couples with citizen children. However, they conclude that
family members who have legal rights become "second class
citizens." These findings frame the unforeseen loss of benefits experienced by citizens partnered with undocumented
individuals.
Although there is a lack of scholarly work examining
mixed-status couples, some existing research draws attention
to the negative impact of restrictive immigration policies on
the lives of U.S. citizens. Bhuyan (2010) analyzes how strict
mandates to verify citizenship and identity for public assistance inherently disenfranchise both immigrants and citizens.
Attempts to block undocumented immigrants from accessing
Medicaid actually reduces the number of eligible immigrants
and citizens receiving benefits and creates particular hardships
for low-income groups, especially citizen children in singleparent homes.
The benefits of citizenship for children are often dependent upon their parents' legal status, even when the children
are citizens (Van Hook & Balistreri, 2006). Recent immigration
policies targeting undocumented immigrants have created a
decline in well-being for immigrant children, many of whom
are U.S. citizens. Androff et al. (2011) point out that children of
undocumented parents experience "economic insecurity, barriers to education, poor health outcomes, arrest and deportation of family members, discrimination, and trauma and harm
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to the community" (p. 78). Examining the vulnerabilities of
mixed-status couples can strengthen our understanding of the
experiences of children when they are part of the family, but it
is vital that adults involved be studied as well.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the experiences
of native-born citizen women who are married or partnered
with undocumented Mexican men. This research highlights
the ways in which citizens' personal lives directly challenge
community misinterpretations and demonstrates the intricate
connections between the rights of undocumented immigrants
and the rights of U.S. citizens. This study argues that punitive
immigration laws have profound negative implications for the
private lives of U.S. citizens partnered with undocumented
immigrants.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, immigration policy has been framed as a national security issue (Hing,
2006), shifting its focus from family reunification to enforcement of "illegal" immigration. Thus, it has become much
more difficult to sponsor an undocumented spouse. Prior to
the terrorist attacks, undocumented immigrants married to
citizens had an easier time becoming legal residents and were
allowed to pay a fine; however, this option is no longer available. Individuals who enter the country "illegally" rather than
overstay a visa face the harshest penalties. Astonishing to
many couples, "illegal" immigrants who entered the country
without inspection must return to their country of origin if they
hope to obtain legal residence (which is still not guaranteed).
Particularly damaging for mixed-status couples, Congress has
decided that individuals with more than 180 days of unlawful
presence are now subject to a three-year bar, while individuals with more than a year of unlawful presence are subject to
a ten-year bar (Mercer, 2008, pp. 300-301). Even more punitively, individuals with more than one year of unlawful presence who are deported from the United States or who chose
to leave and then return "illegally" are permanently barred
(Cruz, 2010). Inadvertently, anti-immigrant policies centered
on enforcement of "illegal" immigration create a vulnerable
social position for citizens.
Filing an extreme hardship waiver is currently the only
option U.S. citizens have to adjust their spouses' legal status
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(along with the immigrant spouse traveling abroad) (Mercer,
2008). The undocumented spouse must "prove that a denial
would cause an extreme hardship, rather than a normal hardship, to the immigrant's citizen or lawful permanent resident
spouse ..." (p. 305). Separation from spouses and children is
not considered an extreme hardship. The lack of consistent
definitions, the discretionary nature of hardship waiver decisions, and the inability to appeal decisions creates a shaky position for families. If a waiver is denied, the "illegal" spouse
will be forced to leave the United States. Naturally, these risks
prevent many couples from even initiating adjustment of undocumented status, as "living in the United States without
status is a lesser moral harm than abandoning one's family
and home" (Cruz, 2010, p. 13).
Low-income citizens are at a distinct disadvantage when
attempting to gain legal status for an undocumented spouse.
Sponsoring citizen spouses must document that their income
is at or above 125% of the federal poverty guidelines. If the
citizen's income does not meet the eligibility criteria, a financial co-sponsor must be used; the undocumented partner's
income cannot be included (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, 2008). This is particularly concerning as mixed-status
families are more likely to be low-income when compared with
other families and may have more difficulty meeting the financial standard set by the U.S. government (Fix & Zimmerman,
2001). Also, it can cost thousands of dollars to sponsor a spouse.
To this point, no research has examined the impact of
mixed-status partnership on U.S. citizens. Because couples are
sometimes treated as a legal unit and other times as legally
separate, status complexities exist for these couples. This study
fills a gap by exploring the overlooked realities confronting
citizens, primarily White female citizens, partnered with undocumented Mexican men, as they attempt to adjust to the ambiguous legal structure of the United States and fight against
public misperceptions that leave them vulnerable.
Methods
This research is part of a larger study focused on mixed-status couples conducted over a two-year period (2007-2009). The
focus of this paper is the experiences of 18 U.S. citizen women
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(primarily White) who are partnered with undocumented or
formerly undocumented Mexican men. I utilized standard
written interview questions, however, a flexible format was encouraged. I asked participants open-ended questions related to
their mixed-status partnership. The questions included experiences with the immigration system, the quality of the couple's
relationships, family strengths and needs, and any other topics
they felt were important. I used purposive sampling, specifically snowball sampling, among community networks of undocumented immigrants and their partners (Patton, 2002).
I interviewed participants in person (n = 12) or, because of
distance, on the telephone at a research center on a Midwestern
university campus (n = 6). During the initial phases of my research I learned some individuals were hesitant to participate
without their partner present. Thus, the majority of interviews
took place with both members of the couple present (11 couples)
and I interviewed the remaining couples separately per their
request (7 couples). In-person interviews generally took place
in the couples' homes (9) or at private community settings
(3). Due to the sensitivity of this research, participants were
not required to provide their names or give written consent;
only verbal consent was required per the Institutional Review
Board. I gave participants the option to be audio-taped (11)
or for notes only to be taken (7), allowing them to choose the
option with which they were most comfortable. The interviews
typically averaged 60 to 90 minutes. When writing results,
pseudonyms were used to protect participants' identities.
This study included participants living in seven states and
one participant residing in Mexico. An overwhelming majority
of women were married (n = 15) and reported being married
for three years on average and with their partner for about
five years. Couples who were not married or engaged were
together from one to three years. Sixteen of these couples were
interracial while two indicated that they and their partner are
both Latino/a. The average female participant was 32 years
old, and slightly older than her male partner (about 28 years
old). Most women either had no children or were part of a
blended family. The women in this study had more education
than their male partners. The median family income reported
was $59,000 per year and about half of the couples owned their
own home.
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Data analysis for this research began after the first interview.
I used an inductive process that focused on building larger
themes and description emerging from the raw data (Strauss &
Corbin, 1990). First, I converted the word-for-word interview
transcripts and notes into Atlas.ti software to analyze the data
(Muhr, 2004). Transcribed data are read line-by-line, on at least
three different occasions. During the first reading I was concerned with gaining "a sense of the whole" (Hatch, 2002). The
second read-through included coding key words and phrases.
During the third assessment I began to develop a list of codes.
Three themes emerged: (1) once you get married to a citizen
it's (not) over; (2) betrayed by my own country; and (3) little
things you don't think about. Because U.S. citizens partnered
with undocumented immigrants rarely have the opportunity
to tell their stories, I chose to identify themes using the participants' own words.
Results
Once You Get Married to a Citizen it's (Not) Over
U.S. citizens, regardless of marital status, consistently indicated that few people truly understand how complicated the
U.S. immigration system is, including the process of obtaining
family visas through marriage. The general public perception
is a simple equation in which marriage equals legal papers.
Several citizen participants were shocked to learn otherwise.
Rebecca, a newlywed, anticipated that the immigration
process would be lengthy and expensive, but she had no idea
that her husband, Antonio, would be required to return to
Mexico for an unspecified period of time, and even then his
case might get rejected. He crossed the Mexico-United States
border "illegally" and has lived in the U.S. unlawfully for more
than one year, thus he will likely face a ten-year bar from the
United States. Similar to other couples, Rebecca and Antonio
were advised by an attorney to put their file on hold as their
extreme hardship waiver would likely be denied. In essence
they were told to "wait until reform happens." Rebecca explains her lack of knowledge: "I thought, there's a lot of paperwork, it takes a long time, but it's for sure. You just gotta put in
the time and do it, spend the money."
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Despite what their attorney called a "clean case," (lawabiding immigrant of good moral character) Abby's husband,
Manuel, received a ten-year bar from the United States and
they subsequently relocated their family to Mexico. Manuel
also entered the country "illegally" and lived without status for
more than one year. Abby has particular empathy for people
from Mexico with few resources who apply for U.S. residence:
We went through two and half years of paperwork,
thousands and thousands of dollars and he got denied.
... I mean if it's that hard for someone who's married to

an American, how are people who aren't married to an
American supposed to do it the right way before they
come here illegally?
Participants expressed how crucial it is to inform the public
about how difficult it is for undocumented immigrants to gain
legal status, even through marriage. Lola says, "I think people
automatically think 'well once you get married to a citizen it's
over,' well no that's not true."
Betrayed By My Own Country
The emotional burdens of mixed-status couples were often
greater than U.S. citizens imagined. Faith describes herself
as a devout Catholic and college-educated professional who
always "does the right thing." Unfortunately she thought life
would get easier after she and her husband, Mariano, were
married. She explains, "I couldn't get car insurance because
my husband didn't have [legal status]." After their wedding,
she called her insurance company to add Mariano to her plan;
she had been with this company for more than ten years.
After speaking with an insurance agent, it eventually became
obvious that her husband was undocumented. Not only did
they deny Mariano's car insurance, they also denied her. She
said, "I called and called and finally found someone who
would insure me." Faith realized if she wanted to maintain
car insurance she was going to have to hide her connection to
Mariano; she has done this for their entire marriage. "It was
very upsetting to me that I had to lie. I cried all day that day."
In addition, Faith said that during 2008, when the U.S.
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government sent out economic stimulus payments to eligible
families, neither she nor her husband received a check, even
though they are both employed. According to the Internal
Revenue Service (2009), families filing taxes jointly were not eligible for the stimulus payment if any individual in the household used an Individual Tax Identification Number (ITIN)
rather than a social security number. Faith asserts, "My rights
as an American citizen have been compromised."
U.S. citizens sponsoring an immigrant spouse must also
be able to provide documentation that they can financially
support their spouse to avoid being a "drain on the system."
Sue explains, "I think it's unfair that being a U.S. citizen we
have to be able to afford our spouse and we have to be able to
prove that without them we are going to be able to suffer. It's
ridiculous." An interesting contradiction exists for economic
resources and marriage. Having an immigrant spouse leave
the country to attempt to adjust their legal status has the potential to increase the likelihood of accessing public assistance
as families with two incomes lose half of their resources overnight, especially those with children. No participants reported
that they had accessed public welfare programs while their
spouse was absent, but a few did present this as a possible
scenario.
Wendy and Ricardo faced significant financial struggles
during his absence to Mexico. She explained that without her
husband's income, she was below 125% of the U.S. poverty
guidelines and that her mother agreed to cosponsor her
husband. Even though Ricardo's hardship waiver was approved and he now has legal status, she explains her anger
at the government. "I felt violated as an American. I was like
'screw this country."' She continues, "I have the right to pursue
happiness, to have my family together, united." She says, "I
felt betrayed by my country."
Little Things You Don't Think About
Undocumented individuals are no strangers to dealing
with persecution. Driving without a license or car insurance,
working under a false name or false papers all lead to tremendous strain. On the other hand, U.S. citizens consistently reported that their new marginalized social location partnered
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with an undocumented immigrant was especially difficult.
Chelsea says, "I always worry that something could happen
and [Juan] could be taken away." U.S. citizens were much
more cognizant and anxious about legal uncertainties than
their partners.
The loss of freedom to travel was one of the main issues
often taken for granted by U.S. citizens. Castles (2005) argues
that within a globalized world mobility has become the most
powerful and coveted stratifying factor. The majority of undocumented partners did not have valid driver's licenses and
car insurance, but nearly all of them drive regularly. With increasingly restrictive state immigration policies and laws, obtaining a valid driver's license has become an increasing challenge. This has created a substantial barrier for the day-to-day
functioning of families and has significant ramifications for
citizen partners.
Chelsea's husband, Juan, commutes 40 minutes to work
early each morning and for a while she was driving him to
work. However, with her full-time job and other family responsibilities, this arrangement soon became impractical.
Although Juan does not have a license, he does have car insurance, but it is in his friend's name. Chelsea too is uncomfortable with having him drive to work; however, they are left
with few options.
Lola is well aware of the boundaries placed upon her relationship with her fianc6, Eduardo. New restrictive legislation
has created additional barriers for them and in her opinion
is nothing more than "racial profiling." In contrast to her
husband, Lola experiences a great deal of anxiety about their
situation:
There are certain things that we cannot do because
of our relationship. We can't fly, you know. We were
gonna go to [a neighboring state] but I know that
you're worried about driving. They just passed a new
law. Basically it's like racial profiling. People can pull
you over if you're Hispanic, and boom ask you for
papers or even, if I'm driving the car and we get pulled
over and they ask who's got papers and if he doesn't I
would go to jail.

106

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

The majority of undocumented partners do not have access
to their citizen partner's employment benefits, even if they are
married. Anna, who cohabitates with Carlos, explains that
marriage will make little difference for their situation. "Even if
he were to marry me, he wouldn't be able to get my health insurance." Similarly, Chelsea explains that her company offers
health care benefits to spouses, yet her husband does not have
a social security number, therefore he has not accessed this resource. She says, "I'm not sure how to pose the questions to the
insurance company." Typically a social security number must
be provided in order to appoint one's spouse as an eligible
beneficiary of benefits such as life insurance.
Finally, going out to a bar to enjoy a few drinks was a
surprising hurdle that given another context would seem
mundane. Donna says, "There were times when I'd feel like I
can't tell the whole truth or we have to make up a story about
why my husband wasn't able to do something like travel or
even go to a bar." Anna sums it up: "It's little things you don't
think about and you take for granted."
Discussion and Implications
The present study exposes a gap in the literature by exploring the contemporary vulnerabilities of U.S. citizens in
mixed-status partnerships. This work moves beyond early discussions that focus on citizen children in mixed-status families (Van Hook & Balistreri, 2006). Citizen partners experience
a double burden of navigating an impenetrable immigration
system, while at the same time fighting against deep public
misunderstanding. Contrary to widespread notions, marriage
to a U.S. citizen does not provide automatic legalization for
undocumented partners. Instead, the immigration process is
extremely complicated, often leading to strain and an unanticipated loss of benefits to U.S. citizens, especially those who are
low-income. This research illustrates how the lives of citizens
and non-citizens are intertwined in ways of which the public
is grossly unaware.
Similar to the findings reported in Fix and Zimmerman
(2001), these participants' experiences validate that restrictive
immigration policies create a second class citizenship for U.S.
citizen spouses. Citizens simply were not familiar with this
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new marginalized status in which their rights were suddenly
compromised. They took for granted the ability to coexist with
few constraints and interpreted these assumed privileges as
an entitlement inherently tied to their citizenship. Unlike the
families in Fix and Zimmerman's study (2001), the majority
of participants in this study were not low-income. Yet, when
attempting to sponsor a non-citizen partner, only the citizen's
income can be included, which is likely to be lower than the
combined family income. In reality, many citizens rely on their
immigrant partner's incomes to sustain two-income families
and are put at greater risk of needing to access public benefits.
Most of the U.S. citizens in this study were White and
coming from a position of assumed rights that they did not get.
This caused them anxiety, perhaps more than their Mexican
husbands, who may have more to lose from their undocumented status. Future research should explore the complex
intersections of race/ethnicity, gender, and social privilege in
citizenship. It is also important to compare the experiences of
citizens in mixed-status partnership with other undocumented groups, beyond Mexico. Finally, exploring the viewpoints
of the immigrant spouses, including women partnered with
native-born men, is needed to provide a more complete picture
of the challenges for both citizens and non-citizens in mixedstatus marriage.
In conclusion, outdated stereotypes must be replaced with
the current experiences of mixed-status couples in the context
of harsh immigration policies and laws. As one participant,
Donna, stated, "I think we do need to get the word out how
there are couples like us that exist and it's not as easy as just
marrying somebody to be able to get your status." Bhuyan
(2010) argues, "legislators and their public supporters may be
less inclined to target immigrants through increasing documentary standards, if the costs to citizens are more visible" (p.
80). Increasing awareness of the hardships for citizen spouses
in mixed-status marriage may create more social empathy for
their vulnerable position, as well as for the plight of immigrants.
Although comprehensive immigration reform is desperately needed, families cannot afford to wait for an improved
political climate that supports a complete Congressional
overhaul. The hardships of family separation and an impenetrable immigration system support Cruz's (2010)
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recommendation that family members with pending visa applications be permitted to live in the country legally and not
be forced to travel abroad to adjust their status. She also advocates for creating provisional changes to the current system
as modifications which may alleviate some of the immediate
hardships facing mixed-status couples. In line with the recommendations made by Cruz (2010), we must permit a greater
number of family visas and remove the unlawful presence
bars. Laws and policies that impact immigrants also have unintended consequences for U.S. citizens. This study makes
clear the need to change harsh, ambiguous immigration policies and promote the human rights of mixed-status families.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to acknowledge Dr.
Helen Moore, Dr. Marcela Raffaelli, Dr. Julia McQuillan, and Dr.
Nancy Malcom for their comments on an earlier version of this
manuscript.
References
Androff, D. K., Ay6n, C., Becerra, D., Gurrola, M., Salas, L., Krysik,
J., Gerdes, K., & Segal, E. (2011). U.S. immigration policy and
immigrant children's well-being: The impact of policy shifts.
Journalof Sociology and Social Welfare, 38(1), 77-98.

Bhuyan, R. (2010). Reconstructing citizenship in a global economy:
How restricting immigrants from welfare undermines social
rights for U.S. citizens. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare,

37(2), 61-84.
Castles, S. (2005). Nation and empire: Hierarchies of citizenship in
the new global order. InternationalPolitics, 42, 203-224.

Cruz, E. H. (2010). Because you're mine, I walk the line: The trials
and tribulations of the family visa program. Fordham Urban Law
Journal.Retrieved from http: / /ssrn.com/abstract=1740685.
Fix, M., & Zimmerman, W. (2001). All under one roof: Mixed-status
families in an era reform. InternationalMigration Review, 35(2),

397-419.
Hatch, J. A. (2002). Doing qualitative research in education settings.
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Hing, B. 0. (2006). Misusing immigration policies in the name of
homeland security. CR: The New Centennial Review, 6(1), 195-224.
Internal Revenue Service. (2009). Economic stimulus payment

information center. Retrieved from http://www.irs.gov/
newsroom/article/0,,id=177937,00.html.
Jasso, G., Massey, D. S., Rosenzweig, M. R., & Smith, J. P. (2000).
Assortative mating among married new legal immigrants to the
United States: Evidence from the New Immigrant Survey Pilot.
InternationalMigrationReview, 34(2), 443-459.

Compromised Citizenship in Mixed-Status Marriage

109

Mandeville Films (Producer), & Fletcher, A. (Director). (2009). The
proposal [Motion picture]. USA: Touchstone Pictures.
Mercer, J. (2008). The marriage myth: Why mixed-status marriages
need an immigration remedy. Golden Gate University Law Review,
38(2), 293-325.
Muhr, T. (2004). User's manual for ATLAS.ti 5.0 ( 2 nd ed.). Retrieved
from http://www.atlasti.com/downloads/atlman.pdf.
Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research:Grounded
theory procedures and techniques. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. (2008). How do I...
financially sponsor someone who wants to immigrate? Retrieved
from http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/F3en.pdf.
Van Hook, J., & Balistreri, K. S. (2006). Ineligible parents, eligible
children: Food stamps receipt, allotments, and food insecurity
among children of immigrants. Social Science Research, 35(1), 228251.

Fear vs. Facts: Examining the Economic Impact
of Undocumented Immigrants in the U.S.
DAVID BECERRA
DAVID K. ANDROFF
CECILIA AYON

Arizona State University
School of Social Work
JASON

T. CASTILLO

University of Utah
College of Social Work

Undocumented immigration has become a contentious issue in
the U.S. over the past decade. Opponents of undocumented immigrationhave argued that undocumented immigrantsare a social
and financial burden to the U.S. which has led to the passage of
drasticand costly policies. This paper examined existing state and
national data and found that undocumented immigrants do contribute to the economies of federal, state, and local governments
through taxes and can stimulatejob growth, but the cost of providing law enforcement, health care, and education impacts federal,
state, and local governments differently. At the federal level, undocumented immigrants tend to contribute more money in taxes
than they consume in services, however, the net economic costs or
benefits to state and local governments varies throughout the U.S.
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Despite the recent reported decrease in undocumented immigrants living in the U.S., undocumented immigration to the
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U.S. continues to be an issue attracting increasing attention
from policymakers and the public. An accurate account of the
scope of undocumented immigration is impossible, however
it is estimated that in 1990 there were 3.5 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S. In almost twenty years, the undocumented immigrant population grew to an estimated 11.9
million people, representing approximately one third of the
total U.S. immigrant population (38 million), 4% of the total
U.S. population, and 5.4% of the U.S. workforce (8.3 million)
(Passel & Cohn, 2009). Undocumented immigrants come to
the U.S. from around the world, however the majority, an estimated 76%, are Latino, of which 59% (7 million) are estimated
to be from Mexico and 22% (2.1 million) from the rest of Latin
America (Passel & Cohn, 2009). Migration, documented and
undocumented, is propelled by both 'push' and 'pull' factors.
Poverty, violence, crime, and corruption push migrants from
sending countries, and the promise of economic prosperity
where employers are looking for low-wage workers pull migrants towards receiving countries such as the U.S. (Liebig &
Souza-Poza, 2004).
The public policy debate surrounding immigration often
involves strident rhetoric, and arguments against undocumented immigrants can be especially harsh, revolving around
the burden to U.S. taxpayers. The non-partisan Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) reported that undocumented immigrants
contribute more in taxes than the costs of providing services at
the federal level. There are costs to some state and local governments for providing law enforcement, education, and health
care services to undocumented immigrants, but those costs
represent a small percentage of their state and local budgets
(CBO, 2007). Nevertheless, many politicians continue to argue
that undocumented immigrants are a huge economic drain
because of the costs associated with law enforcement, education, and use of state and federal health and social services by
undocumented immigrants, which lead to diminished economic opportunity for U.S. citizens (Bums, 2011; Stein, 2011).
The economic arguments against undocumented immigrants include the costs to tax payers resulting from the "criminal" and "illegal" nature of undocumented immigration, such
as the costs associated with law enforcement, border security,
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measures to prevent, detain, and deport the undocumented,
and related crimes such as human smuggling and trafficking.
The Heritage Foundation reported that the cost of incarcerating undocumented immigrants "... represent(s) a huge drain

on taxpayers" with California, Texas, Arizona, Florida, New
York, and Illinois absorbing the greatest financial impact (von
Spakovsky, 2011, 6).
The perception that "illegal aliens" are responsible for
higher crime rates is deeply rooted in American public opinion.
These opinions in turn shape political behavior, which ultimately results in public policies and practices that are created
absent of rigorous empirical evidence (Chvez, 2001; Lee, 2003).
Examples of this are ordinances and bills that have passed and
been enacted into law in several localities and states across the
U.S. In 2006 the city council of Hazleton, Pennsylvania passed
the "Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance," declaring that
illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates and the city's
legal residents and citizens have the right to live in peace,
free of crime committed by illegal aliens (Rumbaut, 2008).
Furthermore, several states, including Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Indiana, and Utah, have enacted laws putting local,
county, and state law enforcement personnel in the position
of relying on stereotypes about what an "illegal alien" looks
or sounds like (American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2011).
A related policy goal is to build a fence along the U.S.-Mexico
border that would guard national security from the perceived
threat of undocumented immigration.
Another argument against undocumented immigration
is that local, state, and federal governments are burdened
with increased costs through their utilization of educational
and social systems such as primary and secondary education, health care programs, emergency rooms, welfare, and
other anti-poverty programs to which they do not contribute
through taxes. Several anti-immigration organizations, such as
The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and
the Center for Immigration Studies, also argue that undocumented immigrants' use of state and federal social welfare programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
(SNAP), Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), school lunch
programs, and Medicaid cost taxpayers billions of dollars
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annually (Camarota, 2011; Federation for American
Immigration Reform, [FAIR], 2000). FAIR also argues that the
cost associated with educating undocumented children in the
U.S. is a major cause of the budget deficits facing many states
(Ewing, 2003).
Although current social work literature discusses the social
impact of various policies on undocumented immigrants in
the U.S. (Androff et al., 2011; Cleaveland, 2010) and calls for
advocacy and action by social workers on behalf of immigrants (Padilla, Shapiro, Fernindez-Castro, & Faulkner, 2008),
there is a gap in the social work literature regarding the economic impact of undocumented immigrants in the U.S. The
purpose of this paper is to begin to fill that gap by examining the economic impact of undocumented immigration and
to assess the costs and benefits of the undocumented people
living and working in the U.S., as well as the economic and
social costs of public policies that have been enacted to deter
undocumented immigration. Further, this paper will analyze
the available evidence relevant to each of these arguments in
an attempt to provide social workers with an empirical basis
for effective public policy advocacy regarding undocumented
immigration.
Economic Costs of Undocumented Immigrants
Crime, Law Enforcement, and Incarceration
Throughout the first decade of the 2000s, discontent and
controversy erupted among local, state, and federal policymakers, business leaders, advocacy groups and organizations,
and citizens regarding the incarceration of "criminal aliens"
in the United States. Since many undocumented immigrants
in the United States are young men from Mexico and Central
America with characteristics similar to native-born populations who are disproportionately incarcerated (young, male,
poor, high-school dropout, ethnic minority), popular stereotypes tend to reinforce the impression that undocumented
immigrants and criminality are linked (Butcher & Piehl, 2007;
Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007). However, the existing evidence on
the incarceration of undocumented immigrants, as well as the
costs associated with incarcerating undocumented immigrants

Economic Impact of Undocumented Immigrants

115

in local, state, and federal penal institutions, does not reflect
the popular negative stereotypes and public discourse which
often seem to guide the decisions and policy making of many
current local, state, and federal legislators.
Previous studies have found that violent and non-violent
crime rates among undocumented immigrants decreased
during the late-1990s and mid-2000s (Bailey & Hayes, 2006;
Butcher & Piehl, 2007; Nadler, 2008; Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007).
According to Rumbaut and Ewing (2007), even as the number
of undocumented immigrants in the United States doubled
during the late 1990s, the rates of violent and property crimes
decreased 34% and 26%, respectively. Using data from the
annual Federal Bureau of Investigation Unified Crime Reports,
Nadler (2008) compared the differences in total crime rates
between High Immigrant Jurisdictions (HIJs) (defined as the
19 states with the most resident immigrants) whose resident
populations include the highest proportion of immigrants and
highest percentage influx of immigrants, and non-HIJs in the
United States between 1999 and 2006. The study found that the
total crime rates decreased by a little more than 10% across the
nation (3808.1 per 100,000 residents in 2006 versus 4273.8 per
100,000 residents in 1999). Crime, both violent and non-violent,
decreased at a faster rate in the 19 HIJs than in the non-HIJs.
In 2006, the total crime rate in HIJs was lower than non-HIJs
(3807.1 per 100,000 residents versus 3809.4 per 100,000 residents). Finally, the total crimes rate decreased from between
7 to 15 percent across all of the jurisdictions between 1999 and
2006. When examining the incarceration rate of undocumented
immigrants, researchers found that the rate is lower than that
for native-born citizens (Bailey & Hayes, 2006; Butcher & Piehl,
2007; Rumbaut & Ewing, 2007). Furthermore, there is evidence
that immigration does not increase crime rates and actually
reduces crime rates in urban areas (Reid, Weiss, Adelman &
Jaret, 2005; Sampson, Morenoff & Raudenbush, 2005).
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2005) examined the costs associated with incarcerating undocumented
immigrants and found that the cost in local, state, and federal
institutions totaled approximately $5.8 billion for calendar
years 2001 through 2004, with local jails and state prisons absorbing the most costs ($1.7 billion a year). While the cost of
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incarceration is important, estimating this cost is highly variable based upon a number of factors, including whether the
local, state, and federal criminal justice institutions collect data
on undocumented immigrants. For example, the U.S. Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) does not collect or keep information
on "criminal aliens," and the numbers that do exist on "criminal aliens" include both documented and undocumented immigrants who are in the U.S. Nevertheless, the CBO reported
that the cost to state and local governments for incarcerating
undocumented immigrants represents an average of less than
5% of the state and local budgets allocated to law enforcement
(CBO, 2007). The highest local cost for law enforcement activities involving undocumented immigrants was incurred by San
Diego County ($50.3 million), and that cost represented 90% of
the state of California's border counties costs associated with
undocumented immigrants for the year, but was almost half
of the total dollar amount ($108.2 million) spent on law enforcement activities involving undocumented immigrants by
all California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas border counties
in the United States (Salant et al., 2001).
Health Care
Health care costs associated with providing care to undocumented immigrants is another contentious issue. The overwhelming majority of undocumented immigrants do not have
health insurance because they are not eligible for government
programs and are often not eligible for employer-provided
health insurance (Goldman, Smith, & Sood, 2006). Although
studies indicate that undocumented immigrants underutilize
health care compared to the general population, undocumented immigrants often use emergency rooms because they are
mandated to provide care regardless of immigration status or
ability to pay (Ku & Matani, 2001; Marshall, Urrutia-Rojas, Soto
Mas, & Coggin, 2005). This mandate can lead to higher costs
for hospitals, especially for non-emergency related health care
issues (Okie, 2007). As a result, there is an estimated economic
cost associated with providing health care to undocumented
immigrants of between $6 and $10 billion per year (Camarota,
2004; Goldman, Smith, & Sood, 2006).
Under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, the federal
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government provided $250 million annually through 2008 to
reimburse hospitals and other health care providers for the
costs associated with providing emergency health care services
to undocumented immigrants (CBO, 2007). Although there are
costs associated with health care provision to undocumented
immigrants, due to their lower rates of use of health care services, these expenditures account for only 1.5% of U.S. medical
costs (Okie, 2007) and the estimated tax burden per household
was only $11 per year for providing health care to undocumented immigrants (Goldman, Smith, & Sood, 2006). While
some may argue that no tax dollars should go toward providing services to a population who many believe should not
even be in the U.S., the $11 annual per household tax burden
is not the overwhelming financial burden that the media and
many politicians claim.
Education
The 1982 Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe guaranteed that undocumented children have a right to be educated
in U.S. public schools. Since then, the costs associated with educating undocumented immigrant children have been an issue
for state and local governments. The average amount spent by
all states during the 2009-2010 academic year was $10,586 per
student (National Education Association [NEA], 2010). There
are an estimated 1.6 million undocumented children living in
the United States (Passel, Capps, & Fix, 2004). By taking into
account the national average spent per student (not accounting
for pre-K children or dropouts), the amount needed per year
to educate undocumented children would be an estimated $17
billion per year. Although undocumented immigrants can be
found in all states, six states continue to account for almost
two-thirds of the undocumented population (California,
Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, & New Jersey), which indicates that the costs to those states would be higher than to
other states (Passel, Capps, & Fix, 2004).
While there is no question that there are economic costs
associated with educating undocumented immigrant children,
this represents only 3.3% of the total cost of between $520-$535
billion spent annually to educate all children in the U.S. (NEA,
2010; Passel, Capps, & Fix, 2004; U.S. Department of Education,
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2005). Also, under No Child Left Behind, the federal government has the English Language Acquisition Program to reimburse states for the costs associated with children participating
in English acquisition programs, regardless of immigration
status. While the federal government reimbursed states $621
million under that program in 2006, that amount only covers
the costs associated with English language programs, and not
the general education of undocumented immigrants (CBO,
2007).
The Social and Economic Costs
of Anti-Immigrant Policies
The negative rhetoric and public perception of undocumented immigration has led to the implementation of new
anti-immigration policies. Not only are there financial implications to implementing anti-immigrant policies, but social
impacts as well, because groups of people are subjected to differential treatment. Anti-immigrant policies have deleterious
effects on the health of the undocumented population as they
live in constant states of fear; individuals are deported, families separated, and they experience discrimination. The Pew
Hispanic Center reports that six in ten Latinos worry that they
themselves or a family member or close friend will be deported
(Pew Hispanic Center, 2010). Many children of undocumented
parents are often U.S. citizens, yet despite their citizenship
status they also carry the burden of many anti-immigrant policies. There are an estimated 5.5 million children with undocumented parents, approximately three-quarters whom are U.S.
citizens (Chaudry et al., 2010). Chaudry and colleagues (2010)
found that parent-child separation due to deportation poses
serious risks to children's immediate safety, economic security,
well-being, and long-term development. Children experience
changes in their eating and sleeping, cry more, are more afraid,
and are anxious, withdrawn, clingy, or aggressive.
Whereas in 2001, Americans perceived Blacks as the racial/
ethnic group that was most discriminated against in the U.S.,
in 2009 Latinos were perceived as the ethnic group that is most
often subjected to discrimination (Pew Hispanic Center, 2010).
Perceptions of discrimination vary among Latinos; 70% of
foreign born Latinos view discrimination against Latinos as a
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major problem, whereas only 49% of native-born Latinos agree
(Lopez, Taylor, & Morin, 2010). Regardless of nativity, one in
ten Latinos report being asked by police officers or other authorities about their immigration status (Pew Hispanic Center,
2010). Substantial evidence links discrimination to indicators of
poor physical and mental health among immigrants and children of immigrants (Ara6jo Dawson, 2009; Ay6n, Marsiglia,
& Parsai, 2010; Ding & Hargraves, 2009; Umafia-Taylor &
Updegraff, 2007; Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2008).
In 1997 the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
and Social Security Administration (SSA) partnered to implement a basic pilot program, commonly known as E-verify, an
automated internet-based verification system that allows employers to voluntarily check the work eligibility of potential
new hires (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 2010).
In 2008 the CBO estimated that enacting a mandatory E-verify
program would decrease federal revenues by $17.3 billion
from 2009-2018 due to workers leaving the formal economy
for the unregulated, untaxed underground economy (Orszag,
2008). These projections have materialized in Arizona, one of
the first states to mandate the use of E-verify, where businesses
are hiring workers off the books without paying income or
payroll taxes (Immigration Policy Center, 2010a). In addition,
the CBO projected an increase in direct spending of $30 million
for the federal judges authorized by this bill, and costs for
implementing E-verify are estimated at $10.3 billion over the
2009-2013 period and $23.4 billion over the 2009-2018 period
(Orszag, 2008).
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) requires all individuals to provide proof of citizenship and identity, with a
passport or birth certificate, when applying for or renewing
Medicaid coverage. As a result, forty-six states had to change
their policy, as they previously only required a signed statement of citizenship, under penalty of perjury (Smith et al.,
2006; Sommers, 2010). The goal of this policy is to exclude undocumented immigrants from accessing Medicaid or public
health insurance (Sommers, 2010).
The findings regarding the effectiveness of this policy
have been mixed. Eight months following the implementation of DRA several states experienced significant declines in
Medicaid enrollment, particularly among low-income children
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(Ross, 2007). Ross (2007) found that this policy is likely to take
a toll on working poor families, regardless of documentation
status, because they are now required to visit the Medicaid
office in person, whereas before they were able to submit the
paperwork by mail. In order to meet these new requirements,
they have to take time off from work to secure the necessary
documentation, such as a birth certificate, visit the Medicaid
office, and cover the fees for the documents. In addition, access
to Medicaid eligibility has been delayed because it takes time
to access the required documents.
Projected costs to states following the passage of DRA
ranged from $1.3 million to $19 million (Ross, 2007). Findings
from the Current Population Survey (2004-2008) reveal that
the policy has been effective in reducing Medicaid enrollment
among non-citizens and has not significantly impacted citizens (Sommers, 2010). Results indicate that 1 in 4 non-citizen
adults were screened out while 1 in 8 non-citizen children
were screened out through the policy. However, the cost-benefit analysis revealed that instead of saving the government
money, the policy has actually cost the U.S. approximately
$600 million through administrative spending and compliance
costs imposed on U.S. citizens applying for Medicaid; every
$100 spent on verifying citizenship and residency only saved
14 cents (Sommers, 2010).
In 2005, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI) was launched by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The SBI is a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing the U.S.
borders and reducing illegal immigration (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2009). The U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) agency is responsible for managing the SBI
program and developing a comprehensive border protection
system. The proposal for securing the border has two main
components: (1) SBInet which utilizes radars, sensors, and
cameras to detect, identify and classify the threat level associated with an illegal entry into the U.S.; and (2) the SBI tactical
infrastructure (TI), or fencing, roads, and lighting intended to
enhance the U.S. Border Patrol agents' ability to respond to the
area of the illegal entry and lead to arrest (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2009). At this time, the focus has been in
the Southwest region of the border, as it has been identified as
needing the most attention.
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The Consolidation Appropriation Act of 2008 required
DHS to complete construction of 370 miles of border fence
by December 31, 2008. DHS set a goal to complete 670 miles
of fencing by December 31, 2008. These goals were not met.
By October 31, 2008 CBP had completed 215 miles of primary
SBI fencing, costing approximately $625 million. The average
cost per mile of pedestrian fencing is $2.8 million per mile
with a range of $400,000 to $4.8 million (U.S. Government
Accountability Office, 2009). SBInet has also been unsuccessful and costly. DHS has spent over $1.5 billion since 2006 (U.S.
Government Accountability Office, 2010). Boeing has billed
the department more than $850 million since the project began
(Bennett, 2010). This large investment has resulted in only 53
miles of unreliable coverage of a more than 2,000 mile border.
In January 2011, the SBInet project was cancelled by Homeland
Security Secretary Janet Napolitano.
Ecnomic Benefits Provided by
Undocumented Immigrants
FederalLevel
There are economic costs and benefits of having undocumented immigrants and their children living in the United
States. The CBO reported that on a federal level, revenues
generated by undocumented immigrants are greater than the
expense of providing services because undocumented immigrants do not qualify for federal programs (CBO, 2007). In
addition to the additional revenue generated through taxes,
undocumented immigrants contribute to the U.S. economy in
other ways.
The financial solvency of the Social Security and Medicare
programs in the U.S. relies on payroll tax revenue (Segal, 2010).
Despite the public discourse to the contrary, the majority of
undocumented immigrants pay income taxes through the
use of Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITINs) or
through false Social Security numbers (National Council of La
Raza [NCLR], 2008; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, n.d.). As a
result, undocumented immigrants contribute over $7 billion
annually to Social Security and over $1.5 billion to Medicare
(NCLR, 2008).
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Although some undocumented immigrants receive Social
Security and Medicare benefits, the majority do not receive
any benefits from those programs (NCLR, 2008; Sommers,
2010). Since false Social Security numbers are not appropriately linked to an individual who can take advantage of
Social Security benefits, the majority of contributions to Social
Security from undocumented immigrants go into an earnings
suspense file. The Social Security Administration factors in the
over $7 billion annual contributions from undocumented immigrants into the Social Security Administration's calculations
and projections for the solvency of Social Security (Porter, 2005;
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, n.d.). The retirement of the baby
boom generation will lead to increased expenditures for Social
Security (Abel, 2003) and additional tax revenue is needed to
provide Social Security benefits to current and future retirees.
Since undocumented immigrants are ineligible to receive government services, it is estimated that undocumented immigrants pay an average of $1,800 per household, per year more
to Social Security and Medicare than they utilize in services
(Camarota, 2004). Therefore, undocumented immigrants actually contribute to the solvency of Social Security and Medicare
and help to provide services to current and future retirees.
State and Local Level
While current rhetoric in the immigration debate decries
how undocumented workers steal jobs, immigrants working
in the U.S. do not take away jobs from citizens; instead they
stimulate the state and local economies and complement the
workforce by providing a necessary pool of unskilled labor
(U.S. Chamber of Commerce, n.d.). For example, despite the
costs, there may be economic benefits associated with having
undocumented children in schools that are often not considered. Higher student enrollment may lead to the creation of
more jobs, not just for teachers, but in all educational-related
services including administrators, maintenance staff, teaching
assistants and other paraprofessionals, bus drivers, and other
school staff which would help local and state economies. The
creation of jobs as a result of higher student enrollment often
results in an increase in federal funding for schools (Spradlin,
2008) and can lead to an increase in state and local revenue

Economic Impact of Undocumented Immigrants

123

generated by income and sales taxes (Harvey, 2011). Higher
student enrollment may lead to an increase in economic activity as a result of the purchase of additional textbooks and other
educational materials, as well as with families' back-to-school
shopping that is done before every academic year. Businesses
anticipate the annual surge in sales and higher profits, which
benefit the local economy because of the sale taxes generated
from back-to-school shoppers (Censky, 2010; Fierro, 2010).
Contrary to the implication that immigrants exacerbate
unemployment, high rates of immigration are linked to less
unemployment (Riley, 2008). This does not diminish the
economy, but encourages specialization and increases wages
for native workers (Card, 2007). Most undocumented immigrants in the U.S. work in low-skilled jobs and do not compete
with American workers. The influx of low-skilled laborers into
the U.S. has been shown to slow the decline of manufacturing
industries (Capps et al., 2007) and contribute to the creation
of new jobs (Peri, 2006). For example, the Bell Policy Center
found that for every job held by an undocumented immigrant
in Colorado, 0.8 jobs are created (Boven, 2011; Fairley & Jones,
2011). While there are few official estimates from the federal
government regarding how much undocumented immigrants
contribute to the U.S. economy, the available evidence indicates that undocumented immigration is part of a positive
force that immigration has upon the U.S. economy.
In addition to the economic benefits to Social Security and
Medicare, undocumented immigrants also provide revenue to
state and local governments as a result of their employment,
purchases, and taxes. Unfortunately, state and local governments do not use a consistent method to analyze the economic
impact of undocumented immigrants, which prohibits accurate comparisons of positive and negative economic impacts
across all states (CBO, 2007). Nevertheless, it is important to
present the information that is available, in order to dispel the
myths that undocumented immigrants do not pay any taxes
and do not have a positive impact on some state and local
economies. Table 1 provides the available information that
allows for comparisons of the economic contributions through
taxes of undocumented immigrants across various states.
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Table 1. State and Local Economic Contributions of Undocumented

Immigrants
State
California

Type of Tax

Total Tax Contribution

state income

$280 million'

Colorado

state income,
sales, & property

$159 - $194 million 2

Georgia

state income,
sales, & property

$215.6 - $252.5 million 3

Indiana

state and county
income,
sales, & property

$96.8 million 4

Iowa

state income, sales,
excise, & property

$40 - $62 million-

Missouri

state income,
excise, & property

$29 - $57 million 6

New Mexico

state income,
sales, & property

$64.7 million

Oregon

state income,
excise, & property

$134 - $187 million 8

Virginia

state income, sales,
excise, & property

$145 - $174 million 9

7

IPastor, Scoggins,

Tran, & Ortiz (2010); 2 Baker & Jones (2006); 3 Coffey (2006); 1Heet
(2009); 5 Pearson & Sheehan (2007); 6 Ehresman (2006); 1Immigration Policy Center
8
(2010c); Oregon Center for Public Policy (2007); 1 Cassidy & Okos (2008)

Also, contrary to studies reporting that the cost to states
with high numbers of undocumented immigrants outweighs
their economic contributions, several states reported that undocumented immigrants contribute more in state and local
taxes than they consume in services, as well as stimulating
state and local economies. The Texas Comptroller reported
that undocumented immigrants provided $17.7 billion in gross
state product, including over $424 million more in state revenues than they consumed in state services including education, health care and law enforcement (Strayhorn, 2006). If all
undocumented immigrants in Texas were to leave or be deported, not only would Texas lose over $400 million in state
revenues, but Texas would also lose 2.3% of jobs in the state
because of the economic activity of undocumented immigrants
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that supports businesses and employment (Strayhorn, 2006).
Arizona, another state with a high undocumented immigrant
population, would lose $11.7 billion in gross state product and
over 140,000 jobs in the state if all undocumented immigrants
living in the state were to leave or be deported (Immigration
Policy Center, 2010b).
Even studies that report an overall economic loss as a result
of providing services to undocumented immigrants indicate
that those losses are negligible once the economic benefits of
undocumented immigrants are considered (Hanson, 2007).
In Illinois, Mehta and colleagues (Mehta, Theodore, Mora, &
Wade, 2002) fotmd that the purchases of undocumented immigrants in the Chicago metropolitan area stimulated an additional $2.56 billion in local spending which supports 31,908
jobs. Iowa estimated that undocumented immigrants subsidize services that only U.S. citizens and documented immigrants can access because undocumented immigrants pay
more in state and local taxes than the costs of providing the
state and local services they utilize (Pearson & Sheehan, 2007).
In Colorado, undocumented immigrants contribute more in
income, property, and sales tax revenue than they consume in
services provided by the state for education, health care, and
incarceration (Fairley & Jones, 2011). In addition to the tax
revenue, the economic activity generated by undocumented
immigrants in Colorado created an additional 91,000 jobs, $4.7
billion in personal income, and $15 billion in industry output
for the state of Colorado (Boven, 2011; Colorado Center on
Law & Policy, 2011; Fairley & Jones, 2011).
Implications for Social Work Practice
The negative public discourse regarding undocumented
immigration may lead to increased levels of perceived discrimination among all Latinos, but undocumented Latinos
in particular. The mission of the social work profession is
to promote social justice and social change on behalf of oppressed and vulnerable populations (NASW, 2008); therefore, the social work profession is uniquely positioned to take
action around the impact of the negative public perceptions
and public policies regarding undocumented immigration. On
the micro level, social workers who work with individuals and
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families must be aware of the negative impacts that perceived
discrimination can have on the physical and mental health of
individuals. As stated earlier, a plethora of studies have found
that the physical and mental health of immigrants and children of immigrants is negatively impacted by discrimination.
It is therefore necessary for social workers to assess physical
and specific mental health conditions that may be associated
with perceived and experienced discrimination such as stress,
depression, and anxiety (Finch, Hummer, Kol, & Vega, 2001).
At a macro level, social workers must also work with communities and facilitate educational forums to discuss the fears
surrounding undocumented immigration. By inviting community members and the media, these forums can be used
to dispel misinformation surrounding the economic costs associated with undocumented immigrants' use of public services and demonstrate the positive impact that undocumented
immigrants may have on the local, state, and U.S. economies.
Social workers must also continue to advocate for social justice
for undocumented immigrants. Social work agencies providing services to Latino communities can create coalitions that
lobby politicians and advocate for more just and humane policies aimed at undocumented immgrants in the U.S.
Furthermore, social workers need to develop strategies
and programs to help immigrants negotiate the effects of
anti-immigrant policy and practices. For example, in some
states most publicly-funded efforts to promote diversity have
been eliminated (i.e., bilingual education and ethnic-based
programs in schools). Consistent with a strengths-based approach, social workers in community based settings can
engage in developing programs that promote ethnic identity
development, as researchers have found that strong ethnic
identity promotes well-being and protects youth from the negative effects of discrimination (Smokowski & Bacallao, 2007;
Umafia-Taylor & Updegraff, 2007). Social workers can also
raise awareness among immigrant commmunities by informing them of their Constitutional rights. For example, the ACLU
disseminates "Know Your Rights" information in English and
Spanish about individuals' as well as immigrants' rights when
interacting with law enforcement agents (ACLU, 2010). Social
workers can partner with immigration attorneys to organize
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workshops to ensure that immigrant communities know their
rights to minimize the potential for civil rights abuses.
The policies that have been enacted to deter undocumented immigration are costly and ineffective. Therefore, all social
workers should advocate for policies that will provide more
accurate information about the economic impact of undocumented immigrants, that will help meet the demand for labor
in the U.S., and that will allow undocumented immigrants to
contribute fully to the U.S. while allowing them to improve
their lives and provide for their families. All states should
conduct a comprehensive cost benefit analysis similar to the
one conducted by the Texas Office of the Comptroller in 2006.
The federal government should reassert its role on immigration and pass comprehensive immigration reform which includes a new and expanded guest worker program; this would
deter individual states from developing harmful, costly, and ineffective policies. Currently H1 (Specialty Occupations), H2A
(Temporary Agricultural Workers) and H2B (Temporary NonAgricultural Workers) visas allow foreign nationals to enter
the U.S. for employment (U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, 2010). The current quota, which is set at 65,000 for
each type of visa, is far short of what is needed to meet the
demand for immigrant labor. Until comprehensive immigration can be enacted by the federal government, the quotas for
these visas should be increased to more accurately reflect labor
demands. The U.S. Congress must also pass the Development,
Relief, and Education, for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act, which
would grant conditional permanent residency for undocumented students who graduate from a U.S. high school or earn
their GED, and either complete at least 2 years at an institution of higher learning or military service. This would provide
undocumented students with the opportunity to not only
improve their lives, but to contribute fully to society through
military service, increased tax revenue, and civic engagement.
Increasing the number of Latino college graduates may generate an additional $7 billion in federal tax revenue to Social
Security per 10 year cohort of students (Robles, 2009).
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Conclusion
Although there are costs associated with undocumented
immigrants living in the U.S., their overall economic contributions, including employment, purchases, and tax revenue
generated may result in a financial benefit to the U.S. at the
federal level, and for some local and state governments as well
(Immigration Policy Center, 2010b, c; NCLR, 2008; Porter, 2005;
Strayhorn, 2006; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, n.d.). Even in
states where the costs of providing services to undocumented
inimigrants is greater than the tax revenue generated, those
costs represent less than 5% of those states' total budgets allocated for law enforcement, education, and health care (CBO,
2007), and not the huge economic drain claimed by many politicians and anti-immigrant organizations. The negative depictions of undocumented immigrants by the media and the
discussion by some politicians about the economic drain of undocumented immigrants on the U.S. economy, which are based
on exaggerations, the distortion of data, or incomplete information, have created a hostile environment for undocumented
Latinos in the U.S. (Becerra, 2012). This has led to ineffective
and costly policies that deny services to undocumented immigrants and increase immigration enforcement (CBO, 2008;
NCLR, 2008; Sommers, 2010; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, n.d.,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009, 2010).
In addition, the negative public discourse surrounding undocumented immigration has led to the rise of extremist and
vigilante groups such as the Minutemen. The implementation of policies, such as Arizona's SB 1070, create fear and lead
to higher individual and societal costs (Androff et al., 2011;
Becerra et al., 2010). These ineffective anti-immigrant policies may have exacerbated the current financial crisis faced by
federal, state, and local governments. The social work profession cannot allow this population to continue to be used as
scapegoats. Social workers must utilize accurate information
about the economic impact of undocumented immigrants and
advocate for humane policies that will help meet the demands
for labor and allow undocumented immigrants to be treated
fairly for their contributions to the U.S. economy.
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While a growing body of literature has established a relationship
between "disordered" neighborhoods and psychological distress,
less is known about the specific mechanisms at work. Using data
collected in the 2008 Arizona Health Survey (N = 4,196), hierarchal linearregression was conducted to assess both the independent
effect of perception of neighborhoodsafety on psychological distress,
as well as the mediating effects of powerlessness, social isolation
and mistrust. The findings suggest that the more safe individuals feel in their neighborhood, the less psychological distress they
experience (b = 1.07, SE = .17, p < .001). This relationshipappears
to be partially mediated by feelings of powerlessness, social isolation and mistrust, indicatingpotential risk and protectivefactors.
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Mental health disorders are a leading source of disability,
making it an important aspect of public health. Rates of depression and anxiety are between 10 and 20% in populations
worldwide (Patel, Flisher & Cohen, 2006) with psychological disorders accounting for 12% of all disability-adjusted life
years lost (Brundtland, 2000). Poor mental health has a variety
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of social consequences including, but not limited to, marital instability (Kessler, Walters & Forthofer, 1998), increased teenage
parenthood (Kessler et al., 1997), substance abuse (Regier et al.,
1990), disruptions in social relationships (Mickelson & Kessler,
1997), and suicide (Prince et al., 2007).
In a classic study, Faris and Dunham (1939) established a
relationship between some mental health outcomes and geographical location, suggesting that the environment in which
a person lives may impact the development of mental health
symptoms. They attributed this relationship to the lack of
social infrastructure in disordered neighborhoods, which
adds to the existing impact of individual-level characteristics.
Although Faris and Dunham (1939) found that this relationship only held true for individuals hospitalized for psychotic
and substance abuse disorders and were not able to control for
individual factors, subsequent research has established a link
between neighborhood environments and anxiety/depression, controlling for individual-level characteristics (Beard et
al., 2009; Galea et al., 2007; Roh et al., 2011; Silver, Mulvey, &
Swanson, 2002; Truong & Ma, 2006).
In a review of the literature examining the independent
relationship between neighborhood characteristics and depression, thirty-seven of the forty-five studies found support
for the hypothesis (Mair, Roux, & Galea, 2008). While these
studies have looked at the association between disordered
neighborhood and mental health, few have explored the specific relationship between perception of neighborhood safety
and psychological distress. In addition, no studies, to our
knowledge, have explored the secondary stressors, such as
powerlessness, social isolation and mistrust, that may link the
external stressor of neighborhood safety to the internalization
of psychological distress.
Based on an ecological systems theory and the social
stress theory perspectives, the present study approaches
perception of neighborhood as one important aspect in the
complex constellation of factors contributing to psychological distress. In order to do this, we examine the associations
between a primary stressor, perception of neighborhood
safety, and psychological distress and explore to what degree
this relationship is mediated by secondary stressors, such as

Neighborhood Safety and Psychological Distress

139

powerlessness, mistrust and social isolation for adults living
in Arizona.
Ecological systems theory conceives of the "environment" as nested structures with multiple layers surrounding and impacting the individual (micro, exo, and macro)
(Bronfenbrenner, 1977). Within this system, an individual
naturally strives to maintain a balance between resources and
demands. According to this theory, psychological distress,
which includes mental health outcomes such as anxiety and
depression, arises when a person is unable to re-achieve equilibrium or adapts in a way that temporarily relieves stress but
leads to additional stressors (i.e., substance abuse, illegal activity) (Saleebey, 2004).
The transition from simply experiencing external stress to
internalizing and experiencing psychological distress can also
be understood in the context of social stress theory. Like ecological systems theory, social stress theory classically defines
stress as a state of arousal resulting either from the presence
of socio-environmental demands that challenge the ordinary
adaptive abilities of the individual or from the absence of
means to obtain something wanted or needed (Aneshensel,
1992; Pearlin, 1989). Stress is, therefore, an internal response to
an external situation or stressor (Aneshensel, 1992).
In the social stress literature, a distinction has been made
between two types of stressors: acute and chronic. While acute
stressors rarely result in negative health outcomes or long term
psychological distress (Aneshensel, 1992; Thoits, 1983), a large
body of evidence has accumulated which links chronic stressors to psychological distress (Avison & Turner 1988; Downey &
Van Willigen, 2005; House, Strecher, Metzner, & Robbins, 1986;
Ross & Huber, 1985; Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2008).
In addition to the distinction between chronic and acute
stressors, there is also a distinction between primary and secondary stressors. Stressors are rarely isolated events, with
every initial chronic stressor potentially having several secondary stressors that arise as a person reacts to the initial
stressor (Elliott, 2000). For example, the loss of employment
can be considered a primary stressor and potential secondary
stressors may include marital instability, financial insecurity,
a lost sense of purpose, or diminished confidence. According
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to social stress theory, different experiences of secondary
stressors may explain why two people who experience the
same primary stressor have different levels of overall distress
(Fitzpatrick & LaGory, 2003). In this study, the manifestation of
distress for those living in an unsafe environment may depend
on an individual's experience of secondary stressors-powerless, mistrust and social isolation-and the absence of these
secondary stressors may serve as protective factors.
Although individuals may not be aware of the influence
of neighborhood on their overall well-being, when disorganized, the place in which a person lives can be a chronic
stressor. Increasingly, researchers have been investigating the
direct relationship between neighborhood characteristics and
psychological well-being, strengthening the evidence that
neighborhood factors have an impact on mental health outcomes above and beyond individual characteristics (Beard et
al., 2009; Elliot, 2000; Phongsavan, Chey, Bauman, Brooks, &
Silove, 2006; Propper et al., 2005; Wen, Hawkly, & Cacioppo,
2006). Both physical (Ellaway, Macintyre, & Kearns, 2001;
Ross & Mirowsky, 2009) and social aspects (Aneshensel &
Sucoff, 1996; Phongsavan et al., 2006; Propper et al., 2005; Wen,
Hawkly, & Cacioppo, 2006) of neighborhood disorganization
have been associated with an increased likelihood of poor
mental health outcomes, including elevated depressive symptoms and anxiety.
More specifically, Galea et al. (2005) found that New York
city residents living in neighborhoods characterized by a
poorer internal environments (cracks in the wall, poor ventilation, presence of pests) and external environments (empty
lots, abandoned buildings, broken windows, trash) were 29
to 58% more likely to report depression in the last 6 months
and 36 to 64% more likely to report lifetime depression than
persons living in neighborhoods characterized by a less disorganized physical environment. In the first study to use an experimental design to assess neighborhood effects, it was found
that parents who moved to mixed income neighborhoods
from high poverty neighborhoods experienced an 8% to 33%
decline in psychological distress and depressive symptoms,
while boys age 8-13 years of age experienced a 25% decrease
in depressive/anxiety and dependency problems (Leventhal
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& Brooks-Gunn, 2003). Additionally, in Los Angeles, a relationship was found between adolescents who described their
neighborhoods as having ambient hazards and their reported
depressive symptoms (Aneshensel & Sucoff, 1996).
In addition to the direct effect via chronic stressors, perceptions of neighborhood disorganization may also have indirect effects on psychological distress by impacting the residents' coping resources, such as social cohesion (Aneshensel
& Sucoff, 1996; Ellaway, Macintyre, & Kearns, 2001; Faris &
Dunham, 1939), trust, and power (Ahem & Galea, 2011; Ross
& Mirowsky, 2009), leading to feelings of social isolation, mistrust, and powerlessness (Phongsavan et al., 2006; Ross & Jang,
2000; Stockdale et al., 2007). It has been suggested that mistrust, defined as a lack of faith and confidence in others, is a
natural protective reaction to neighborhood disorder (Ross,
Mirowsky, & Pribesh, 2001). This protective reaction is the secondary stressor that may occur as a result of the chronic stress
of living in a threatening environment. It follows, then, that
in a neighborhood where a person views neighbors as a potential threat, interactions with neighbors and supportive relationships are less likely to be formed (Liska, 1997; Stockdale
et al., 2007). Lack of informal social networks and feeling socially isolated in a disordered neighborhood can also increase
individuals' feelings of fear and mistrust (Ross & Jang, 2000).
Because social support has been shown to buffer the effect of
stressors, minimal social support may make a person susceptible to psychological distress (Brownet al., 2009; Kessler &
McLeod, 1985; Stockdale et al., 2007).
In addition, an unsafe or disordered neighborhood may
also lead to feelings of powerlessness-defined as the feeling
that the outcomes of one's life are determined by forces outside
of oneself-because neighborhood stressors create a sense that
life is chaotic and full of uncontrollable threats (Geis & Ross,
1998). Bandura (2000) writes that perception of self efficacy,
the conceptual opposite of feelings of powerlessness, impact
an individual's ability to cope with stressful environments. A
threatening neighborhood environment may also lead to feelings of powerlessness when a person is not able to move out of
the area, communicating to individuals that they are not able
to meet their basic need for safety (Hiroto, 1974). It follows that
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perceptions of mastery or self efficacy have been found to be
inversely associated with psychological distress (Aneshensel,
1992). While Sampson et al. (1997) have argued that collective
efficacy, which is dependent on social cohesion and trust, is
related to decreased levels of violence in a neighborhood, Ross
& Mirowsky (2009) posit that disorder, including feelings of
safety, impact individual feelings of efficacy, trust and social
cohesion. They go on to state that it is these secondary stressors, powerlessness, mistrust and social isolation, that connect
living in a disordered neighborhood and psychological distress (Ross & Mirowsky, 2009).
While these direct and indirect relationships have been
explored, tested, and supported for "neighborhood disorder,"
previous research has tended to aggregate many neighborhood stressors, including graffiti, vacant lots, crime, loitering,
and drug use, in order to characterize it as hazardous or "disordered" (Aneshensel & Sucoff, 1996; Ellaway et al., 2001; Ross
& Mirowsky, 2009; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Although
aggregating stressors is helpful in determining which neighborhoods may be considered high risk, this approach makes
it difficult to determine exactly what about living in a "disordered" environment impacts psychological distress.
It has been suggested that after the most basic needs of
food and shelter have been met, an individual's attention naturally shifts to safety or securing one's environment (Maslow,
1987). In a discussion about a neighborhood's influence on all
aspects of health, Taylor, Repetti and Seeman (1997, p. 439)
define healthy environments as those "that provide safety and
opportunities for social integration." In one of the few studies
that have examined perceptions of safety and mental health
outcomes independently, Roh and colleagues (2011) found
that perceptions of neighborhood safety significantly predicted depressive symptoms among older Korean adults. Based
on theory and the limited evidence available, perceptions of
neighborhood safety may have a significant effect on psychological distress and should be examined independent of other
neighborhood indicators.
The overall hypothesis guiding the study is that feeling
unsafe in one's neighborhood will act as a primary stressor on
psychological distress. Thus, the more unsafe a person feels in
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his or her neighborhood, the higher the psychological distress,
indicating a positive relationship. However, when feelings of
trust, power, and neighborhood social support are present, the
primary stressor of living in an unsafe neighborhood may not
lead to psychological distress, thereby mediating the relationship and providing potential protective factors to living in disordered neighborhoods, the secondary hypothesis.
Methods
Sample
Data used in this study came from the Arizona Health
Survey (AHS) collected in the early part of 2008 and sponsored
by the St. Luke's Health Initiatives. The AHS, a populationbased, random-digit dialing telephone survey, is intended to
be representative of Arizona's non-institutionalized population living in households with a landline-based phone. A
multi-stage sampling design was used and residential telephone numbers were selected within two geographic strataMaricopa County and the remainder of Arizona. The final
sample size included 3,130 adults living in Maricopa County
and 1,066 living in the remainder of Arizona, totaling 4,196
adults. Within each household, one adult was randomly selected to complete the survey. Interviews were conducted in
English and Spanish using a computer-assisted telephone interviewing system. To maximize the response rate, letters were
mailed to households selected for which addresses could be
obtained prior to the telephone survey.
The overall response rate was a composite of the screener
completion rate (i.e., success in introducing the survey to a
household and randomly selecting an adult to be interviewed)
and the extended interview completion rate (the success of
getting one or more selected persons to complete the extended
interview). The screener completion rate was 36.6% and the
extended interview completion rate was 53.7%, resulting in
a 19.2% overall response rate (Arizona Health Survey, 2008).
Because AHS was not successful in obtaining a demographically representative sample of Arizonans, the data were weighted
so that they could be generalized to the entire population of
Arizona.
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Measures
Psychological distress was measured using the Kessler 6
(Kessler et al., 2002) which has been shown to be highly correlated with a clinical mental health diagnosis (Wells, Bushness,
Homblow, Joyce, & Oakley-Browne, 1989) and sociocultural
variations in rates of diagnosis (Wakefield, 1999). Respondents
were asked about the severity of certain signs of stress, and
responses were then combined to give a score that represents
a person's overall level of psychological distress. The Kessler 6
score is an aggregate of the participant's response to six questions (o= .80): (a) "About how often in the past 30 days did you
feel nervous?" (b) "During the past 30 days, about how often
did you feel helpless?" (c) "During the past 30 days, about how
often did you feel restless or fidgety?" (d) "During the past 30
days, how often did you feel so depressed that nothing could
cheer you up?" (e) "During the past 30 days, about how often
did you feel that everything was an effort?" and (f) "During
the past 30 days, about how often did you feel worthless?"
Responses to each question were coded as 0, "None of the time,"
thru 4 "All of the time." The final aggregate measure ranged
from 0 - 24, with higher scores indicating greater levels of psychological distress.
Perceptionof Feeling Unsafe in the Neighborhoodis a subjective
measure of neighborhood safety. Perception of feeling unsafe
in the neighborhood was measured using the question: "Do
you feel safe in your neighborhood?" with responses ranging
from (1) "All of the time" to (4) "None of the time." While using
objective measures of safety (i.e., amount of criminal activity in
the neighborhood) is a more traditional way of conceptualizing a variety of aspects of neighborhood disorder (Macintyre &
Ellaway, 2003; Ross & Mirowsky, 2009), subjective experiences
and perceptions are a more directly related to health (ChristieMizell, Steelman, & Stewart, 2003) and are high correlated
with objective measures (Austin, Furr, & Spine, 2002; Ellaway,
Macintyre, & Kearns, 2001; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004).
Powerlessness was measured with the following question,
"Please tell me how often the statements were true of you over
the past month.. .You felt in control of your life." The responses ranged from (1) "All of the time" to (5) "None of the time." In
order to measure a person's level of neighborhood mistrust,
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the participants were asked, "Tell me if you strongly agree,
agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statement...People in my neighborhood can be trusted." The re-

sponses were given values ranging from (1) "Strongly agree" to
(4) "Strongly disagree." In order to measure levels of perceived
social isolation the following questions were considered: "Tell
me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree
with the following statement... (a) "People in my neighborhood help each other out" and (b) "There are people I can
count on in this neighborhood" (x = .74). The responses were
given values ranging from (1) "Strongly agree" to (4) "Strongly
disagree." The average value of these two questions was calculated and a mean scaled variable was constructed.
Statistical Analysis
Using Stata 10.0, hierarchal linear regressions were conducted to assess both the independent effects of perception
of safety, powerlessness, social isolation and mistrust on psychological distress, as well as the mediating effects controlling
for marital status, age, gender, race education and income. To
test for mediation, the four-step process proposed by Barron
and Kenny (1986) was used: Step 1) The relationship between
perceived neighborhood safety and psychological distress was
tested; Step 2) The relationship between perceived neighborhood safety and a mediator variable (powerlessness, social isolation, or mistrust) was tested; Step 3) The relationship between
the mediator and psychological distress was tested; and Step
4) Both perceived neighborhood safety and a mediating variable were entered into the multiple regression equation. If the
relationship between perceived neighborhood safety and psychological distress decreases when the mediator is added to
the model, then mediation is present. A Sobel (1982) test was
used to determine if the decrease in psychological distress
observed was statistically significant. For all models, weights
were applied and standard errors were adjusted by stratum,
Maricopa County and all other counties, to adjust for any bias
in the sampling procedure.
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Results
After the data were weighted, 49% of respondents reported that they were female and 65% were married. The majority of respondents were non-Hispanic white (71%), followed
by Hispanic (26%) and African American (3%). On average,
participants completed some college (M = 14.69, SD = 4.99),
were 47 years old (M = 46.96, SD = 18.64) and reported earnings between $50,000 and $60,000 a year (M = 7.94, SD = 4.19).
Table 1. Steps 1, 2 and 3. The Relationship between Perception
of Neighborhood Safety and Psychological Distress with
Powerlessness, Community Isolation, and Mistrust as Mediators
Psychological
Distress
Step 1
Feeling unsafe in
neighborhood

Powerlessness

Social Isolation

Mistrust

.22(.04)***

.20(.02)***

.28(.03)***

1.07 (.17)...

Step 2
Feeling unsafe in
neighborhood
Step 3
Powerlessness

1.92(.12)***

Social Isolation

.95(.18)***

Mistrust

.65(.16)***

Note: all independent variables were modeled separately; all models control for
marital status, age, gender, race, education and income. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

The mean Kessler 6 score was 3.85 (SD = 3.78), indicating that
on average people reported experiencing low levels of psychological distress. When asked if they felt safe in their neighborhood, 63% reported that they did all of the time, 30% reported
they did most of the time, 6% reported that they did some of
the time and 1% reported that they did none of the time. When
asked if they felt in control of their lives, 37% of participants
reported that they did all of the time, 42% reported that they
did most of the time, 14% some of the time, 4% a little of the
time and 3% none of the time. When asked if they agreed that
"people in their neighborhood could be trusted," 23% stated
that they strongly agree, 63% reported that they agree, 10% reported that they disagree and 2% reported that they strongly
disagree. The mean of the neighborhood social isolation scale
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was 1.88 (SD = .59), indicating that on average people "agree"
that people in their neighborhood help each other out and can
be counted on.
Step 1) A statistically significant positive relationship was
found between perceptions of feeling unsafe in the neighborhood and psychological distress when controlling for marital
status, age, gender, race, education and income (b1 = 1.07, SE
= .17, p < .001) (see Table 1). As perceptions that a neighborhood is unsafe increases, psychological distress increases. This
model accounted for 11.69% of the variation in psychological
distress.
Step 2) Like Step 1, all models control for marital status,
age, gender, race, education and income. A statistically significant positive relationship was found between perception of
feeling unsafe in the neighborhood and feelings of powerlessness (b1 = .22, SE = .04, p < .001), between feeling unsafe in the
neighborhood and feelings of social isolation (b, = .20, SE = .02,
p < .001), and between feeling unsafe in the neighborhood and
feelings of mistrust (b, = .28, SE = .03, p < .001) (See Table 1).
Table 2. Step 4. OLS Regression of Perception of Neighborhood
Safety and Psychological Distress introducing Mediating Variables

Married
Age

Model 1
b(SE)

Model 2
b(SE)

Model 3
b(SE)

-.38(.17)-

-.58(.23)**

-.46(.23)*

-.02(.00) .

.03(.01)-.. .

.03(.01)**

Gender (Male)

.11(.16)

.33(.19)

.30(.20)

Race (Hispanic)

.23(.22)

-.38(.27)

-.37(.27)

Race (African American)

.03(.37)

-.07(.39)

-.32(.36)

Education

-.07(.02)...

-.07(.02) .....

Income

-.11(.02)

.

.12(.02)-.. .

.12(.02)***

Feeling unsafe in neighborhood

.65(.15)***

.96(.18)***

.96(.18)***

Powerlessness

1.85(.13)'**

Social Isolation

.73(.18)***

Mistrust
Model R-Square
F-test
Change in R-Square

06(.02)***

.37(.16)*
32.09%

13.04%

12.17%

189.09"**

19.70***

5.35*

20.41%

1.13%

0.36%

Note: Dependent (outcome) variable - psychological distress (Kessler)
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p .001
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Step 3) As Table 1 shows and controlling for marital status,
age, gender, race, education and income, a statistically significant positive relationship was found between powerlessness and psychological distress (b1 = 1.92, SE = .12, p < .001),
between social isolation and psychological distress (b1 = .95, SE
= .18, p < .001), and between mistrust and psychological distress (b, = .65, SE = .16, p < .001).
Step 4) Table 2 presents the tests of mediation. A statistically significant positive relationship remained between perception of feeling unsafe in the neighborhood and psychological distress when testing for mediation of powerlessness (b, =
.65, SE = .15, p < .001). However, it decreased from the original
model (b, = 1.07, SE = .17, p < .001), indicating that feelings of
powerlessness partially mediate the relationship between perception of feeling unsafe in the neighborhood and psychological distress.
With the addition of powerlessness, this model accounted
for 32.09% of the variation in psychological distress. When conducting a Sobel test, the indirect effect was found to be statistically significant (Sobel test statistic = 5.20, p < .01) (not shown).
A statistically significant positive relationship also remained
between perception of feeling unsafe in the neighborhood and
psychological distress when testing for mediation of neighborhood social isolation (b, = .73, SE = .18, p < .001), but again
it decreased from the original model (b, = 1.07, SE = .17, p <
.001). Feelings of social isolation partially mediate the relationship between perception of feeling unsafe in the neighborhood
and psychological distress. With the addition of neighborhood
social isolation, this model accounted for 13.04% of the variation in psychological distress.
The Sobel test indicated a statistically significant indirect
effect (Sobel test statistic = 4.67, p < .01) (not shown). A statistically significant positive relationship remained between
perception of feeling unsafe in the neighborhood and psychological distress when testing for mediation of mistrust (b1 = .96,
SE = .18, p < .001), and, like powerlessness and neighborhood
social isolation, decreased from the original model (b, = 1.07,
SE = .17, p < .001) and indicates that feelings of social isolation partially mediates the relationship between perceptions of
feeling unsafe in the neighborhood and psychological distress.
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With the addition of mistrust, this model accounted for 12.17%
of the variation in psychological distress. The Sobel test indicated the indirect effect was statistically significant (Sobel test
statistic = 3.72, p < .01) (not shown).
Discussion
Adding to the growing body of literature examining the
relationships between neighborhood factors and mental
health, the purpose of this study was to examine the specific
association between perceptions of neighborhood safety and
psychological distress. The hypothesis that a person's perception of neighborhood safety is positively associated with psychological distress was confirmed, indicating the more unsafe
a person feels in their neighborhood, the more psychological distress he or she reports. This finding is consistent with
previous studies that found that neighborhood factors are associated with mental health outcomes (Eliot, 2000; Leventhal
& Brooks-Gunn, 2003; Phongsavan et al., 2006; Propper et al,
2005; Wen et al., 2006), however this study provides new information about the importance of perception of neighborhood
safety when discussing the impact of neighborhood disorganization on individual mental health outcomes. The relationship
found between perception of neighborhood safety and psychological distress supports social stress theory in its assertion
that chronic stressors which occur outside of the individual
are related to internalized feelings of distress (Ahern & Galea,
2011; Fitzpatrick & LaGory, 2003). While the implied direction
of the relationship is based on ecological systems theory and
supported by previous research (Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn,
2003), causal conclusions cannot be made due to the cross-sectional nature of the data. Despite the inability to make concrete
causal claims, this study establishes a relationship between
perception of safety and psychological distress and suggests
that more research is needed to investigate how this aspect of
the neighborhood environment impacts mental health.
In addition, this study aimed to test the mediating effects
of social isolation, mistrust and powerlessness on the relationship between perceived neighborhood safety and psychological distress. Social isolation, mistrust and powerlessness were
all found to have statistically significant mediating effects on
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the relationship between psychological distress and perception of neighborhood safety, supporting the second hypothesis
and assertions made in previous literature (Ross & Mirowsky,
2009). In the context of social stress theory, these findings
suggest that mistrust, social isolation and powerlessness may
be a reaction (secondary stressor) to feeling unsafe (primary
stressor). The mediating relationship found further suggests
that this reaction is a link between the environment and the
internalization of stress.
Secondary stressors could provide an explanation to the
ecological fallacy that asserts that it is false to assume that all
people in a high-risk neighborhood will experience negative
outcomes (Wheaton & Clarke, 2003). Again, while conclusions
about causation cannot be made, these findings do suggest
that trust, social support and self-efficacy can offer protection
to individuals experiencing the primary stressor of feeling
unsafe in their neighborhood from experiencing psychological distress. For social work, understanding this mediating
effect can be applied to creating interventions which increase
social support, trust and power in neighborhoods where individuals report feeling unsafe, thus potentially impacting some
mental health outcomes. In order to test the hypotheses about
causal mechanisms, randomized control trials of interventions
that target these areas are needed; however, for people who
are living in environments that are unsafe and are not able to
be altered, increasing feeling of support, power and trust may
be one mechanism to improve overall levels of psychological
distress.
It should also be noted that while it was found that powerlessness, social isolation and mistrust all mediate the relationship between feeling unsafe in one's neighborhood and psychological distress, there appears to be a difference between
the potential impacts of each of these factors when examining
the effect sizes of each model. The model that included powerlessness accounted for 32.09% total variation in psychological distress, a 20.41% increase over the model that includes the
controls and feeling unsafe. This can be compared to the 1.13%
and .36% increase in overall variance accounted for when social
isolation and trust are added respectively. While tests were
not conducted to test if these differences in effect sizes were
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statistically significant, powerlessness appears to account for
more of the variation in the psychological distress and therefore may have the largest overall impact if targeted in the creation of an intervention.
Limitations & Future Research
It should be noted that this study focuses on subjective
neighborhood perceptions rather than geographical location
or objective measures. Although it is unclear what impacts a
person's perception of neighborhood safety, it is reasonable to
hypothesize, based on previous research (Austin et al., 2002;
Ellaway, Macintyre, & Kearns, 2001; Sampson & Raudenbush,
2004), that physical environment plays a substantial role.
Previous studies have shown that not only are subjective
measures of environment highly correlated with objective
measures of neighborhood disorders, but also that subjective
reality affects behavior and beliefs more directly. While this
may limit the scope of the conclusions, we do not believe that
it jeopardizes the overall significance of the findings.
In addition, this study was also limited by the sampling
techniques that may have biased the sample. The use of landlines rather than cell phones selected out a potentially large
portion of the population that could be both younger, due to
their tendency to use cell phones, and of lower socioeconomic
status, who may not be able to afford landlines. These issues
with sampling might lead to results that are not accurately representative of Arizona's population as a whole and may not be
fully capturing the experiences of ethnic minority groups and
rural populations. Some of these limitations were addressed
when weighting the sample but should still be considered
when looking at the findings. Another limitation of the study
was the use of single items to measure mistrust, perceptions of
safety and powerlessness. Although the measures used have
face validity, multiple items would help to insure the validity
and reliability of these measures.
Although the findings of this study gives us insight into
the relationship between perception of safety and psychological distress, it raises questions that still need to be explored.
The main questions raised concern causation and the direction of the relationship found. Future research should assess
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what drives a person's perceptions of safety. Although it is
reasonable to make the inference that a person's perception
of safety is primarily influenced by the objective neighborhood environment in which they live, it is also possible that
their perception is affected by the media, history of victimization and/or mental health diagnosis (i.e., schizophrenia). In
addition, this research would be strengthened by the inclusion
of both objective and subjective measures of neighborhood.
Future research should match a person's subjective reports of
feeling unsafe with objective measures of the neighborhood,
such as crime rates or neighborhood socioeconomic status, to
determine if concerns about safety cluster in neighborhoods
that are characterized as "disordered." Future research should
also explore what measures most effectively capture neighborhood disorder and have the biggest impact on those living in
that neighborhood.
Conclusions
While a growing body of literature has established that
social context matters in mental health outcomes, few studies
have examined the specific mechanisms that impact those outcomes. This study adds to the existing body of literature that
has examined the relationship between neighborhood factors
on mental health by being the first, to our knowledge, to test
the relationship between perceptions of neighborhood safety
and psychological distress and explore possible protective
factors. The significant mediating relationships found in this
study suggest possible protective and risk factors that can be
targeted in interventions, potentially improving mental health
outcomes for individuals living in unsafe neighborhoods.
Understanding specific neighborhood factors that impact
mental health enabled us to design more effective interventions and is crucial to addressing mental health disparities.
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This paper explores the social ties and capital of women relocating to low-poverty neighborhoods through the Moving to Opportunity program and a "regular mover" group who did not.
Findings suggest the low-poverty movers seldom made close ties
in their new neighborhoods; they also had fewer childhood friends
and exchanged less support than the regularmovers. Many, however, welcomed escaping the constant exchange that characterized
their former neighborhoods and moved to areas higher in collective efficacy--experiencing neighborhoods rated high in child
supervision, facing less conflictual relations with neighbors, and
exhibiting greater trust in others-relativeto the regularmovers.
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Over the last decade and a half, tens of thousands of people
have moved from public housing developments through federally- and locally-sponsored housing mobility initiatives such
as HOPE VI and Moving to Opportunity (Popkin et al., 2004).
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The implementation of these policies has resulted in a marked
transformation in the physical landscapes of many cities,
particularly in those (like Baltimore and Chicago) where many
of the high-rise developments have been demolished and
thousands of families relocated to two- or three-story housing
units. Redevelopment and housing mobility policies have also
transformed the social landscapes of individual families and,
potentially, the neighborhoods where they once lived or currently live. In fact, recent housing policies partially rest on the
assumption that such transformations will not only occur but
will benefit relocated families. The idea behind these policies
is that relocating families into less-disadvantaged neighborhoods will result in improved social ties, resources, opportunities, and, therefore, well-being. Nevertheless, some, especially
those familiar with previous federal initiatives such as urban
renewal (see Gans, 1962), might argue that despite recognizing
the importance of social ties for mobility, the massive relocation of families typically has failed to consider adequately the
existing social networks of those who are being moved.
In these analyses, we investigate the social ties and the
deployment of resources made available through them (i.e.,
social capital) for two sets of low-income public housing residents who moved under different circumstances. One group
received a Section 8 voucher (now called a Housing Choice
Voucher) which required that they rent a unit from a private
landlord in a low-poverty neighborhood (the tenant pays a
portion of the rent based on her income, with the government
covering the remainder up to a certain threshold). Another
group did not receive this restricted voucher but, nonetheless,
usually moved after the public housing in which they lived
was demolished as part of other housing initiatives, such as
HOPE VI.
Overall, our findings suggest that changes in social ties
and social capital occurred for those families who moved to
low-poverty neighborhoods. Most notably, the analyses indicate that this group may have experienced a significant loss of
social support social capital at the individual level (e.g., assistance with cash). On the surface, this may be cause for concern,
as one might worry that these relocated families would struggle, for instance, to make ends meet after having lost some
in-kind and cash support to which they might have been
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accustomed. We find, however, that many of the respondents
did not lament these changes in social support-instead, they
saw moving as a welcome opportunity to disrupt the social exchange networks in which they were once embedded and had
felt trapped. Moreover, we find some indications that the lowpoverty movers were living in neighborhoods at least slightly
higher in collective efficacy-they were more likely to describe
having more positive and less conflict-ridden interactions with
neighbors (especially regarding children's behavior) and were
less likely to distrust others in their communities. These findings highlight the importance not only of investigating how
relocation might influence the social ties of relocated families.
but also hearing directly from those being relocated about how
they interpret any such changes that occur.
Literature Review
Whether policy-makers push for investment in low-income neighborhoods or advocate for families to move out of
high-poverty ones into more advantaged areas, the underlying
assumption is that place matters for the well-being of families.
Wilson (1987, 1996) argued that neighborhood disadvantage
results in individual disadvantage, as residents of high-poverty neighborhoods are socially isolated from the mainstream
world of educational and job opportunities. Moreover, he suggested that the quality of resources embedded in an individual's personal social network may be contingent on neighborhood-level factors.
Those interested in "neighborhood effects" often employ
the concept of social capital-or the "resources embedded
in social relations that actors can use to garner benefits and
improve their life chances" (Offer & Schneider, 2007, p. 1126).
As Dominguez and Watkins note (2003), the concept has been
invoked to analyze processes at the individual level (e.g., to
analyze poor mothers' coping strategies), as well as at the aggregate level (e.g., to analyze neighborhood social organization, see Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997). At the individual level, two types of social capital exist-bridging or leverage
social capital and bonding or support social capital (Briggs,
1998; Warren, Thompson, & Saegert, 2001). Leverage social
capital includes resources or information that help people with
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social mobility (e.g., a lead on a good job), whereas support
social capital characterizes the assistance that people receive
from their ties to survive (e.g., food). Neighborhoods can shape
individual-level social capital, as high-poverty neighborhoods
may compromise social interaction if individuals mistrust one
another, disengage from the local environs because they are
fearful, and/or move in and out of areas before long-standing
ties form (Ross, Mirowsky, & Pribesh, 2001; Wilson, 1987, 1996).
Research also suggests, however, that those living in highpoverty neighborhoods might actually have a greater reason
than those living in moderate- to low-poverty areas to form
attachments and maintain close ties with others as they try to
survive and solve local problems (Stack, 1974; Suttles, 1972).
Thus, while it is true that their social networks may be highly
local, dense, and homogeneous and not the type generally associated with enabling upward mobility (Dominguez & Watkins,
2003; Stack, 1974), individuals living in poor communities may
have many close ties, interact with others often, and commit
a great deal of resources and time to their personal relationships. These social networks may then act as a private safety
net, providing low-income families with in-kind and financial
assistance (such as cash loans and gifts, food, transportation,
clothing, housing, and childcare), as well as emotional and
informational support (Edin & Lein, 1997; Henly, Danziger,
& Offer, 2005; Lein, Benjamin, McManus, & Roy, 2005; Scott,
Edin, London, & Kissane, 2004; Stack, 1974).
At the aggregate level, social capital is an attribute of a collective, where prevailing norms, trust, and social relations are
employed for the public good or community benefit (Putnam,
2000). A related concept, which we employ in this analysis, is
collective efficacy. Collective efficacy includes "active engagement" by the individual and community and is a "task-specific
construct," while social capital focuses on the potential resources in one's network (Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1999, p. 635).
Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997, p. 918) contend that
collective efficacy-"social cohesion among neighbors" and a
willingness to work for common values-is a critical neighborhood-level indicator of neighborhood disadvantage (or
advantage). Communities with high levels of collective
efficacy are characterized by neighbors who trust one another
and look out for each other-watching each other's children
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when they are in public space and intervening when problems
arise.
Improving the level of collective efficacy that poor individuals experience may not be the primary aim of housing mobility and poverty deconcentration efforts. However, it is likely
that advocates of such policies, in line with the research that
suggests concentrated affluence is positively associated with
collective efficacy (Sampson, Morenoff, & Earls, 1999), assume
that relocated families will come to reside in areas higher in
collective efficacy when they move to low-poverty areas. No
study, of which we know, has studied this topic qualitatively
and in depth. More common, though still limited, are studies
that investigate issues related to the social ties and individuallevel social capital of people who participated in housing initiatives. Studies that exist in this vein typically explore whether
individuals lost connections with others or were able to make
new ties after relocation, with a handful investigating changes
in exchange activities. Some of these analyses use data from
the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) housing mobility demonstration. After volunteering for MTO, residents living in public
housing or Section 8 project-based housing located in extremely poor neighborhoods in Baltimore, New York, Chicago,
Los Angeles, and Boston were randomly assigned into one
of three groups. The "experimental group" received housing
counseling and a special voucher that could only be used in
census tracts with 1990 poverty rates of less than 10 percent.
A second treatment group received a regular voucher with no
geographic restrictions. A third group, the "controls," received
no voucher through MTO, although they could remain in their
public housing units or apply for other housing assistance that
became available to them (e.g., a regular Section 8 voucher).
Pettit (1999, 2004) examined the impact of MTO on social
connections for families in Los Angeles 6 to 10 months after
the program move. While she acknowledges that she cannot
account for the location of social ties in her data, she finds
that most relocated families were able to construct new social
ties in the short term. Pettit (2004) also suggests that neighborhood-level factors promoted interaction among the residents. In particular, she argues, "Moving to low-poverty, safe
neighborhoods enabled [MTO] parents and their children
to make social connections-relationships with friends and
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neighbors and linkages to institutions" (Pettit, 2004, p. 298).
Moreover, survey follow-up on MTO families in five cities revealed no differences between the experimental and control
group adults in neighboring activities or in the proportion of
individuals with three or more close friends (Orr et al., 2003).
Notably, though, the experimental group was significantly
more likely to have college-educated friends or friends earning
more than $30,000 (Orr et al., 2003), an indication that the
MTO treatment improved the chances of having friends with
more resources, and, perhaps, the potential for leverage social
capital.
Recent work from the three-city MTO qualitative study
(based on research in the Boston, Los Angeles, and New York
sites) indicates a wide array of network arrangements among
those MTO families who moved to low-poverty neighborhoods. Some of these families centered their networks on kin
who lived outside of their MTO placement neighborhoods;
others avoided kin and focused their networks on friends they
made at work, during childhood, or in former neighborhoods.
For some, the move was problematic as it strained communication and coordination with their networks, but for others,
moving away from "needy" ties was experienced as relief
(Briggs, Popkin, & Goering, 2010).
Research on families who moved through HOPE VI has
found that relocated individuals frequently experience a
loss in their social ties and a decrease in exchange activity
(Curley, 2009; Greenbaum, Hathaway, Rodriguez, Spalding, &
Ward, 2008; Clampet-Lundquist, 2004). In their study of two
Tampa neighborhoods receiving relocated HOPE VI families,
Greenbaum et al. (2008) found that adults experienced a decline
in neighborhood social ties after their relocation. Moreover,
they reported less exchange with neighbors, as adults instead
were relying more on exchange within their kinship networks. Similarly, Clampet-Lundquist (2004) documented that
individuals who moved through HOPE VI in Philadelphia
experienced a decline in local ties and support exchange.
And, in her longitudinal investigation of low-income women
relocated through HOPE VI in East Boston, Curley (2009,
p. 242) found that "relocation resulted in less instrumental and
emotional support (which in turn had a detrimental effect on

Social Ties, Social Support, and Collective Efficacy

163

some women's economic stability and mental health)" but that
for some, relocation provided a way to sever ties that were experienced as "draining."
Recent research has begun to unpack how housing mobility policies affect poor women's social ties and individuallevel social capital. In this paper, we seek to contribute to this
growing, yet still relatively small, literature through a qualitative examination of the experiences of poor women in two
MTO sites (Chicago and Baltimore) in which researchers have
not previously studied these topics in depth. We also further
expand this literature by investigating whether the low-poverty movers lived in neighborhoods characterized by high collective efficacy and by offering a comparison of social support for
two groups of individuals relocated under different circumstances. The rich qualitative data allow for a detailed account
of these issues, permit unexpected findings to emerge, and
provide an opportunity to investigate how the participants
themselves interpreted any changes they experienced.
Method
In this article, we examine the following broad research
questions: What are the implications for social ties, social
support, and collective efficacy for women who move from
high-poverty to low-poverty neighborhoods compared to
those who do not make such a move? How do such women interpret any changes that emerge across these areas? And, how
might we explain any changes that seem to exist?
To address these questions, we use data from the MTO
qualitative study in Baltimore and Chicago, in which a random
subsample of MTO participants were interviewed 6 to 9 years
after having signed up for the demonstration. In all, 233 families were included in this sample. The research team completed interviews with 188 adult respondents across the two cities
-124 in Baltimore and 64 in Chicago-for a response rate of
81%.
All families in the MTO experimental group received
vouchers to move to a low-poverty neighborhood, but across
the five cities, just under half actually used their vouchers.
Thus, here, we focus our analyses on those families that used a
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MTO voucher to move to a low-poverty neighborhood (henceforth, "low-poverty movers") and those that were not given a
voucher through the program to move (henceforth, "regular
movers"). We chose to restrict the sample in this way primarily
because we were interested in exploring qualitatively how a
low-poverty move might relate to social support and collective
efficacy (i.e., in quantitative language, a treatment-on-treated
analysis), not how assignment to a particular program group,
per se, might relate to these issues (i.e., an intent-to-treat analysis). Moreover, the sampling design in Chicago did not include
those in the experimental group who did not make a program
move. We understand that our decision to limit the analysis in
this way prevents us from exploiting the full benefits of MTO's
experimental design. We cannot, for instance, determine if the
low-poverty movers differed from those who were offered the
MTO voucher but who did not make a program move in ways
that influence our results. Other analyses of the MTO data have
revealed that the low-poverty mover group was more likely to
be younger, enrolled in school, living in smaller households,
and dissatisfied with their baseline neighborhood environments than those in the low-poverty group who did not use
their MTO voucher (Clampet-Lundquist & Massey, 2008).
Our goal is to compare two groups of people who spent
time raising their families in extremely high-poverty neighborhoods but who moved under different circumstances.
One group (the "low-poverty movers") moved to a low-poverty neighborhood through MTO (they were required to live
there for at least 1 year), while the other group (the "regular
movers") experienced "normal" housing policy during this
time-staying in their developments, moving out with an
unrestricted housing voucher, or moving to another public
housing development. Notably, housing authorities destroyed
and revitalized the developments in which the majority of the
sample had lived at baseline, and, indeed, the families who
originally signed up for MTO were quite mobile in the years following the start of the demonstration (much like other families
struggling to find affordable shelter in unstable and, at times,
exploitative low-income rental markets). In fact, 92% of those
assigned to the control group in Baltimore and Chicago (our
"regular movers") moved since the start of the demonstration.

Social Ties, Social Support, and Collective Efficacy

165

In all, our subsample includes 133 respondents-71
regular movers and 62 low-poverty movers. Interviews with
these respondents were conducted between July 2003 and
August 2004, with interviewers using an in-depth interview
instrument to explore each respondent's neighborhood,
social status, employment, children, and health. On average,
these tape-recorded interviews took 2 to 5 hours to complete.
Generally, we conducted the interviews in the respondents'
homes, paying them $50 to $85, depending on household type.
To ensure confidentiality, we use pseudonyms chosen by the
respondents throughout the paper.
The two groups of respondents were remarkably similar
across a number of basic characteristics at the time of the interviews, including median age (39 years old), median number of
children (three children), and median length of time residing
at their current address (3 years). Furthermore, over half of the
respondents were employed at the time of the interview (59%

of the regular movers and 63% of the low-poverty movers),
with most of these women working full-time (71% of the employed regular movers and 62% of the employed low-poverty
movers). The majority had achieved a high school diploma or
GED (55% of the regular movers and 58% of the low-poverty
movers), with only a small subset having received an associate's or bachelor's degree (4% of the regular movers and 7% of
the low-poverty movers).
Importantly, the families in the low-poverty mover group,
on average, were living in less disadvantaged neighborhoods
than the regular mover group at the time of the interviews,
which was 6 to 9 years after joining the demonstration. The
census tracts in which the low-poverty mover group lived in
2003 and 2004 had a higher percentage of persons with an associate's degree or better (20.7% versus 14.3%), lower percentage
of persons below the poverty line (20.9% versus 3 4 .4 %), and
higher percentage of persons employed (51% versus 42.8%)
than those in which the regular movers lived. All of these were
statistically significant differences (at p < .05, p < .001, and p <
.001 levels respectively). Thus, while many of the members of
both groups had moved multiple times after joining the MTO
demonstration, the low-poverty movers were still in less poor
neighborhoods than the regular movers when we talked to
them in 2003 and 2004.
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A team of trained graduate students performed preliminary coding of the transcribed interviews, entering them into
a Microsoft Access database. These initial codes were primarily descriptive rather than analytic. One of these descriptive
fields, for example, was "friends," in which all data related to
the friends or acquaintances of the respondents were placed.
If a respondent identified family members as friends, this was
included as well. We imported this field, as well as one that
captured any discussion of exchange of resources, protective
observation and supervision of property or children, and interactions with neighbors regarding children into QSR NVivo,
along with quantitative descriptor variables for each respondent (what NVivo refers to as "attributes").
All subsequent coding and analyses occurred through
NVivo, in which we analyzed the data in line with an inductive, grounded theory approach, where findings emerge from
the data themselves rather than from predetermined hypotheses (see Charmaz, 1995; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, for details
on this analytic approach). Accordingly, we began by coding
the interview text into various conceptual categories (or what
NVivo refers to as "nodes") until we reached theoretical saturation (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As new nodes emerged in
our analyses, we returned to text that was previously coded
to ensure uniformity in our coding across cases. We then reexamined the data to explore patterns across the codes and
cases and to develop an overall account that would accurately
portray the lived experience of the respondents.
Results
Close Social Ties
When public housing empties through voluntary or mandatory means, a concern is that families may experience a net
loss of close ties as they lose touch with friends and family
from their old neighborhoods and fail to make ties in their new
ones to replace them. This may be of particular concern when
families move some distance away from their original public
housing addresses, as in the case of the low-poverty movers
in our sample. We find, however, that neither group appeared
bereft of close social ties-about half of the low-poverty
movers could identify currently having at least three close ties,
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compared to about 60% of the regular movers. Notably, some
of these close ties were with biological family members, but
many were with individuals whom scholars commonly refer
to as fictive kin (Stack, 1974).
Similar to accounts of MTO respondents in other cities
(Briggs et al., 2010), our respondents in Baltimore and Chicago
discussed a number of ways by which they had met their
current close ties, including meeting them through work,
church, mutual acquaintances, and various programs (e.g.,
drug rehabilitation). One of the most common ways that both
the low-poverty and regular movers claimed that they had
met their current close ties, however, was as adults "from the
neighborhood." In essence, they described how close relationships developed over time from running into the same individuals over and over or from other mechanisms by which "the
neighborhood" threw adults together. For example, LaShea,
a Chicago low-poverty mover, explained how she became
friends with two women (to whom she still is close despite her
moving):
Truthfully, I met them [while] living in the projects...
[our kids] ended up putting us at different times
together ... we had our babies, we put them in [the

same] daycare, then we didn't live that far, you know,
almost directly across from each other, then we started
going to school, to get our GED and we ended up in the
same class.
Few of the low-poverty movers (and the regular movers as
well), however, expressed that they had met a currently identified close tie from living in their current neighborhood; rather,
those close ties that they reported having met "through the
neighborhood" as adults, as in LaShea's example, were generally ones that they had made from living in other neighborhoods, most often while living in the projects. This indicates
that an important mechanism of bridging social capital may
be lacking, as the low poverty movers were not forming close
ties with their present neighbors. It should be remembered,
however, that the respondents, on average, had only resided
in their current neighborhoods for 3 years, which may not be
enough time for such ties to develop.
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Additionally, some respondents reported that they had
met a current close tie not as adults but from "growing up."
These respondents discussed becoming close to someone
while they were children, often through interactions during
elementary, middle school, and high school. They also emphasized that such long-standing relationships provided a level of
understanding that others did not, largely because they had
been "through so much" with their childhood friends over the
years. For example, Alanda, a regular mover from Chicago, explained about one of her close ties, "Well, we grew up together,
so she understands me more so than anybody."
Notably, the most common way that the regular movers
claimed they had met their current close ties was from "growing
up." Moreover, they were twice as likely as the low-poverty
movers to have a close tie that they met this way as children,
suggesting that moving to a low-poverty neighborhood may
be more disruptive to these sorts of ties than a regular move.
Thus, if there is any support for a social disruption hypothesis
(Pettit, 2004), it exists only for a subset of ties in this studythose made as children. As long-term, close connections may
enhance the exchange of material and nonmaterial aid, the
findings here provide a potential explanation for the differences in social support that we report next.
Individual Social Support
The respondents talked about a range of resources they exchanged with their network ties, which we categorized under
the rubric of social support. All in all, they reported exchanging slightly more nonmaterial than material assistance-over
three-quarters had given or received nonmaterial support, but
less than three-fifths had given or received material support.
They also reported receiving help more than giving it, although one should note that the interviewers focused more on
receipt of help than the giving of it in the interviews.
When we compared the regular movers with the lowpoverty movers, we found that the regular movers were
more likely than the low-poverty movers to exchange social
support, with some variation by type. Yet, it is not as simple a
story as critics of housing mobility policy suggested when they
warned that social support would plummet as people moved
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from their local social networks. In fact, the stories shared from
the women in our sample reveal that some of them (both in the
regular mover and the low-poverty mover groups) were relieved to move away from needy ties or from an environment
where local norms encouraged heavy exchange.
Exchange among Social Ties
All in all, the regular movers gave and received a great deal
of social support. Some was intangible, such as offering emotional support to a friend or family member. In fact, about 90%
of the regular movers discussed how they gave or received
emotional support within their social networks. Melissa, a
regular mover living in Baltimore, for instance, told us how
she supported one of her friends who lived nearby:
[My buddy is] the one that really needs some help.
She's just going through [a lot]. I called her a couple
days ago just to see how she's doing, and she's just
really down and depressed, talking about how she's
ready to give her kids away 'cause they don't listen to
her. They disrespectful, and it's like she's really going
through a lot and she doesn't [get] no support ... So it's

like a lot of that comes down on her sometimes, and
she goes through it, and I try to talk to her and really be
a good friend to her.
The vast majority of regular movers (70%) also reported
receiving help with babysitting. Typical among them were
cases like Granny Ann, a Baltimore resident, who reported
having a friend who would watch her grandchildren, as well
as get them ready for and pick them up from school when she
worked. She described how appreciative she was to have this
person in her life:
It's a very good friend that, through everything I've
been through, that he was right there for me, you know,
he's just been my friend. And if I call him and say, "Do
me a favor, I gotta run to the market, come watch the
kids," [snapsfingers] he'll be there like that.
Exchanging tangible support, such as food, housing, cash,
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transportation, and other in-kind items (such as clothing or
appliances) was also quite common among the regular movers.
For example, when we asked Billie, a Baltimore regular mover,
how often her friend lent her money, she replied, "Almost
ever[y] pay period, or something ... we running low on money
before it's time to get paid, you know, I can borrow a couple
dollars from her." Tammy, also a regular mover in Baltimore,
told us that her friend "probably need[s] me more than I need
her because of her [drug] situation. So therefore, I help her
with her children, food, money, whatever, support, anything.
You know, 'cause we're just friends. And she helps me with
absolutely nothing [laughs]."
While, certainly, most of the low-poverty movers were involved in some type of social support exchange, particularly
the receipt of emotional support (where regular movers and
controls were comparable), our data suggest that, overall,
they were giving and receiving less social support than their
regular mover counterparts. In fact, the low-poverty movers
were about a quarter less likely to have received childcare from
others, a third less likely to have received cash or housing assistance (e.g., allowed to double up with someone), about half
as likely to have received transportation help, and about half
as likely to have received other in-kind items. Furthermore, the
low-poverty movers were almost a third less likely than the
regular movers to report giving emotional support and advice
to others, half as likely to provide childcare for others, and
almost two-thirds less likely to have given cash to others.
One important type of intangible resource that can flow
through social ties is information or connections that may lead
to jobs. Policymakers predicted that the low-poverty movers
would be able to access improved resources and social connections for jobs (bridging or leverage social capital), yet the data
indicate this has not occurred. We found no difference in the
proportion of regular movers and low-poverty movers who
gave or received information about jobs through their close ties
(about a third of each group did so), and nothing to suggest
that the low-poverty movers were leveraging better job opportunities from their social ties than the regular movers, as
the low-poverty movers held similar types of jobs (in terms
of wages and working conditions) as the regular movers at
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the time of the interviews. These results are consistent with
Turney, Clampet-Lundquist, Edin, Kling, & Duncan's (2006)
research on the MTO Baltimore sample, where they found that
low-poverty movers typically used friends and family outside
of the low-poverty neighborhoods for information on jobs, and
that neighbors were more likely to have jobs and careers that
were not accessible to the low-poverty movers due to lack of
education.
Norms around Exchange
All in all, the data suggest that more of the regular movers,
relative to the low-poverty movers, were immersed at the time
of the interviews in the kind of exchange networks described
decades ago in Carol Stack's (1974) seminal ethnography, All
Our Kin, in which poor individuals feel obliged to both give and
receive material and non-material aid to survive. Accordingly,
one could interpret the comparably lower social support among
the low-poverty movers negatively-that these movers were
missing out on the kind of support desperately needed when
poor. But, as researchers have found in other locales (Briggs
et al., 2010; Curley, 2009), our analyses reveal that for many of
the low-poverty movers (and some regular movers as well),
relocating provided the welcomed opportunity to remove
themselves from draining reciprocal relationships. Entering
into a new neighborhood, these respondents chose not to give
out food or cash to their new neighbors because, as Mariah, a
low-poverty mover who has remained in her first low-poverty
Baltimore suburb, put it, "it starts up something." They also
avoided asking their new neighbors for help or, at times, interacting with them much at all, concerned this would instigate a
never-ending exchange cycle. Shawnies, a low-poverty mover,
for example, described why she does not get involved in exchange networks: "I'm not gonna go to nobody and borrow no
sugar.. .if you tend to start borrowing from somebody, it seem
like they always wanna borrow more."
Moreover, many of the low poverty movers perceived
differences in exchange norms across the neighborhoods in
which they had lived. These neighborhoods represented a
wider socioeconomic variation than those through which the
regular movers passed, with much lower poverty levels. When
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asked about exchanging support, those who had moved often
replied, "That's ghetto," and in doing so, differentiated their
new neighborhoods from where they used to live. Stacey, a
Baltimore low-poverty mover, described borrowing as "project
business" and claimed, "You don't do that junk around here."
Thus, while a few bemoaned the lack of exchange in their
present neighborhoods, for many, it was a relief to be out of an
environment where the norm consisted of neighbors asking to
borrow items as varied as money, milk, or a mop.
All things considered, a number of factors likely contributed to the differences we observed in social support. Though
both the low-poverty movers and the regular movers (for the
most part) moved out of their baseline neighborhoods, the
low-poverty movers had a voucher to support a more radical
move (i.e., to a low-poverty neighborhood farther from their
baseline address); and, in fact, the low-poverty movers were
indeed living, on average, farther away from their baseline
neighborhoods than regular movers years after random assignment (Turney et al., 2006). It seems likely, therefore, that
those social ties at greatest risk to dissolve with such moves
would be those with the most disadvantaged individuals, as
they may not be able to afford traveling to the areas where their
friends and family lived. While we cannot test this claim with
the available data, a net loss of needy ties would likely result
in the low-poverty movers giving less social support than their
regular mover counterparts did, as we found in this analysis.
Moreover, the fact that the regular movers were more likely to
report having met their close ties as children leads us to believe
that the low-poverty movers' relocation severed some longstanding relationships (e.g., ties that were made as children)
that previous research and our data suggest are particularly
receptive to social support exchange. Additionally, the differences in social support may relate to how the low-poverty
movers considered whether exchange was a'propriate in their
new neighborhoods and whether they wanted to develop new
neighborhood-based exchange networks or maintain certain
previous ones. Interestingly, previous research indicates
that those in the MTO experimental group who felt dissatisfied about their baseline neighborhoods were more likely to
use their voucher (Clampet-Lundquist & Massey, 2008), and,
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perhaps, some of the dissatisfaction was related to norms of
exchange.
Neighborhood Collective Efficacy
One of the hopes of housing mobility programs like MTO is
that when people move, they will land in neighborhoods abundant in social capital. While we recognize that neighborhoodlevel social capital can be operationally defined in many ways,
here we focus on two related indicators commonly associated
with collective efficacy to look more specifically at network
resources in action for a common good-the amount and kind
of supervision witnessed in regard to neighborhood children
and the degree of trust felt towards others in the neighborhood.
When discussing whether other residents could be counted
upon to watch out for each other or for each other's children,
many of the regular movers responded that they could not.
Patty, a Baltimore regular mover who lives in a Section 8 apartment, for example, argued that "nobody looks out for the next
person['s] kids around here. They don't. They don't. They see
things happening in this area dealing with kids, and they don't
care. That's how they feel, it ain't my child."
Moreover, the regular movers often described having to
interact with other parents about fights and threats among
children and discussed at length the problematic nature of
dealing with other parents in their communities. More specifically, they described avoiding bringing issues to other parents
because such interactions were viewed as: (1) futile, because
the parents did not care how their children acted or would
deny that their children did anything wrong and (2) dangerous, because they might lead to physical or verbal confrontations with the parents. Kristine, a regular mover in Baltimore,
argued that sometimes parents are in denial about their children and alluded to the potential for conflict,
I have a real problem because when I see kids doing
stuff, I [want to] be like, "What are you doing? Excuse
me." But who their parents are, no [you can't do that].
And no, you don't know people like that. People don't
like you coming in and telling them what their kid is
doing and what their kid wasn't doing 'cause they ain't
trying to hear it ... It's like that type of aggressiveness.
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You know, where I don't particularly feel comfortable
even getting involved in or trying to get involved in
that.

The interviews also revealed that many members of the
regular mover group distrusted others-both in their neighborhoods and generally. Some worried that getting close to
others would invite gossiping or people getting in their "business." Robin, a Baltimore regular mover, explained why she
didn't have many people in her life to whom she felt close: "I
communicate and talk to them [people around her], but to me
they could still be back-stabbers, you know, they just maybe
wanna be in your business, then before you know it, they're
telling somebody." The case of Chamette, a Baltimore regular
mover, illustrates nicely how some might close themselves off
so completely from others near them that they may not even
notice the potential for close ties around them. Charnette failed
to notice for 8 months that one of her friends (from a previous neighborhood) moved in next door. She explains how this
could happen.
If you, you just come down the street, and I wouldn't
look at you dead in your face ...
never look up, never,
I never look up to people ...
One night she said, she
called me by my name and I said, "Oh, my God, all this
time [she's been living next door]." [laughter]
As a contrast, many of the low-poverty movers described
living in communities where people looked out for one
another and were more likely than the regular movers to be
in neighborhoods where we classified supervision of children
as "high" based on the interviews. In these "high supervision"
neighborhoods, respondents claimed they could count on
others to watch their children and to intervene if issues arose.
For instance, Joyce, a low-poverty mover who now owns her
home in Baltimore, claimed, "Everybody watch out for the
children ...I can let him [my 2-year old] go outside, and I
really don't even necessarily have to stay out on the porch to
watch him, 'cause I know ... one of those families are out there,
they watching the children." Similarly, Janelle, a low-poverty
mover in Chicago, told us, "I know so many people around
here, and so ...
people do come and tell me what they're doing.
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And I like that ... because like certain things my boys can't get
away with because somebody going to come tell on them."
Moreover, many of the low-poverty movers described congenial interactions with parents in the neighborhood. Catrina,
who still lives in her low-poverty MTO placement neighborhood in the Chicago suburbs, told us, "Out here, it's like us
parents as parents, we can get along with each other and we
can talk ...It's like a family." Tisha, a low-poverty mover who
owns a home on a quiet block in Baltimore, recounted a recent
experience which exemplifies Catrina's comment about getting
along--even when problems arise.
One little boy busted my basement window ...I went
to the mother ...She said, "Give the receipt, get the
window fixed, whatever you got to do, and we will
pay for it." So when I did get the window fixed, I gave
the receipt today, the next day my money was in my
mailbox. And she was really apologetic to me.
A number of the low-poverty movers were quick to note
how dealing with issues surrounding children was quite different in their previous high-poverty neighborhoods-contexts, remember, where many of the regular movers continued
to parent. Mariah, a low-poverty mover living in a Baltimore
suburb, recalled a situation where her son fought with girls
about twice his age, and she decided to talk to the girls' mother:
I'm about ready to go down there and really get crazy
[with the girls' mother] ...And, anyway, the mom
called me on the phone and say, "You know what, if
my girls give you any more problem, call the police on
them." ... I felt better then ...See that's one thing about
moving to that [low-poverty] area, I learned I had time
to think before acting. In the city too much going on,
you ain't [have] no time to be doing no thinking.
Furthermore, while there were some low-poverty movers
that indicated they had problems trusting others, as a group,
they were half as likely as the regular movers to report that
trust caused problems for their maintaining or forming relationships with friends, family, and neighbors. Given that
the regular movers were living in more disadvantaged
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neighborhoods at the time of the interviews across a number
of indicators than the low-poverty movers (described previously), this finding might be expected and is in line with
previous research that demonstrates a positive correlation
between neighborhood disorder (e.g., crime, vandalism, graffiti, and noise) and reports of mistrust among residents (Ross
et al., 2001). Additionally, as discussed above, the low-poverty
movers' interactions with neighbors over children's behavior
were more collegial and, perhaps, this is indicative of community trust-a key element in collective efficacy. Motunrola, a
low-poverty mover in Chicago, waxed eloquently about how
her community pulls together in times of need and alludes to
this type of trust:
This neighborhood where if someone get sick, oh
[sighing], everybody come running... And I know
we talk about each other and get mad at each other,
but when push comes to shove, something happens
to someone on this block, we all come together. And
that's, see it's like a family.
Conclusion
We began this investigation interested in comparing the
social ties and capital of two sets of poor families who had
lived in public housing in Baltimore and Chicago. One set
moved with a voucher restricted to a low-poverty neighborhood and the other was subject to regular federal and local
housing policies, which involved a substantial amount of
relocation in Baltimore and Chicago. We find little evidence
that the low-poverty movers (or those relocated through other
housing initiatives) in our study were forming close ties with
people in their current or placement neighborhoods, or that
they were using social ties to leverage better job opportunities.
Moreover, the findings suggest that the low-poverty movers
were less likely than the regular movers to exchange most
types of social support with their ties. In particular, we found
that women in the regular mover group were more likely than
the low-poverty movers to have given and received most
types of material and some types of non-material aid (e.g.,
cash, clothing, transportation, housing, and babysitting). The
regular movers and low-poverty movers did not differ in their
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receipt of emotional social support, however, nor was either
group socially isolated.
Some might argue that by not exchanging as much material aid with their networks as the regular mover group, the lowpoverty movers may be better able to reserve their resources
in such a way that fosters upward mobility. The low-poverty
movers themselves often expressed how moving allowed them
to escape the constant exchange of support that characterized
many of the projects and communities in which they had once
lived. They also were more likely to reside in areas we rated as
high in child supervision, seemed to experience less conflictual relations with their neighbors (especially over children's
behavior), and exhibited more trust in others than the regular
movers-all of which indicate stronger collective efficacy at
the neighborhood level. While it may appear to be a contradiction that the low-poverty movers have lower exchange levels
relative to regular movers yet report higher levels of informal
supervision and community trust, it is not, as these are different types of indicators. One's exchange patterns may be among
people who may or may not be neighbors, and it is possible for
communities to hold norms that do not include expectations of
regular (and perhaps draining) exchange, but do entail looking
out for one another and trust.
By and large, we have taken the stance that these different
types of moves (low-poverty versus regular public housing
policies) affected the respondents' ties and access to social
capital. Essentially, we have two groups of families with similar
basic demographic characteristics, yet differing levels of individual social support and, to a lesser degree, neighborhoodlevel social capital, specifically collective efficacy. We make the
claim that moving to a low-poverty area and living there for at
least one year may have impacted these social resources. Some
research (e.g., Carol Stack's All Our Kin), however, indicates
that being deeply immersed in resource-poor social exchange
networks might actually discourage residential mobility.
Thus, those who are already disengaged from long-standing
social ties and support networks may be those more willing
to move. While we cannot definitively dismiss this alternative
explanation for some of our findings, we do know from other
MTO research that no significant differences exist between
those in the experimental group who used their voucher and
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those who did not in terms of having friends or family in the
neighborhood at random assignment, though there were other
differences, as described previously (Clampet-Lundquist &
Massey, 2008). Additional research that can elucidate comprehensively how social ties and support interact with one's willingness to move is certainly needed, as are studies that can
address the issues of causality that these analyses cannot.
Rarely did either the regular or low-poverty movers have
a close tie that they made from their current neighborhoods
and many (particularly the regular movers) distrusted those
living around them (and others generally). Perhaps housing
mobility program counselors might help foster connections
among movers and other residents, so that those relocating
might leverage better opportunities. Recent research from a
second Gautreaux mobility program suggests that landlords
might also help their tenants "integrate socially into the neighborhood" and that a "friendly neighbor or a helpful landlord
served as a point of entry into the neighborhood network"
(Boyd, Edin, Duncan, & Clampet-Lundquist, 2010, pp. 132,
136). In addition, our findings on how the respondents made
their close ties suggest that neighborhood activities, programs,
and routines that bring individuals together repeatedly over
time can provide an avenue for individuals to forge ties to
others. Thus, as recent work by Mario Small (Small, Jacobs, &
Massengill, 2008; Small, 2006) suggests, community organizations, such as childcare centers, may offer a way to enhance the
social networks and resources of relocated families. While certainly more research is needed on these potential mechanisms
for social tie formation, post-relocation counseling that includes information on local activities, institutions, and groups
(e.g., churches, recreation centers, block associations, childcare
centers), as well as incentives to participate, seems prudent.
As the next wave of studies on relocated families commence, we hope that researchers pay particular attention not
only to what changes families experience over time, but also
to how they understand these changes and what they see as
important to their lives and those of their families. As our
findings indicate, what may on the surface appear as a negative outcome (loss of social support) may not be perceived as
such by those involved. By approaching research in this way,
perhaps, we can be in a better position to advocate for housing
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policies that meet the needs of some of our most vulnerable
families and improve their well-being.
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Book Reviews
William W. Eaton, Ed., Public Mental Health (2012). Oxford,
Oxford University Press. $89.99 (hardcover).
Mental and behavioral health disorders account for only a
modest proportion of national health expenditures, but they
constitute an enormous public health problem, contributing to
much suffering, community burden, disability, and increased
mortality. Attention over the years has focused on an individual approach. A broader public health approach is needed with
thoughtful attention to social, environmental and biomedical
determinants. This volume represents the first comprehensive
effort to present such a perspective.
The book, edited by William Eaton, an eminent researcher
and Professor and Chair of the Department of Mental Health
of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and
his colleagues, includes eighteen chapters covering these important disorders, methods, descriptive epidemiology, risk
mechanisms, the relevant service systems and prevention and
future directions. This collection is unusual in its inclusion of
the efforts of some 48 researchers from this unique and outstanding research-oriented department, and thus is more integrated than one typically finds. The authors' discussions,
spanning issues from genetics and the brain to world mental
health systems, is evidence-based and sophisticated, inclusive of research well beyond the United States, and sensitive
to uncertainties and gaps in our knowledge. The treatment of
issues is predominantly population-based with serious efforts
to provide reviews of the best epidemiological studies and
analyses in the world literature. This volume is an enormous
effort and any reader will come away learning a great deal.
It undoubtedly will be an important inspiration and reference
source for years to come.
In this short review, I can only briefly communicate the
content of the many excellent chapters by choosing some
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, December 2012, Volume XXXIX, Number 4
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examples to convey the scope of this volume. The book begins
with a chapter by Eaton and colleagues' examining the prevalence of some 17 disorders, estimated on the basis of numerous
studies, and illustrating the large cumulative burdens, especially those resulting from autism, major depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, dementia, and personality disorder.
Paul McHugh, a brilliant psychiatrist, and for many years chair
of Johns Hopkins psychiatry department, presents an astute
critique of the limitations of DSM, its checklist atheoretical approach and the need for an alternative conceptualization structured around etiological pathways. Two excellent chapters introduce students to epidemiological and quantitative methods
particularly relevant to a public health orientation. Similarly, a
chapter by Zandi and colleagues provides an excellent primer
for social work students introducing them to the importance of
genetics, a topic typically neglected among non-medical practitioners. But the social receives its due attention with thoughtful chapters on the importance of social forces including SES,
race and ethnicity, marital status and urban living, stress and
the life course, and adaptation.
For the social work practitioner, the section on the services
system is especially valuable. I particularly liked the chapter
by Mojtabai and colleagues on pathways to care and assessing need. Ron Manderscheid and colleagues do their usual
excellent job in bringing together important data on services
and costs. In the final chapter, Leaf and colleagues do a nice
job of reviewing the important challenges ahead, addressing
such important issues as enhancing population resilience, advancing the current focus on recovery, better increasing coordination and integration of services, and implementing the
Affordable Care Act that offers many opportunities to greatly
improve mental health services.
From the perspective of social work students, the book's
strengths also pose some limitations. In its broad coverage and
extraordinary detail, it offers more an encyclopedic coverage
to dip into for illumination on specific topics than an integrated story line to inform practice and policy. Thus it should be
in every serious social work library but may not be the most
successful text for all but the most advanced students. The
authors deserve our appreciation for a masterful volume that
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will do much to advance understanding of mental health as an
essential public health challenge.
David Mechanic, Institutefor Health, Health Care Policy and
Aging Research, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey

Susan Chandler & Jill B. Jones, Casino Women: Courage in
Unexpected Places (2011). New York: Cornell University
Press. $29.95 (hardcover).
Chandler and Jones' Casino Women: Courage in Unexpected
Places describes a chapter in labor history that has yet to be
fully explored: how women in the lowest rungs of highly
profitable service organizations, many of them immigrants,
have overcome the odds, fought for their rights in the workplace, and often won. Chandler and Jones signal early on that
their book is "hopeful," rather than bemoaning the sad state
of union density (roughly 7% in the private sector according
to 2011 Bureau of Labor Statistics figures) or the exploitation and injustices experienced by immigrants in the Western
states in the lower rungs of the labor market. They focus on
how organizing has transformed the lives of a largely female
workforce both on and off the job. Organizing in "company
towns" has shaped U.S. labor history and the consciousness
of union members, their families and communities. Like mill
workers in Lawrence and Lowell Massachusetts, meat-packers in Wisconsin and Illinois, steel workers in Pittsburgh, auto
workers in Detroit, and clerical workers at Yale University
in New Haven, Connecticut, casino workers in Nevada gain
power in numbers through their pivotal role-as exploited
workers, essential fuel for the engine of the local economy, and
members of immigrant and/or minority populations trying to
gain a foothold in the U.S.
Casino Women is the product of ten years of talking to women
mainly in Nevada about their lives and experiences as casino
workers in highly unionized Las Vegas and barely unionized
Reno. Workers from other casinos in nearby Indian reservations and Lake Tahoe also contributed. The authors' methods
included: interviews with workers and union activists (many
with the Culinary Workers Union); focus groups with former
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casino workers, social service and health professionals, and
other community representatives; key informant interviews;
and site visits to workplaces, union halls, and a wide variety of
community spaces. The results of this thorough, longitudinal
approach exceed "data triangulation" in qualitative research
studies; Chandler and Jones create a deep context for understanding the women's lives they explore and the casino industry that dominates the state and local communities.
The story of Casino Women unfolds over 5 parts; the first
describes the "back of the house, front of the house" divide
through the voices of the largely immigrant women of the
housekeeping, kitchen, and laundry departments in the "back
of the house," and the young, mainly white, cocktail waitresses in the "front of the house." Part II tells the story of union
women, including the compelling story of grassroots union
organizing among African Americans propelled by the civil
rights movement, and the shift when the "back of the house"
jobs came to be dominated by new immigrants from Latin
America. Part III describes the struggles of nonunion women
to fight for rights in the workplace, and the personal transformations that blossomed, even when struggles failed to bear
fruit. Part IV brings us to the casino floor through the story
of dealers at the "dead center of the casino industry, where
money is transferred from players' hands to the coffers of the
gaming corporations;" despite their position at the "top of the
non-managerial pyramid," dealers work under stressful surveillance and a cloud of tobacco smoke. Finally, Part V explores
the position of women in management; ironically, a step up the
career ladder often comes with a high price tag, including poor
job security, reduced time for other life pursuits, and-most
important for the story that Chandler and Jones are developing-loss of space for resistance and solidarity, as female managers must become compliant partners in the lean and mean
corporate world.
Through stories such as the 6 year strike at Frontier Hotel
and Casino, where immigrant workers drew on their experiences of hardship to stay the course and ultimately win, the
history of organizing among African American women like
Sarah Hughes, who began her career as a night maid at the
Desert Inn casino and went on to become a central figure in
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the labor and civil rights movements that built the Las Vegas
Culinary Workers Union, and the story of Edna Harman, a pit
boss and recovering alcoholic who discovers the Maryknoll
sisters and a commitment to social justice in central America
and then returns to help central American casino workers,
Chandler and Jones build on 3 key themes: the personal transformations experienced by women who take on the power of
the gaming industry, the enormous contributions of the union
in improving the lives of casino workers (especially compared to non-union counter parts), and the "consequences
of silence"-the price paid by those who remain compliant.
Throughout the writing, the narrative replaces the glitzy image
of Nevada casinos with the reality of those who work and live
in its communities.
Health and safety have always been key union organizing issues, but service sector work has generally been seen
as less hazardous than industrial work. Casino Women challenges these perspectives and provides concrete examples of
health and safety hazards to workers: housekeepers' back and
knee injuries, cocktail waitresses' foot injuries and sexual harassment experiences, and dealers' exposure to second-hand
smoke (which has been outlawed in most other public spaces).
These serious health and safety hazards "embody" the exploitation of casino workers. By including these experiences, the
authors make an important contribution to the study of health
and safety for service workers.
Some readers might take issue with the hopeful perspective that the book takes. Casino workers describe the "disgusting" environment of the casinos and the devastating effects on
the often "desperate" clientele that frequent them. Chandler
and Jones focus on the empowerment of those who find their
true work in the union and sense of community from their coworkers. While the role of casino worker activists extends to
concrete improvements to the community (better standard of
living, union sponsored education programs, access to health
care), it is disturbing that casino workers toil in the service of
an essentially destructive industry.
Chandler and Jones are both social work professors at
the University of Reno Nevada (Jones emeritus), who bring
a "person in environment" perspective to their analysis. In

188

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

particular, the use of social workers as key informants is novel
and enlightening, and recognizes the unique perspective that
social workers can bring to analyzing how public issues result
in private troubles. Historians, public health researchers, and
sociologists should take note of this under-utilized source of
information and perspective. This book is well-written and
straight forward with a natural use of quotes. The time spent
on writing and data gathering shines through, and the voices
of the participants ring clear and true. It is refreshing to encounter a book that takes on the themes of globalization and
neoliberalism without resorting to jargon.
This book should be read by those interested in labor and
women studies, community organizing, and occupational
health and safety in the service sector. It would also make a
great addition to the social work curriculum as a model of
how the social work perspective can be embodied by a qualitative research methodology and as a text which shows how the
adage "the personal is political" still resonates.
Jennifer Zelnick, Touro College GraduateSchool of Social Work.

Carol Lynn McKibben, Racial Beachhead: Diversityand Democracy
in a Military Town (2012). Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press. $24.95 (paperback).
A number of texts have examined and deconstructed the
history of twentieth century race relations in America, from
broad sweeping views of the politics of racial relations, like
Gerstle's 2001 American Crucible:Race and Nation in the Twentieth
Century, to more regional or focused accounts of racial politics
and community change (Bayor's 2000 Race and the Shaping of
Twentieth Century Atlanta and Bernstein's 2011 Bridges ofReform:
InterracialCivil Rights Activism in Twentieth-century Los Angeles).
One largely unexamined piece of this history is the role of military towns in the transformation of race relations in American
society. Here historian Carol McKibben makes her contribution to the literature, using a variety of sources and documents
to lay out the history of race relations, politics, and progress in
the town of Seaside, California, the former location of the Fort
Ord military base. In this work, she seeks to tell the story of
how a small military community in Northern California was
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able to establish a peaceful, racially integrated society when so
many others have failed in these attempts. In a turn from other
accounts of federal civil rights policies, McKibben illustrates
how one arm of the government-the military-promoted
racial integration in this small coastal community.
The author begins by describing the founding of the town
of Seaside in 1917, a community nestled close to the popular
tourist destinations of Monterey and Carmel in Southern
California. In presenting this history, Seaside is situated in a
larger economic and demographic context of the California
coast. The next chapter focuses on the demographic transformation of Seaside during the period of the 1930s and 1940s.
The author traces how the influx of military personnel drove
the residents to incorporate as a city. During this period, the
residents experienced a clash between federal housing policies that enforced segregation and the needs of the military to
house its high ranking black officers on par with others. Other
ethnic and cultural groups also settled in the area during this
time, including many groups of Asian Americans, as well as
migrants from Mexico. With initial periods of some disarray,
all of these groups managed to settle into a largely integrated
society.
Chapters three and four trace the major post-war developments in Seaside in regard to race relations. She describes how
local Seaside leaders were able to take advantage of government efforts to desegregate housing to redevelop major parts
of the city. At that time, the politics of the city continued to
actualize racial integration in economic, political, and social
spheres. For example, city records show that the city council
was racially diverse and, surprisingly, its citizens did not vote
for local officers along racial lines. McKibben argues in chapter
four that the common bond of the military shaped the identity
of the community more so than color or ethnic lines.
Lastly, Chapters five and six delve into the decades of
the 1980s and 1990s, which ushered economic crisis, crack
cocaine, and rampant crime into the major California cities of
Los Angles, San Francisco, and Oakland, but none of which
had a dramatic impact on Seaside. Yet by the end of the 1990s,
Fort Ord had shut down and the population demographics
changed dramatically. As McKibben's central argument is that
the military culture facilitated racial integration with a unified
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identity she likewise documents the struggle with race and
culture that ensued after Fort Ord's closure.
The author's carefully crafted history of Seaside offers a
glimpse into an untold story of racial integration and harmony
on nearly all levels of this unique community. The strength of
the work is in the careful historical analysis and use of a variety
of sources to bring to life this hidden coastal town that represented great racial progress in practice. On the other hand, the
idealism invoked by this account of Seaside leaves the reader
to wonder at times if this sense of racial integration was experienced by all groups and parties involved. With such diversity as Southern African Americans, West Coast Whites, and
Mexican migrants, it would make sense that there would be
several layers of cultural and racial misunderstandings or missteps. Nevertheless, by placing the developments of this community within a larger social and political context, the author
most certainly contributes to a greater understanding of race
relations in the twentieth century and the role of the military
in facilitating racial integration.
Laura S. Abrams, Department of Social Welfare,
University of California,Los Angeles

Robert Sampson, GreatAmerican City: Chicago and the Enduring
Neighborhood Effect (2012). Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press. $27.50 (hardcover).
Chicago, according to Robert Sampson, is "arguably the
quintessential American city" that "captures the full range
and intensity of American passions" (p. 76). In Great American
City, Sampson, currently a member of Harvard's sociology
department and formerly at the University of Chicago, shows
how Chicago embodies important components of political,
social, economic and cultural histories and continues to serve
as a great laboratory for urban research. His 'interrogation'
of Chicago's neighborhoods and communities advances our
knowledge of how social space and place are intertwined with
physical space. Early on, he argues that "differentiation by
neighborhood is not only everywhere to be seen, but that it
has durable properties-with cultural and social mechanisms
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of reproduction-and with effects that span a wide variety of
social phenomena" (p. 6). In arguing for a holistic approach
to urban research he abandons a reductionist, individuallyfocused perspective, promoting a structural and cultural analysis instead. He admits to being a structural determinist (p.
63) but argues that individuals matter, too. By discussing how
structural forces, including urban planning and politics, affect
and shape Chicago's neighborhoods, Sampson advances the
field of urban sociology.
Sampson's findings are based on research spanning eight
years (1994-2002). His Chicago Project grew from the Project on
Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN).
The methodology included thousands of extensive home interviews, a Community Survey, ethnographic observations
(Systematic Social Observations) in sample neighborhoods
clustered from 77 Chicago community areas, a Key Informant
Study, and an analysis of a Longitudinal Cohort Study.
Chapters 1-4 of the book provide a detailed history of how
the study grew out of an in-depth study on crime in Chicago,
the challenges (financial, size), and some of his personal biases
towards the subject. In Chapter 4, Sampson skillfully uses data
to argue that places are meaningful and are imbued with social,
political, economic and human histories that are durable.
Chapters 5-6 focus on various phenomena associated with
poverty, such as inequality and crime, while making the case
that "disadvantage is not encompassed in a single characteristic but rather is a synergistic composite of social factors" (p.
100). In chapters 7-8, the author argues that collective efficacy,
described as "social cohesion combined with shared expectations of social control" (p. 27) can help us understand and
predict neighborhood cohesiveness and civic engagement, as
well as crime and violence.
Chapters 10-14 provide solid analyses of structures, locations, boundaries, and the redistribution of poverty as poor
residents moved and various public housing projects were demolished, and discuss why some places prosper over others.
The final chapters discuss changes in Chicago's neighborhoods, including how neighborhood effects have remained
durable.
Sampson supports previous urban studies, such as those
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of Wilson, Massey and Denton, and Pattillo. He highlights the
consequences of racial residential segregation on neighborhood change and their impact on residents and shows that
social isolation, regardless of the source, reproduces conflict
and stratification in Chicago. Social differences are "pervasive,
strong, cross-cutting, and paradoxically stable even as they are
changing in a manifest form" (p. 6). Place and place boundaries, he shows, are meaningful and purposeful.
Given the book's strengths, some of Sampson's research,
language and discussion are problematic. Sampson is a criminologist, and his professional interests shape many of his
analyses and descriptions. Throughout the book, he judges
Chicago's neighborhoods through a criminologist's lens, and
suggests that life in these places is mainly about survival and
not living. Sampson's repeated mentions of crime and violence
situates Chicago neighborhoods along a crime-violence continuum. Although he proclaims to support a holistic approach
and focuses on structure while also acknowledging various
resource deficits in many of the neighborhoods, Sampson portrays Chicago neighborhoods as being dominated by crime and
dysfunction. Although the author acknowledges institutional
violence and its impact on the children and neighborhood wellbeing, his book falters as he repeatedly frames urban blackness alongside "disorganization," "disadvantage," "violence"
and "crime." Almost as an aside, Sampson suggests that this
is not his goal or intention. It would have proved useful had
he shared the characteristics of the neighborhoods he studied
beyond this deficit-focused framework. Additionally, Sampson
builds much of his argument around the theory of collective
efficacy, but factors such as resources, nutrition, the physical environments of schools, and racial social histories, were
too little discussed. These factors have significant imprints on
space and place. We must be mindful of Mills' admonishment
that we not lose sight of, but fully engage, biography, history,
and social structures in understanding our social world.
Gwendolyn Y. Purifoye, Department of Sociology,
Loyola University Chicago
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Melvin Delgado, Prisoner Reentry at Work: Adding Business to
the Mix (2012). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. $58
(hardcover).
That the U.S. prison population has skyrocketed in the
last 20 years has begun to be widely discussed among sociologists, legal scholars, practitioners, and even the public at large.
But the hard circumstances that former prisoner face when
they leave prison has been much less studied. This is Melvin
Delgado's concern, and he has written a relatively short book
(188 pages plus references) to highlight both the difficulties
that this population faces and two examples of programs that
are successful in providing ex-prisoners with community and
work while preventing recidivism. Delgado, a professor of
social work at Boston University, shows his compassion for
this denigrated population and shows that, given appropriate
supports, its members have or can develop skills to become
productive members of society.
The first three chapters of the book, Returning ExOffenders to Society, Community Reentry, and Employment
Issues, review the literature to document what is known about
the challenges facing prisoners who return to the "free world"
(a term not used in the book but one commonly found in criminology literature). Citing findings that, in 2006, about 713,000
prisoners were discharged from state and federal prisons and
that, at least in some states and provoked by the states' budget
crises, releases are being stepped up, Delgado documents the
many ways in which prisoners are unprepared to undertake
crime-free lives: rehabilitation, educational and vocational
training programs in prisons have all but disappeared; drug
addictions, very common among prisoners, and mental illnesses go untreated; and family ties have frequently attenuated. Then there are structural barriers to successful reentry:
federal laws make it unlawful for ex-felons to live in public
housing, even if their families reside there; private landlords
discriminate against them, too; there are restrictions against
receiving food stamps; legal barriers prevent former prisoners
from doing some kinds of work; ex-prisoners cannot vote in
many states; and employers pervasively refuse to hire anyone
with a prison record (easily researched online). And, because
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the great majority of prisoners are either African-American
or Hispanic, racism is an additional burden to reintegration
into society. The barriers to employment are described as the
principle reason that ex-prisoners fail. The predictable consequence is, too commonly, a return to crime and the prison.
Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to detailed and laudatory
descriptions of two innovative and forward-looking programs, Homeboy/Homegirl Industries and the Delancy Street
Foundation, respectively. Both of these organizations were
started in California by dynamic innovators whose approaches have established models of housing, skill development,
self-help, entrepreneurship, self-governance, and mutuality in
populations ignored by society in general and often given to
mistrust among themselves. Delgado appreciates the knowledge and skills that ex-prisoners either have or are capable
of developing, and his book is successful in giving them the
"voice" that he describes as being too generally ignored.
Chapter 6, only 5 pages long, entitled "Implications for
Practice," calls on professionals to adopt flexible and comprehensive approaches to working with former prisoners; he
again touts the success of the aforementioned social enterprises and suggests that they form the basis of a new, proactive
reentry approach.
The final chapter, 7, calls upon criminologists and the
helping professions to adopt a paradigm shift from viewing
ex-inmates as suffering from deficits to possessing assets that
only need to be tapped. The "strengths perspective" popular in
social work literature is thus to be applied to this population,
one that has been largely abandoned by social work. Research
in this field, similarly, should be informed by former prisoners themselves, a position maintained by the author that seems
both sensible and humane.
Prisoner Reentry at Work is most useful for students and
practitioners interested in knowing more about and working
with or developing programs for prison-leavers. It is not
without its flaws, however. The writing is often repetitious and
is frequently dominated by long quotes from other sources,
particularly from what seem to be promotional materials
of Homeboy/Homegirl Industries and The Delancy Street
Foundation. Of greater concern, the author provides almost no
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material about the role of public policy, except those (housing
restrictions, denial of public benefits, e.g.) that impede ex-prisoners' ability to survive outside of prison. A section entitled
"A Role for Government" consists of only two paragraphs that
concludes that the private sector cannot shoulder the burden
of reentry on its own. The two voluntary programs highlighted in the book are inspiring, but no empirical outcome data are
presented and, in any case, successful replications are unlikely.
More attention to what pro-active public policy for this significant population should look like would have strengthened the
book; this is a policy arena crying out for attention.
MargueriteG. Rosenthal, Emerita, School of Social Work,
Salem State University.
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